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About the Book
The methods discussed in this book cover how to estimate market sizes, prices and their 
interdependency. The book is for people who develop new products or services and want to 
evaluate their market potential or find ways to improve upon them to make them more successful. 
Just as a tool in a shop helps you transform materials into a desired object, this book helps you 
transform data or market observations into a useful understanding needed to evaluate new areas 
of business and increase your chances of success. Many of the largest business successes 
depended on the insight of people, who at the time they made the right decisions, may not even 
have verbalized to themselves why these were the right decisions—it just seemed right to them. 
This book will help you get a more explicit understanding thereby easing the task of making 
better decisions and communicate to others why they are the right decisions. The final decisions 
may not differ from what those few insightful people would have come up with, but knowing 
why they are the right decisions helps reduce the risk.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovation is the name of the game in many business sectors. Firms launch an ongoing stream of 
new products and keep exploring new business models in order to achieve growth in sales, profits 
and company value. An extensive literature focuses on ways to develop innovative products, 
markets and business models.1
Both among startups and established companies a significant percentage of the development 
projects lead to poor financial results. Mistakes can be costly, and sometimes leave even large 
companies in ruins.
While company executives hope their efforts will yield the desired 
results, the final verdict often lags until the market proves the innovators right or wrong.
2 Among the startups the odds are not good: 52 percent of all new businesses 
fail within the first four years.3
Making good decisions often depends on understanding the financial implications of the 
planned business activities. Although only one small step out of the entire business planning
cycle (
But what can be done to increase the chance of success?
Figure 1), it is a critical step. Too often the financial projections rely on experience and gut 
feelings. Experience is great when the new endeavor bears close resemblance to previous 
undertakings. Gut feeling approaches sometimes work well; after all, some of the most noticeable 
marketplace “winners” started because of gut feelings about the market. The problem is all those
times when it fails.
Figure 1. The business development cycle
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A successful business tends to give customers the tools they need to create value for themselves. 
This book follows the same philosophy; it is a user’s manual helping managers create value in 
their businesses. The future success of a business depends on its ability to create sustainable 
positive cash flows. If we have a tool relating management decisions to cash flows, we can 
evaluate different ideas before the fact and identify the most likely future winners. We can also 
use the understanding of the cash-generating mechanisms to design ideas that are likely to work 
or change existing plans so good technical ideas are more likely to lead to a business success. In
turn, that will improve the whole process of defining a business strategy.
This book addresses the problems associated with the experience and gut feeling approaches 
by developing a toolbox for analyzing profit opportunities in a systematic and quantitative or 
semi-quantitative manner. Just as a civil engineer through quantitative analysis shows that a 
proposed bridge design can withstand certain wind speeds, a manager should be able to show 
investors that a proposed business can withstand a certain level of market turbulence.
Many of us wish we could predict the future the way the Oracle in Delphi claimed to do it—
certainly it would be a good way to beat the market or always make the best decisions. One could 
argue that the future is to some degree bound by what exists today (infrastructure, humans, 
traditions), and predictable courses of development going forward from what exists. However, 
there will also always be an element of surprise, such as a really smart competitor, or a natural 
disaster. Therefore, those kinds of predictions may remain elusive phantoms.
What this book focuses on is different, namely questions of the kind, “If I (or somebody else) 
take a specific action, what might the likely range of outcomes be?” The action may be to 
introduce a new brand of shampoo. The result may be estimates of the financial impact it has for 
a specific company. We base these estimates on the assumption that historical data can tell us 
something useful about how humans may react in similar situations in the future.
A new product may have lots of features and there are many potential distribution channels, 
many different potential customers, many ways of marketing the product and many ways the 
competition may react. Therefore, estimating how the product will do in the market can seem like 
a very complex problem, and it is easy to drown in detailed information when we try to answer a 
few simple questions about market size and profitability. Looking at master pieces in art, science 
and engineering, precision is very important, but at the same time the problem has been 
simplified in a way so we do not get lost in irrelevant details. Actually too much detail can easily 
clutter the picture to a point that we can longer see what is important. We need to do the same 
here: simplify the clutter and create a very precise understanding of the essentials.
This book is based on a simple framework describing what drives positive cash flows. The 
approach provides a conceptual way of evaluating business opportunities and using past 
experience and data to estimate future results. It can be extended into models that provide 
estimates of future cash flows and the possibility of running quantitative what-if scenarios and
parameter optimization for the different strategies under consideration. Although the results may 
be quantitative, consider them only as approximations, not as a crystal ball giving future cash 
flows to the nearest cent. Even when not quantitative, the approach creates a useful framework 
identifying the different key variables driving corporate profits up or down.
Some authors argue that there is little meaning in attempting to arrive at accurate predictions 
given the inherent uncertainty in the marketplace.4 However, it is hard to find a venture capitalist 
Good work is simple and very precise
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who does not want to see future financial projections as part of the business plan or a corporate 
manager who says “yes” to a new project without any financial estimates. And there is a general 
trend toward using more quantitative methods in business.5
A variety of quantitative approaches are used today. Companies operating in well-established 
environments employ many tools for estimating the expected cash flows; from extrapolation of 
historical data or comparison to baseline figures obtained from best practice evaluations. And 
operations research gives us the tools to improve the efficiency in manufacturing, procurement 
and logistics.
As long as we understand the 
uncertainty of the projections we develop, the process of developing quantitative (or semi
quantitative) estimates can actually open our eyes to aspects otherwise easily overlooked.
6 While these tools can improve the corporate profits significantly, they are rarely 
used to form a new corporate strategy. One of the few cases where this took place was when the 
Canadian Pacific Railway changed its entire corporate strategy in the 1990s based on an 
operations research analysis. As a result of this, Canadian Pacific Railway saved several hundred 
million Canadian dollars and significantly improved customer satisfaction.7 Of course, the 
railway business is centered on logistics, where the operations research approach is essential, and 
it would be hard for businesses in most other sectors to replicate the company’s success. When it 
comes to less structured business problems the required mathematical modeling tools will have to 
be correspondingly more advanced (e.g., based on competitive biological systems)8
The approach used in this book is generic and transparent. Besides allowing for quantitative 
estimates, this book provides both a framework that can assist the reader in understanding why 
the results are the way they are. The book is especially useful when it comes to evaluating the 
market potential for new products where there are no relevant historical data and where the 
current customers cannot even imagine the product.
. These 
models may use complexity theory and other advanced math. While this approach adds a much-
needed quantitative dimension, it often includes some black-box component that is not 
transparent to the manager, and it is too complex to be practically usable by the majority of 
business practitioners.
9 For those products there is still a lot we can 
learn from historical sales data relating to other products because of the way customers repeat 
their logic, rationality and constraints to any purchase decision. By understanding that rationality 
it also becomes possible to understand why the adoption of a new product takes place the way it 
does—rather than just trying to calibrate empirical technology adoption curves.10
Besides facilitating business decisions, a rigorous approach helps communicate business 
decisions to both investors and employees. Lawyers can use the same tools to estimate foregone 
opportunities. The toolbox can also be used to evaluate the potential impact of specific risks. For 
example, what might the impact of a recession or a war be? Even for nonprofit organizations the 
method offers the opportunity to identify ways of creating the largest positive impact on a 
community with the least resources, in that case the profit is not measured in monetary units, but 
in impact.
1
Literature on radical innovation includes: Clayton M. Christensen & Michael E. Raynor, 2003, The Innovator’s Solution, 
Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth, Harvard Business School Press, 304 p. and W. Chan Kim & Renée Mauborgne, 
2005, Blue Ocean Strategy, How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant, Harvard 
Business School Press, 240 p.
2
Examples of projects that took major tolls on large corporations are Ford’s Edsel brand and Corning’s microphotonics work.
3
Jeffry A. Timmons, 1995, New Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship for the 21st Century, 4th edition, McGraw Hill College 
Division, Boston, MA., 815p.
4
Eric D. Beinhocker, 2001, Robust Adaptive Strategies, chapter 6, pp. 131-155 and Richard T. Pascale, 2001, Surfing the Edge 
of Chaos, Chapter 5, pp. 105-129 both in Michael A. Cusumano, & Constantionos C. Markides (eds.), 2001, Strategic 
Thinking for the Next Economy, MIT Sloan Management Review, Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Company, San Francisco, 317 p.
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Introduction 4
5
J. Doyne Farmer, Martin Shubik & Eric Smith, 2005, Is Economics the Next Physical Science, Physics Today, vol. 58, no. 9, 
pp. 37-42, September 2005.
6
Examples include: Raymond R. Mayer, 1982, Production and Operations Management, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New 
York, 654 p.; Alain Patchong; Thierry Lemoine & Gilles Kern, 2003, Improving Car Body Production at PSA Peugeot 
Citroën, Interfaces, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 36-49, Jan.-Feb. 2003; and Martin K. Starr, 1978, Operations Management, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 618 p. 
7
Phil Ireland, Rod Case, John Fallis, Carl Van Dyke, Jason Kuehn & Marc Meketon, 2003, Perfecting the Scheduled Railroad: 
Model-Driven Operating Plan Development, presentation at INFORMS conference on Creating Value in the Extended 
Enterprise, Phoenix, Arizona, 4-6 May 2003.
8
E. Bonabeau, 2002, Predicting the Unpredictable, Harvard Business Review, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 109-116, March 2002 and E. 
Bonabeau, M. Dorigo & G. Theraulaz, 1999, Swarm Intelligence: From Natural to Artificial Systems, Oxford University
Press, 288 p.
9
Justin Martin, 1995, Ignore Your Customer, Fortune Magazine, vol. 131, no. 8, pp. 121-126, 1 May 1995.
10 E.g., Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller & Frank Bass, 1990, New Product Diffusion Models in Marketing: A Review and 
Directions for Research, Journal of Marketing, vol. 54, pp. 1-26 and Johan Norton & Frank Bass, 1992, Evolution of 
Technological Generations: The Law of Capture, Sloan Management Review, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 66-77, Winter 1992.
5Chapter 2
Learning
Improving profits has its roots in our ability to learn. Good business decisions are often based on 
a combination of detailed knowledge about the market and intuitive foresight, making it 
impossible to replace a skilled business leader with a computer based decision system. But we 
can aid the leader by turning data into useful information. If we can increase, by a few percent,
the chances of success among the projects targeting new business opportunities, then that can be 
huge in terms of earnings. This is especially true for projects where large initial investments are 
justified by expected high subsequent margins, so the sunk cost will be high if the project is 
aborted after launch.
Many companies that quantify efficiency also become good at optimizing it. But quantifying a 
new business opportunity is harder and seldom done with precision. Most companies take a 
different approach to generating useful information when it applies to business decisions rather 
than engineering decisions. Had it been a company that was going to build an entirely new type 
of tire, it would probably have built a computer-based model of the tire and used that model to 
understand its performance and show where the tire might fail under extreme load and 
temperature conditions, even before constructing the first prototype. 
But the same company would most likely not build a model showing the market potential for 
the tire and under which extreme market conditions the business might fail. Why not? The tire 
obeys the laws of physics, and the properties of the materials used in constructing the tire are 
known, or can be experimentally determined. A business, on the other hand, is much more 
complex and less well understood. Business is to a large extent driven by human behavior, a 
behavior defined by people having individuality and often providing an element of surprise, so 
we lack the same cut-and-dried “laws of business” that could help us analyze new business 
opportunities. 
For new products, customer surveys often seem a great source of insight; however, it can be a 
challenge to survey customers in a way so we really get the information needed:11
However, it takes skills using historical data when it comes to new products. When products 
like the Post-It notes and the Palmtop were launched they did not replace any preexisting product, 
making an extrapolation of historical market data useless. However, people did have the needs 
that these products satisfy, but used other means of satisfying those needs, e.g. they might write a
reminder on their hand, or make a note in their calendar. When the new products were introduced 
they changed their spending pattern to include them in their purchases. So in order to predict the 
sales volume of an entirely new product yet to be introduced we cannot extrapolate historical 
data, but instead we need to use the historical data to reveal peoples motives and rationale for 
buying. The problem of analyzing and optimizing business opportunities can be addressed in 
It is easy to 
identify “average” wishes or what people in general think somebody in the market might want, 
but they may not reflect the desires of any “real” customer. It is also easy to find value drivers
that people would like themselves; however, when it comes to paying for them, they realize that 
their dreams are larger than their pockets. Therefore, historical market data may be more reliable. 
The statements here may not apply equally much to industrial markets where customers often 
work with well-defined budgets and purchasing procedures; here a customer survey may be more 
“reliable.”
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different ways depending on how complex the problem is and how different it is from our past 
experience (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Methods of analysis
For simple problems (Figure 2, area A) we have quite a selection of tools available, from already 
tried “recipes” to interpolation between historical data points. If we have well-established 
theories or adequate amounts of data available we may be able to develop a model that can be 
used to estimate what we would like to know. Today, modeling is extensively used as a basis for 
developing and improving manufacturing processes. It is also finding an increasing role in 
business processes development and decision making as well. For example, operations 
researchers use linear programming to optimize logistics or work scheduling.
In some situations people seek to launch a me-too business or make a variation of a product that 
the company has been manufacturing different incarnations of the last 50 years. In these cases the 
complexity of the problem is high, but it resembles closely problems that have been solved in the 
past (
Experience Method
Figure 2, area B). Under those circumstances, learning from past successes and failures is 
often the way to go and there are good reasons for the widespread usage of business case studies 
and best practice compilations.
Experience is the art of the skilled operator, and the judgment by the savvy business 
manager. Experience- and intuition-based approaches prove useful in complex environments with 
extensive variability and little data. It is taught through apprentices and case studies, but to be 
successful the practitioner often needs a feel for the problem and intelligence that cannot easily 
be documented or replicated. A real challenge is that it is easy and tempting to draw conclusions 
based on one irrelevant data point, such as a case study from a company that might have 
superficial resemblances to the problem at hand. It is not that experience from a steel mill bears 
no relevance in a hospital or Internet company environment; the problem is to know what aspects 
of that experience should or should not be applied in the new environment. These approaches 
leave it up to the user’s cognitive abilities to generalize them in a manner that allows them to be 
Major
B. Experience method.
Case studies, best 
practice, theories of 
management
A. Modified “recipes”, interpolation or extrapolation 
of historical data, simple models
C. Guesses, theory, 
black box models or 
theory-structured 
learning
Complex
Simple
Minor
Scope of Change
P
ro
b
le
m
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Learning 7
successfully applied to different situations. Some may even limit our ability to step outside the 
boxes they define.
Best-practice studies can establish what is best-in-class, measure a company’s performance 
relative to the best competitors, show how others have managed to get there and use ideas from 
similar businesses as a resource for designing improvements. Although it has been widely 
applied, the approach has clear shortcomings. First, there is no guarantee that the companies used 
to define the “baseline” are anywhere near peak performance, and the method is not good at 
supporting innovation that will leapfrog the competition. Second, it is not always possible to 
successfully implement the best practice methods in a company with a culture significantly 
different from the culture in which it originally developed. Third, it is harder for the employees to 
take ownership of and feel enthusiasm for methods that are being imported into the organization.
The real challenge comes when the scope of change is major and the complexity at the same time 
is high (
Major Change and High Complexity
Figure 2, area C). A very innovative product or a totally unproven business strategy
typically falls in this group: the complexity is high because of the many interrelated aspects that 
make up a business and its environment, and the change is large because it breaks with the 
existing ways of doing business. The easy way out is to say “a guess is the best we can do.” This 
argument could even be defended as some researchers argue that there is a minimal penalty for 
not using optimal game theory solutions, especially in complex competitive environments12 and 
other researchers find that profitability correlates negatively with extensive business data 
collection and processing.13 Some authors14 argue that theory, not data, can help us analyze 
problems that differ significantly from what we know, in particular radical innovation. However, 
theory without data gives only qualitative results. Qualitative results can be useful in many 
situations: in terms of evaluating projects they may, for example, identify one alternative that is 
better than another.15
The huge quantities of data that are becoming available from business and government sources 
can be impossible for a human brain to digest in an unbiased manner without the aid of 
mathematical procedures. Identifying patterns and trends exclusively based on data may take its 
beginning with simple regression analysis, but there are many other and more advanced methods.
Some of the data-based models are black-box models with inputs (e.g., product characteristics 
and marketing investments), outputs (e.g., sales), and some empirical relationships that relate 
inputs to outputs. The empirical relationships could be developed using artificial intelligence or 
neural networks to identify which inputs are relevant and which type of equations would be 
suitable approximations. Experiments using this approach on business problems turned out to 
yield good results for simple problems, but often poor results when the systems were complex in 
nature. Even with very large data sets there still was not sufficient data available to build solid 
models for the more complex problems. The “shortage” of data is, however, generally the rule 
rather than the exception. Besides that, if there is “sufficient” data for the more complex business 
problems, the quantity of data becomes so overwhelming it’s a challenge to manage and process. 
But what if none of the alternatives are worth pursuing? In order to answer 
that question it is necessary to derive results that tie directly into the financial projections, which, 
of course, are quantitative in nature. And quantitative relationships build upon data.
Another major drawback of this method is that it often adds little to our understanding: while a
correlation (e.g. good r2 in linear regression) is a good way of describing the data, it tells us little 
about any possible underlying cause-effect relationships. That X and Y has a high correlation 
coefficient, does not mean that Y depends on X, as there may be a common cause influencing 
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both X and Y. However, in order for us to make predictions about the future we need to identify 
the underlying cause-effect relationships. We can do that in various ways: (1) perform controlled 
experiments, (2) use statistical methods where we first assume all possible relationships, and then 
subsequently prove that all but a few are not significant or (3) use prior cause-effect knowledge 
proven independently – here referred to as theory-structured learning. The third approach makes 
a lot of sense because it reduces the need for data, and we do not need to rediscover what is 
already known.
Malcolm Gladwell looks at a human’s ability to under certain circumstances make amazingly 
accurate decisions based on brief first impressions.
Theory-Structured Learning
16 Some of his observations have direct 
implications for analyzing business opportunities for new products. First, you may be able to find 
more truth about people by observing them than by asking them about themselves.17 The lesson 
from that is that customer surveys and focus groups, no matter how much effort people make 
toward being honest, may not predict actual future purchase behaviors. However, observing what 
they do today may be a predictor for how they will react tomorrow, even when faced with an 
entirely new product. Secondly, it is possible to make accurate assessments based on a short time 
of observation (small data sample) if you know the important few things to look for.18
Dealing successfully with large changes in an unstructured environment (
The
general relationship models tell us what to look for and when we are equipped with that, it is 
possible for us to extract meaningful learning from an incomplete data set.
Figure 2-C) can be 
approached either from an experience base (Figure 2-B) or by taking an analytical approach 
(Figure 2-A). While distinctly different at first sight, the two approaches become increasingly 
similar as more advanced methodologies are employed (Figure 3). Gladwell gives an example of 
a researcher who started out building a mathematical model to make forward predictions and 
eventually became so familiar with the subject that he could make those predictions out of his 
head, thereby taking a cognitive approach to something that started as a math-based model. 
However, people new to the field could not, and the model was a necessary learning tool.19
Figure 3. Levels of analysis in the Experience and the Modeling methods. Each step down 
will normally include aspects of all of the steps above it
Step-by-step recipes
Cognitive
Best practice replication
Advanced models, including 
neural network models
Empirical models
Law based models 
Digested case studies
Theory-structured learning
Experience method Analytical method
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Analyzing business opportunities is almost like driving a car. It is an ongoing process from the 
beginning of the trip to the end; not at any given moment is the attention removed from the road. 
Initially we learn the rules of the road (theory, model), but eventually they are embodied in our 
driving habits to a point that we take the correct decisions even without thinking about it. 
Observations about the road conditions and other drivers (data) are constantly being gathered,
structured and interpreted based on the theory.
The art of business analysis often boils down to identifying patterns of relevance based on a 
confusing mess of individual observations about companies, markets, technologies and so on. 
Fundamentally, it resembles the job of an artist presenting selected aspects of reality in a painting 
or a physicist deriving a general equation based on numerous laboratory experiments. The 
“patterns” identified by the business analyst, the artist and the physicist all put us in a better 
position for understanding the world around us, and making better decisions about what to do 
next. Above we discussed pattern identification based on data or preexisting theory. In theory-
structured learning both are combined, often leading to superior results. Cherkassky & Mulier 
argue that in order to identify causality we need both.20
Figure 4
In theory-structured learning we use prior 
knowledge about the general relationships to make the most out of the data available. One could 
argue that it is force fitting data to a model; however, one can equally well argue that it is a way 
of building on what we already know, to avoid having to discover everything over and over 
again. The learning process taking this approach is illustrated in . At an abstract level, 
theory-structured learning is not any different from the way humans learn: we receive 
information from the surroundings and, by combining that with our existing experience and 
reference framework, we derive new knowledge. Knowledge is like a value driver, formed 
through the combination of a need (a problem) and a solution to that need (relevant information
and data).
Figure 4. Schematics of the theory-structured learning process. The upper row of circles 
represents the actual systems, and the lower row represents what we know. The overlap 
between the upper and lower rows represents what is both known and relevant. The size of 
this overlap is critical to our ability to learn.
Learning machine minimizing the discrepancy
Predictive capabilities
Relevant 
input
Observed 
variables
Input generator
Actual 
relationships
Known 
functions
Actual 
outcome
Observed 
output
System Output
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The predictive capabilities will be limited by how much of the relevant data is known and by our 
knowledge of relationships (known and relevant functions). But even if our knowledge was 
complete we cannot expect a totally precise and unequivocal answer because there is always the 
chance of someone doing something unexpected which may even be totally irrational. In that 
respect business is like quantum mechanics, even if we knew everything about the past we cannot 
accurately predict the future – all what we can do is provide a probability distribution reflecting 
possible outcomes. But that is still very useful.
While the combination of theory and data often is the best overall solution, the question is what 
theory and which mathematical tools are most suitable for analyzing the financial viability of 
proposed business initiatives? As there are ample excellent books on data analysis, this book does 
not cover that aspect of the theory-structured learning process, but focuses instead on the theory 
aspect. 
Many theories are handicapped by using past business failures and successes to extract some 
basic “lessons learned” that would have given a business an advantage at that time, but 
unfortunately they often cannot reveal the lessons before the fact. An example of this is the 
concept of network externalities,21
The larger the deviation from status-quo, the more fundamental the theory needs to be in order 
to remain applicable. For example, looking at the growth of the cell phone market we can use 
theory (e.g., technology adoption models)
which did not catch on in the management literature until long 
after some businesses relied on it in their strategies. With the pace of business today, “old lessons 
learned” are like expired patents: they provide value to the society at large, but normally they do 
not offer much of a competitive advantage to leading-edge businesses.
22
 Customer budget constraints versus product cost and cost of ownership.
and data (historical cell phone sales) to estimate how 
it may evolve over the next few years. However, if we were looking to introduce the first wireless 
phone ever, we would need a much deeper understanding of a number of different factors 
determining the success or failure, including:
 The customer needs, including data on communication needs in different environments.
 Customer risk adverseness. A new product possesses a risk, but data from other launches of 
radical innovative products may help us map out customer risk tolerances.
 Marketing effectiveness. Here again we can learn from other new products launched.
So analyzing businesses that derive their competitive advantage from “breaking all the rules” can 
be a tall order. However, it is not impossible, because even if a business breaks the rules, the 
customers they serve are still humans, who react like humans, and we can seek to understand that. 
While many ways of formulating a fundamental, internally consistent and generally applicable 
theory exist, there may not be any single right or wrong way. In physics we find different 
theoretical descriptions of the same phenomenon, e.g., light may be treated as a wave or as a 
particle. Neither description is wrong; however, neither is complete. Much the same holds true 
for business. This book is one attempt to bring together ideas from a variety of different 
disciplines into a single framework suitable for analyzing the financial viability of new business 
Even if we knew everything about the past we cannot accurately 
predict the future
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opportunities. In cases where quantitative data are not available in sufficient quantities, it is still
possible to identify overall trends, and possibly quantify relative changes without developing 
exact numerical models. Independent of the specific approach taken, some rigor will benefit the 
accumulation and processing of information. The general process is illustrated in Figure 5, and a 
few of the areas discussed further in the remainder of this chapter.
Figure 5. Conceptual steps of building a profit model
Data and Knowledge
Knowledge management23
The value of the product or service will differ depending on the node, so we must determine 
the value in each node of interest; however, doing so can be a challenge. Associated with each 
node in the value net is a vector that describes its perception of values. As the information 
depends on the context, it is good to collect a broad range of context information and relate it to 
the vector. Semi-quantitative measures are often better than no measure at all. And quantitative 
results benefit from estimates of the uncertainty—which occasionally can be quite large.
and management information systems effectively capture and deliver 
knowledge and data of importance to the various parts of a business, but are rarely designed to 
support the type of work described in this book. Likewise government statistics often include 
useful data that cannot be used as-is. This book is not about knowledge management or 
management information systems. However, a few of the issues directly related to quantitative 
data needed to evaluate profit opportunities are addressed.
Define objectives: e.g., maximize profits and 
constraints, e.g., capital limits. Establish a metric 
for quantifying success.
Define value net interaction to be investigated.
Gather, structure and clean data. Also, quantify 
non-quantitative information. Map the value net.
Based on the relationships and data identified, go through iterative steps building a model that explains 
historical patterns. Try different variables and different models to achieve a good match with the data. 
Calculate uncertainties. Test model against data that were not used in building the model. Evaluate potential 
effect of errors or uncertainty in any of the variables.
Use the model to explore different scenarios, optimize price-volume. Use as input in the strategy forming 
process and support the decision making.
Identify general theory, e.g. the profit-loss equation 
from this book.
Preparation:
Modeling:
Application:
Test for robustness and sensitivity.
Testing and validation:
Problem definition:
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There may be variables we intuitively know are important but have no quantitative data on. In 
those cases we can incorporate empirical sub-models based on our experience and intuition or we 
can create pseudo-variables by assigning arbitrary numbers to different levels, e.g., rating brand 
equity on a scale 0-10.
While well-established businesses over the years gradually developed a tradition for how to 
gather and process information, this tradition may not be well aligned with today’s needs. How to 
establish a system for collecting and processing information is particularly pertinent during the 
formation of a new venture or the creation of a new product where data and knowledge growth is 
particularly rapid. 
Modeling
After the information has been collected, structured and analyzed, we can turn to the usages 
described in this book. With robust models or at least well-structured knowledge, we can draw 
conclusions and support the creation of ideas. A note of caution: if a parameter is left out of a 
model it is de facto assumed to be “average.” For example, in the case of the smart fortwo
(Chapters 12-13) the number of dealers was much smaller than for the average car, and it was not 
until dealers were included in the model that the results became realistic. Therefore, the lack of 
certain data (the upper part of the top left circle in Figure 4) can sometimes cause considerable 
problems.
Testing and Validation
We can run sensitivity analysis at different levels. The easiest is to investigate the effect of 
errors/variations in the various input parameters. If we develop quantitative models, the data 
might not only be the basis for developing the model, but data not used in defining the models 
can be used for testing the validity of the models. Often we can build more than one model 
describing the same problem, and by comparing results from these different models we can get a 
feeling for how far off the results may be by adopting a given model and how robust the models 
are. 
A general problem for all methods is how to ensure that the validity of the conclusions extends 
beyond the limited historical data on which they are based. A few precautions can be taken:
 All historical data sets should include metadata covering key characteristics of the “setting” 
or environment. It will never be exhaustive, but should enable the user to acquire a “feel” 
for the setting from which the case studies or data originate.
 Look at the variables that in turn influence the parameters in question. If sales depend on 
TV commercials, do not look only at target audience and stations, time of week and 
programs this audience watches but also determine why the viewers look at those times and 
why they like those programs. In that way even changes in TV consumption patterns 
among the target audience can be anticipated.
 Be open to selecting or reselecting new key parameters. A preconceived notion of what is 
going to be important can be dangerous.
 Generalize to see the more fundamental patterns. For example, consumer purchasing 
patterns may be governed by basic physiological behavioral patterns. If these “laws” can 
become part of the model, it is significantly safer to extrapolate into unknown territory.
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Chapter 3
Value Nets
The value chain follows the flow of goods/services one way and the flow of money the other 
way. The value net24
When Harley-Davidson decided to support clubs for their customers,
also includes all the constituencies that directly or indirectly influence the 
creation or destruction of value of products or services delivered by the business. For example, a 
friend of the customer, who is influencing the customer’s purchasing decisions, is part of the 
value net but not the value chain. 
25
Each constituency in the business landscape is here regarded as a node in the value net. The 
same node often plays multiple roles, e.g. as a customer, a competitor, a supplier and an 
influencer. First order nodes interact directly with us, such as our customers. Second order nodes
are the next step out, e.g., the bank that a customer gets a loan from to buy our product. A study 
of factors responsible for driving General Motors (GM) Company’s stock prices
they recognized how 
customer-to-customer relationships could at the same time enhance the value of its products.
Only recently have we discovered some of the fundamental characteristics of value nets, in part 
thanks to the Internet where the number of nodes is large and the transaction costs low, creating 
extreme forms of value nets. However, the fundamentals of the value net apply equally well to a
seventeenth century blacksmith as to an Internet company.
26 revealed the 
significance of the interest rate on car loans. Originally, car loans were offered by banks that are
second order nodes; however, GM realized the importance this has to the purchase decisions by 
car buyers and decided to offer in-house financing like some of the other car makers. Effectively 
GM restructured the value net by acquiring the functionality of one of the second order nodes; it
ensured that complements (loans) necessary for success could be provided on the terms optimal 
for its business.
Figure 6. Three different value net configurations for milk processing
Figure 6 illustrates three different value nets associated with the processing of dairy products.
The value net to the left (A) is simple: the farmer sells milk to the dairy that processes it and then 
sells it to stores. While simple, that value net has a major drawback: the elasticity of demand is 
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different for different products, which means that an optimal solution for the dairy will limit
production of certain milk products. That in turn reduces demand for milk and consequently puts
some farmers out of business. As that is politically undesirable, the U.S. government influences
milk prices according to the usage of the milk27 Figure 6( -B), making it possible for the dairies to 
increase production of a wider range of products, thereby keeping more farmers in business and 
giving consumers the opportunity to increase their consumption of milk based products.
However, the prices have less to do with free market prices, and there is little natural regulation 
in that market. A third alternative (Figure 6-C) was used in Denmark around 1900 where about 
80 percent of the total milk was processed by co-op dairies owned by the farmers.28
The health care value nets are configured differently in different countries. In some places the 
decision makers (doctors and patients) are separated from the nodes paying the bills (health 
insurance company), giving them limited incentives to save (
In that value 
net the interest of the dairy coincided with the interest of the farmers, and the dairy would set the 
pricing of the products so they would benefit the farmers, rather than merely making the dairy 
most profitable. The drawback of this value net is that the small coop dairies close to the local 
farmers were not competitive against large commercial dairies.
Figure 7-A). In other countries the 
health insurance, doctors, and hospitals are bundled into one node, like a public health care 
system, leaving pharmaceutical companies and patients with less power (Figure 7-B). The latter 
value net certainly makes it easier to manage cost, and could lead to taking a more proactive 
stance on keeping people healthy. But there are fewer incentives to keep waiting lists down.
Figure 7. Two health care related value nets
Even in case of the most stable businesses, new surprise nodes may pop up in the value nets. The 
Inuits in Greenland had been selling seal skin for centuries through the Royal Greenlandic Trade
(KGH) when Greenpeace initiated a campaign against the killing of seals. With this new node
influencing their customer’s customers, the Inuits found their market dwindling. They used to 
hunt the seals for both skin and meat, so now they just hunted them for the meat, leaving the un-
sellable skins on the shores. Without the income from the skin trade they could not afford
traveling so far on their hunting trips, which led to an increase in the consumption of imported 
food and an increase in the seal population. The growing seal population represented a node in 
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the value net of the people fishing: the seals reduced the amount of fish in the sea along the 
Greenlandic coast to a point that it was difficult to maintain the volume of fish caught by the 
people fishing—and some of them started killing seals just to keep the population down and the 
fish population up. This example illustrates how a remote node (Greenpeace) in the value net had 
a major impact on the business of both seal hunters and the people fishing.
Sometimes we cannot associate a node with a specific person or entity; for example, we may 
not know who contributed to a charitable fund that helped us, but it is still important to identify 
the anonymous donor as a node. Not every node represents even a human or a human 
organization, but they could be crop-eating insects or a severe hurricane.
One “customer segment” we often overlook is the ones who do not buy.29
While some value net changes, like the appearance of a new competitor, often are beyond the 
control of the company, other changes result from conscious decisions by management. It could 
be the decision to outsource or introduce a two-tier supplier structure. It is often possible to 
“invite” new nodes in or “exclude” existing nodes from the value net. We may, for example,
invite a provider of complementary services in by creating a mutually beneficial customer referral 
program and joint promotions. Or we can exclude nodes, e.g., by setting the price so certain
customers no longer can afford the offerings.
We may spend 
money on ads targeting them and they may provide us with valuable feedback and understanding 
of problems in the current business, so they are an important part of the value net, yet just 
because they do not create a monetary income they are too often ignored.
The further away in the value net a node is, the less we know about it, and the harder it is to 
influence. Many of the distant parts of the value nets originated from moves by competition,
customers and government. Unfortunately, much of the value for any business is created in these 
more distant parts of the value net, and long-term success will depend on reaching these parts. 
Furthermore, some of the most successful businesses have induced radical changes in the entire 
value net through the design of entirely new value constellations. Especially, successful launches 
of radical innovations oftentimes require substantial value net modifications. So we may have to 
take a more proactive role in the design of better value nets. 
Resolution
The concept of a value net is fairly straightforward; however, there are choices in how detailed to 
make them. In particular, when should nodes be treated as a block and when should they be 
treated individually? As a general rule, the number of nodes should not be larger than the 
company (or person) is able to deal with on an individualized basis. 
The better organized the value net is, the more structured the interactions are, the more 
information technology is used and the better the humans are at dealing with complexity, the 
more nodes can be handled. On the other hand, the more individuality each node requires, the 
fewer nodes can be handled. If the nodes are employees in a company, we may find that a 
supervisor interacts directly with 10-15 subordinates, and if the job functions are complex, the 
supervisor cannot maintain efficiency if this number gets much larger. 
The value net includes everyone who directly or indirectly is 
important to the company
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By having each subordinate supervise other people, we can grow the organization without 
exceeding the supervisory capacity. Effectively we lump each subordinate and the subordinate’s 
subordinates into one node, thereby reducing the complexity in the value net and maintaining 
efficiency. On the other hand, if a commander orders a hundred people to perform the same task 
at the same time, then there is little individual information about each node required, and the 
commander can handle the larger number of nodes without losing efficiency.
Ha Hoang argues that as the number of business alliances a company forges goes up, so does 
the complexity of the managerial task, and eventually the company cannot successfully harvest 
the full benefit of each alliance.30 The toymaker, LEGO, manages a large number of alliances, but 
does so by using a well-defined alliance agreement with each partner, thereby easing the 
managerial task.31
Car makers face the task of procuring many different parts. They do it by having standardized 
supplier agreements, extensive usage of IT systems and first-tier suppliers that their second-tier 
suppliers interact with—all aiming at reducing the complexity of the value net. Some companies 
employ value net simplification as their business model; it may be a wholesaler who procures 
merchandise from many different sources and offer it as a “one node supplier,” or it may be 
computer consultant who helps companies integrate different software systems.
Effectively what LEGO had done was to reduce the individuality of each 
alliance node.
It is convenient to lump all customers together in one group, but often it will make more sense 
to treat each customer segment as one node. A consulting company may provide highly 
customized services to a limited number of customers, while a fast food chain may provide 
highly standardized meals to millions. The consultant will probably look at each customer as an 
individual node, while the fast food chain will look at customer segments as individual nodes. If a 
company acquires automated manufacturing tools with lot-size-of-one capabilities, we can only 
harvest the full economic benefits if we understand how each customer is different, and in that 
case each customer could be treated as an individual node; however, handling of the 
individualism is both simplified and automated.
During the 1970s and 1980s numerous companies were highly diversified conglomerates. In 
the 1990s most of these companies became much more focused, and many of them pursued only 
one line of business. The conglomerates benefited from cross-functional economy of scale and 
reduced market risk due to the diversification; however, they still could not compete against the 
more strategically focused companies that put all their human and financial resources into 
succeeding in a single market. The focused companies chose to focus on a smaller and more well-
defined value net and to know more about each node in that value net. Apparently there is no 
standard answer to the question of how many or how few nodes the value net should be broken 
down into, but there are clear dangers of becoming overly ambitious by trying to treat too many 
nodes individually.
Internal Value Nets
Besides the external value net that includes customers and suppliers, we can look at the company 
organization as an internal value net. Companies often have choices in how to arrange the 
internal value nets and where to draw the boundary between “inside” and “outside,” e.g., through 
the use of contractors and freelance workers instead of employees. During the 1990s many 
companies decided to focus on their core business and outsource some of the non-strategic 
functions, effectively moving functions from the internal to the external value net. Today, some 
businesses are further integrating outside resources, e.g. Research and Development (R&D) can 
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be done faster, more successfully and at lower cost by having the internal R&D employees join 
forces with external people and organizations that already have part of the solutions sought.32
Some companies have been reorganized to allow the various parts of the organization to 
collaborate on a peer-to-peer basis, effectively forming a more “natural” open-market style of 
internal value net (see p. 61). So how diffuse or how structured should the internal value net be? 
And how much of the value net should be under our direct control versus being under peer-
influence? Analyzing the internal value net is not much different than analyzing the external 
value net, each employee, like each customer, having an interest in optimizing his or her own 
profits. Finding the right balance between value creation and value appropriation for the 
employees33
Designing Value Nets
can lead to larger overall business performance.
Some new products and most radical innovations require a redesign of an existing value net. So, 
how should we design the value net to the maximum benefit? Unfortunately, it’s often impossible 
to answer this question until we have gone through the whole process described in the following 
chapters, and then work our way back to the beginning. There may not be any right or wrong 
value net; however, the value net will influence volume and prices and is therefore a good 
starting point for the subsequent chapters. It is impossible to consider every node in the value net,
so how do we select the most relevant ones? The next section discusses value drivers: the 
exchange of value among the nodes. As soon as we can quantify the value drivers each node
provides, we can also identify the most important nodes based on their importance to company 
finances.
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Chapter 4
Key Variables
In understanding why customers buy or don’t buy something, we can start by looking at how a 
customer finds a solution to their needs or wishes. A product may have many different features 
and properties, which together solve a few basic needs or desires of the customer. Here the term 
value driver is used to describe those solutions. For example, independent of how many bells and 
whistles a clock boasts, it can be considered having just two primary value drivers: keeping 
people informed about the time and providing esthetic value. It may use different methods for 
telling the time: dials, a digital display, bells ringing at certain times, an alarm that goes off at a 
preset time, etc. – but they all support the same value driver. On the other hand, a product full of 
features that does not solve a problem for anybody lacks value drivers. So the important thing is 
the combination of a customer need with a product solution (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Schematics of value drivers
But that is only part of the story, if the product is unaffordable, or the customer cannot find the 
product, the customer still does not have a solution. In that way certain constraints are just as 
important as the value drivers in determining how much gets sold. Collectively all these variables 
are called the key variables. In some sense it is only when there is a profit opportunity, that a sale 
will occur and the customer buys a product which will contribute to a customer solution34
Figure 9
. In a 
subsequent chapter it will be discussed how profits depend on value to the customer, risk, market 
power and cost, which are the four main groups of key variables ( ). They represent the 
main things the product does for the customer and the main limitations the customer has. The key 
variables characterize the links between the nodes in the value nets. 
Key variables can be described by an ideal optimum and by constraints. For example, an
optimum is the ideal performance that the customer is wishing for; the constraint is that the 
customer cannot do his/her job unless the product offers a certain minimum level of performance.
As a general rule, the optimum is most important to value drivers, and the constraints are most 
important to risk, market power and cost – although it is not always that way. However, for the 
sake of simplicity the three groups of key variables: risk, market power and cost are here called 
constraint variables.
Customer needs
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Product 
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Customer 
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Figure 9. Schematic presentation of the processes leading to a customer solution. A sale 
requires that there is a product that can meet the customer needs in all four areas.
Value Variables
In this book a value variable, or value driver35
Figure 8
, is defined as a reason for any asset, product, 
service or act to become valuable to a person. In other words, it is the solution to a customer’s
problem ( ). Often the value proposition captures some of the value drivers. Many value 
variables (and other key variables) are in common among multiple products and markets, e.g.:
comfort, productivity enhancement, fun / entertainment, pleasure and social image building. A
value driver like social image building is in part influenced by how the product has been 
positioned and marketed and what brand the product is sold under. 
TV news or computer-based presentations usually offer two value drivers: information -
learning and entertainment. Information is the message being conveyed, the entertainment may 
be pretty graphics or the way the speaker is dressed. For some people one value driver is more 
important then the other; for example, I encountered a person who always watched the TV news 
with the sound off and no text, evidently looking for the entertainment value driver only. Even 
for the same person, the relative importance of the two value drivers may fluctuate from one 
minute to the next; for example, if the subject suddenly turns to something of non-interest, the 
entertainment value driver takes over in importance, helping the listener stay tuned until the next 
interesting piece of information appears.
Product features that all support the same value driver can easily substitute for each other, in 
the sense that customers willingly trade one feature for another. So the aesthetics of a clock may 
be enhanced by a nice color or beautiful ornamentation, and a person may accept a color that is 
not perfectly matching his or her wishes in return for better ornamentation. That makes it possible 
to score products relative to each other by calculating averages of all the features supporting one 
and the same value driver. For example, we can rank sports cars by their performance
(performance value driver) using an aggregate score based on time to get up to speed, top speed, 
handling abilities and braking abilities. Some value drivers cannot be described by one 
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continuous ranking, but can instead be represented by a number of distinct groups, where one 
cannot say that one group is more or less than another – yet their distinction is very important to 
the customer. For example, the taste style of prepared food could be classified in groups like 
Italian, hot Mexican, sea food, Chinese, etc. A couple looking for a restaurant may consider a 
subset of these groups, but not all. Some value drivers are mostly customer created, e.g. the social 
dimension of a social network website is created by the users not the company, yet it is often the 
most important value driver. 
A value driver is not an inherent property of a product itself, so it is not something that a 
supplier can deliver in a box to a customer. It is not until the product is inserted into the 
customer’s value net to solve the customer’s problem that value drivers emerge. Therefore, the 
same product will have different value drivers to different groups of customers such as a tire used 
for a tire swing or on a car. Even with identical value drivers, the customers are likely to rate their 
relative importance differently. So, strictly speaking, from a value driver perspective mass market 
commodities are rare. But at the same time those differences mean that people willingly trade 
with each other, which is one of the most important properties of an economy.
Value Drivers that Matters
Simplicity is strength when it comes to understanding markets. It is easy to come up with a lot of 
reasons for a product to possess value, but it can be hard to analyze all of those reasons. 
Especially when we have to quantify the value drivers through surveys, customer interviews, 
special accounting procedures and extensive statistical searches, it can become expensive to 
collect data, so it is critical to focus on what matters. So what is that? 
The only value drivers that really are important are the ones that in reality drive current and 
future purchasing decisions, and how much people are willing to pay. And usually there is only a 
handful of basic reasons for someone to decide to purchase something. To identify what that is, 
we must take an “in the customer’s shoes” viewpoint of what the customer really wants 
accomplished. It has been argued that we often tend to think of others being similar to us, but in 
reality this may not be the case.36
Both the customer and the supplier will bundle a product. The customer looks at value created 
from the entire bundle, which is not only the specific product being sold but also the sales 
experience, service, support and warranty. Customers insert the products they purchase into their 
world, meaning that value creation is subject to their needs, their skills and their abilities to 
acquire the complements required. So, a customer who creates tremendous value through 
consumption will be willing to pay more for the same product than a customer who does not have 
the same value-creating capabilities. It therefore becomes important to take the customer side 
value creation into account. In other words, the value drivers and the utilityscapes need to be 
sufficiently broad to cover the solutions the customers are seeking, not just the specific 
contribution our product makes to that solution.
Therefore, it may not be enough to just sit down and imagine 
what we think they think, but rather we need to observe their actual behavior, in particular related 
to how they attempt solving their problems today. What makes it more challenging is that the rest 
of the world changes between the time we observe and the time we have the product ready for 
launch, so the question becomes, what will the customer think and feel under those new 
circumstances? 
When a customer stares at a shelf full of fairly similar products, he or she will make the 
purchase decision based on “something” which always boils down to being different in one or 
more of the value drivers. We should try to capture this “something” that differentiates our 
product from the competition. The customer’s perception of value is what really matters, because 
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that is what he or she bases his or her purchasing decisions on. The perceived value will, to some 
degree, be influenced by the value received from previous purchases. In addition, in the longer 
term, repeat purchases will be influenced by the value actually received from the present 
purchase. However, purchase decisions never hinge on the actual value received because neither 
the customer nor the seller can know it for certain at the time of purchase.
Surveys of supermarket customers show that many of them will pay a surcharge for name 
brands over generic brands, even if they think that the generic brand has the same quality,37
Purchase decisions may be influenced by many other irrational perceptions
so a 
brand name may need to be factored into one of the value drivers, even in cases where it does not 
reflect anything about the direct utility of the product. In general, feelings and irrational beliefs 
influence purchasing decisions, while real facts that the customer knows nothing about exert no 
influence. Therefore, customer communication and education will influence which value drivers
become important. This is extensively utilized in marketing and advertisement, although not 
necessarily driven by a value net profitability analysis.
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We can look at the value as a combination of all the value-contributions that the different 
nodes are providing. If an essential complement to the product is not present, then the entire 
value vanishes; for a computer such a complement is electricity. If there are many supporting 
offerings, e.g., self-help guides, evening classes and user communities, then the value goes up. 
We are used to thinking of value being something delivered by a supplier. However, in reality 
customers often beat anybody else at creating value for themselves and as a supplier the best we 
can do is to facilitate this process. So the unique dishes the AAKC user creates is what makes the 
whole experience worthwhile.
including: (1) 
some customers do not necessarily regard a sunk cost as something that should not influence 
future purchase decisions, (2) some customers follow past habits without re-evaluating their 
desirability today and (3) some customers do not even try to seek the optimal output if they do 
not consider the purchase important enough to spend time thinking about it. If the customer 
perceives the item as cheap, then he or she may ignore the negative value driver associated with 
the payment. These examples illustrate how customer rationality cannot be assumed in judging 
value driver importance.
The value of a value driver changes as the value net which surrounds the customer changes. If 
you move from Norway to the Christmas Island, the value of your slalom skis will diminish as 
“complementary products,” such as snow are lacking. Even a simple event such as a promotional 
campaign can create new perceptions of a product or make the customers discover new 
connections in the value net changing their ratings of the different value drivers. The dynamic 
nature of the value drivers can make their mapping challenging. However, for most problems a 
static view of the value drivers is good enough.
Constraint Variables
Just like there are a few basic needs that make a customer buy a product, the purchase decision 
will be governed by a few basic constraints such as budget constraints and channel / availability 
constraints. Most products cost time and money to acquire, maintain and use. And most 
customers set limits for the amount they are willing to spend; therefore, cost to the customer
becomes a variable associated with almost anything. Sometimes customers distinguish between 
two cost constraints: up front investment and cost of ownership. If the customers know they must 
spend time figuring out how to use the product or spend time getting it fixed, even that will 
influence the purchase, and should concern the supplier. Companies that carefully map how the 
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customer spends time and money in connection with the solution they provide, and then identify 
ways of reducing these costs to the customer, take this variable serious.
Shopping
39
While a budget constraint is a continuous variable (like the transport value driver), the channel 
/ availability constraint consists of a number of discrete groups (like the food styles), e.g. online 
availability or sold in stores in town X. If a customer only shops in the three largest stores within 
the city he / she lives in, then that becomes a constraint potentially limiting the sale. Store brands, 
geographic store locations, internet availability, payment options, channel awareness through 
marketing and sales staff abilities in specific stores will all contribute to limiting the customer 
access to the product. As needed we can construct one or more constraint variables, reflecting 
availability to the customer.
There may also be legal constraints (e.g. not to be sold to people under age 18) and customs / 
tradition constraints (e.g. purchase patterns directed by religious beliefs or sports events). One of 
the constraint variables is the competition. Like you can create a value driver by combining a set 
of features, you can create an aggregate “competition intensity” variable, by adding different 
factors of importance including the availability of similar products that could become a 
substitute.
Constraint variables are very similar to the value variables, in that they emerge as a result of a 
customer requirement in combination with a supplier solution. A sale will only take place if the 
price is within the range the customer is willing to pay. And the product distribution needs to 
cover part of the venues where the customer shops. 
A purchase normally consists of three distinct decisions: 
1. Will the customer “invest” in the shopping activity at all, and if so, will our solution be one 
of the options considered?
2. Does our offer match the customer’s needs? In other words, does our product meet the 
expectations in each of the value driver dimensions (cf. utilityscapes in the next chapter)?
This question is a matter of value and risk versus customer expectations.
3. Compared to the alternatives, is our offering competitive? This question is about our market 
power, the cost to the customer and other constraint variables.
Only when the outcome of all three decisions is favorable do we achieve a sale. The previous 
discussion focused on the second and third question. The first question, however, follows the 
same rules of value, risk and market power. We can consider the purchase of a DVD. When the 
customer is already in the store, the shopping cost becomes a sunk cost, and will not influence 
which movie, if any, he or she buys. Before going shopping, the effort of searching for a movie is 
a variable cost: the customer may elect to forgo shopping at all, and instead spend the time on 
something else, in which case no purchase will be made. So if the store carries really good 
movies, the value goes up; if it offers a large selection and the customer is almost certain to find a 
good one, the risk goes down, and if there is nothing else to do in that town, the market power
goes up—all contributing to increasing the chance of the customer going to the store in the first 
place. 
Cost and Availability
Is the cost of the product within the customer’s budget? That is the critical question, not the 
availability of a solution. Availability is often a question of money, and at “any price” most 
things are possible. With large enough a budget you may develop a solution—or be willing to
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afford existing technologies, e.g. if you need electric power on a satellite you can use 
photovoltaic panels although quite expensive, just the $5,000 to $10,000 or more per-pound cost
of getting them out in orbit40
1. Not available at current prices and budget constraints. For truly unavailable items the 
price is infinite and sales are zero.
adds significantly to the cost. Yet, based on the vale they deliver, 
they are worth the cost. Availability falls into three groups:
2. Nearly competitive, e.g., electric heating in houses that could alternatively be heated with 
oil or gas.
3. Cost is a non-issue, e.g., rechargeable cell phones, where the cost of power used for the 
charger is negligible compared to the phone charges.
If the product is expensive, hard to get or something that it will take a lot of research to discover, 
all results in the same: a significant investment of time and/or money will be required by the 
buyer.
34
There must be an opportunity for a profit to the seller, and an opportunity for a profit to the buyer (value reduced by risk and 
market power minus price paid).
35
Not all authors agree on the definition of the term value driver. An alternative usage of the term is found in Mark C. Scott, 
1998, Value Drivers, The Manager’s Guide to Driving Corporate Value Creation, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Jacquemin Alexis, 1987, The New Industrial Organizations: Market Forces and Strategic Behavior, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 217 p.
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Raj Sethuraman, 2000, What Makes Consumers Pay More for National Brands than for Store Brands --- Image or Quality?, 
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Data on a few key variables is all that is needed to know
who will buy, and why
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Chapter 5
Utilityscapes and Sales Volume
I was once asked, “How could one have known that the microwave oven would become such a 
success, considering that micro-waved food does not taste as good as food cooked by other 
methods?”41
A product or service provides the customer with different types of basic utility through the value 
drivers. For example, most jackets have two value variables and one constraint variable of 
importance to the person wearing it: providing warmth, contributing to the social image of the 
user by making a fashion statement and be subject to a budget constraint. For the sake of 
simplicity we will here focus on the two value drivers.
Food has at least three value drivers: nutrition, flavor and speed of preparation. For 
the microwave we can focus on the tradeoff between flavor and speed. Even before the household 
microwave oven was introduced there were many alternatives where people made a similar 
tradeoff; for example, cake mixes versus cakes made from scratch or TV dinners versus home 
cooked meals. Looking at historical sales figures for these alternatives could have given a clue 
that people would be willing to pay a premium for faster preparation, not only paying more 
money but also to some degree sacrificing the taste value driver.
A value driver combines a customer desire with a product solution, which is a prerequisite for 
a transaction. Besides that sales are also determined by other key variables such as the customers’ 
budget constraints. A given market has typically a small number of key variables (value drivers 
and constraint variables). If we use these key variables as the principal axis defining a 
multidimensional space, then we can use that space to show the locations of both product 
solutions and customer wishes (within a given market). The result becomes a map; here called an 
utilityscape, and it can be used to show how sales volumes relate to the key variables. This 
chapter will explain utilityscapes from the perspective of products, one customer, and aggregate 
sales.
Product Positions
42
Figure 10
Some jackets provide mostly warmth 
and little fashion, some provide quite a bit of both, and so on. In that way the two value drivers
“warmth” and “fashion” define a two-dimensional utilityscape ( ).
The warmth and fashion dimensions are fundamentally different. Warmth can be quantified in 
terms of insulating properties (R-values as used in the rating of construction materials) and while 
there may be different features all contributing to keeping warm, we can calculate an aggregate 
score where more means warmer. The fashion aspect differs; it is a matter of matching more or 
less into any one of a number of different types of fashion (business causal, skiing, gothic, …). 
While we can list all of these different types of fashion along an axis of a diagram, one cannot 
necessarily say that one is more than another. But that does not make the chart less useful.
Any given jacket will plot somewhere in this space depending on how it scores in each 
dimension. And as the jacket ages it may travel through the utilityscape, if it loses its insulating 
capabilities or goes out of fashion; however, for now let us just focus on new jackets.
Suppliers bundle value drivers when they design their products, so we cannot get one without 
the others. For example, you cannot buy a jacket that has no design to it at all. Or a neighbor may 
offer help, but also spread undesired gossip and play noisy music. If the neighbor moves, all the 
value drivers disappear—positive and negative.
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Figure 10. The utilityscape for jackets
Product Value and Risk
How well does a product satisfy the needs of a customer? Most products feature some versatility, 
which means that they cover a range within the utilityscape. Everything else equal, the larger an 
area a product covers in the utilityscape, the less the risk is, in particular to the customers who 
may not be quite sure what their future needs are going to be. Going back to the example of 
jackets: some jackets have removable inner lining making it possible to change their “warmth 
value driver” – i.e. the jacket occupies a large space within the utilityscape. Also, some locations 
within the utilityscape pose fewer risks than others; for example, while a newly married couple 
will fit in a two-seat sports car, they may opt for buying a larger car with five seats (larger 
transport value driver). A five-seat car can satisfy the range of needs from one to five. So if they 
transport a couple of friends or, a few years down the road, have children, the car will still meet 
their needs.
Customer Wishes
Customers usually don’t write a detailed list of specs and then start shopping for the solution 
which most closely matches their spec sheet. Rather they identify what they would like to 
accomplish (value drivers), and then look at what alternative solutions the market place offers in 
that general area – subject to their constraints. In that way the customers are willing to consider a 
certain limited range of solutions for each key variable. This range reflects that customer demand 
is inherently uncertain in nature, but there are bounds to that uncertainty. In theory we could 
describe the customer in terms of an acceptable range for each key variable, and tradeoffs he/she 
is willing to do between different variables. This could be a viable approach in analyzing 
customer survey data, but outside the scope of this chapter.
The axis in a utilityscape should not only include what is feasible today, but extend as far out 
as anyone’s dreams go, i.e. it is healthy to see the desires which are not yet satisfied by any 
product, but customers may be dreaming about.
Customer Value and Risk
Products are not stand-alone items. People own a portfolio of products that as a whole aims at 
satisfying their broad range of needs. Every product does not need to satisfy every need, but the 
overall portfolio should most of the time—and when it cannot, there should be other solutions 
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easily available. Customers cannot be viewed as stand-alone nodes: they seek to complement 
what is missing in their value net, e.g., a guy has a boat, and his friend buys a pair of water skis, 
complementing the boat. One way to look at the value of a product is to look at the total value of 
the value net with and without the product in question inserted.
Each customer is not defined by a specific point but by a density distribution within the 
utilityscape—for a variety of reasons:
1. Customers do not necessarily mathematically define what is better or worse.
2. Customers willingly trade off one variable for another (e.g., more of one value driver for 
another). This reflects the elasticity of demand for each customer. 
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Therefore, in the utilityscape a customer represents a point with a distribution diminishing as it 
moves further out in the different dimensions. There are often clear preferences for certain 
combinations of values, and tradeoffs between these.
Aggregate Sales
If we knew what key variable ranges are acceptable to each customer, and we know the position 
of each product, we could calculate a theoretical demand map. However, going back to the 
example of the jackets, some customers cannot articulate what tradeoffs they are willing to make 
until they are trying on the different jackets in the store and have to make a payment with their
money. Customers usually don’t dream up their ideal jacket in a vacuum, and then go out to seek 
the best match. They look around, get influenced by what they see, react to it and iteratively 
zoom in on the best available option. Therefore, the products available influence the demand, and 
there is no true independently defined “base demand.” However, it can in some circumstances be 
useful to calibrate some hypothetical demand functions based on the current demand.
Customers optimize mixed portfolios, not just monetary profits. Buying a jacket represents a 
tradeoff between warmth, fashion and price. The location within the utilityscape reflects a 
particular customer’s relative importance of the different key variables that define the dimensions 
of the utilityscape. If we take historical sales data and tally up how many customers select 
different key variable combinations then we can generate a utilityscape. The utilityscape becomes 
a map of the portfolios actually selected by the customers.44
Figure 11
That does not tell us what range of 
options they were willing to consider but what solution they actually settled on and actually were 
willing to spend their money on ( ). The map shown is a made-up illustration; however, 
these types of maps can be based on historical sales figures and can be used as a basis for 
estimating sales volume, as shown in the case study (p. 80).
Marketing is there to influence customers as to the location in the utilityscape they choose to 
settle in, and a utilityscape based on historical demands will therefore in part reflect past 
successes and failures of marketing. A good marketer motivates customers to make purchases by 
helping them relate to the key variables that define the axis in the utilityscape.
The historical data used to create a utilityscape could be for a specific geographic region or for
a specific age group of customers, and that will define what market the utilityscape is applicable 
to. It is therefore reasonable to develop a series of utilityscapes, one for each of the markets under 
consideration. 
While conventional customer segmentation in marketing is based on customer characteristics 
and product segmentation is based on product characteristics, segmentation based on the 
utilityscape is based on key variables, thereby combining the two. At first the difference may
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Figure 11. The utilityscape for jackets; darker areas indicate higher demand
seem insignificant; however, the utilityscape brings products and customers into one diagram, 
which is exactly the combination that forms the basis for sales.
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The success of many products depends on the availability of complementary products; for 
example, few computers will be sold if there is no software to buy. The utilityscape provides a 
graphical representation of the effect of combining different basic dimensions within a single 
product, or group of products; so computers and software can be treated within one utilityscape.
If computing power (speed, memory) is represented on one axis, and software categories 
(different clusters, just like fashion) on the other axis, then we can map the interdependencies of 
these two in terms of market opportunities. We can, for example, expect that image processing 
software, which traditionally is data-intensive, will find most of its market in conjunction with 
powerful computers, while word processing can be sold across the board. Based on these 
concepts we can analyze product portfolios, and the effect of adding or removing one product 
(including service, or an auxiliary product) to or from a portfolio of products.
The utilityscape is a map that shows us the total market for segments characterized by a certain
range in each of the key variables, not the sales volume of a specific product. If there is a market
monopoly, the two are the same, but normally there are multiple products all competing for the 
same part of a utilityscape. Based on historical sales data it is normally possible to estimate how 
the sales, within a given part of the utilityscape, will be distributed between the different products 
indirectly in competition with each other.
The concepts here are formulated based on a consumer market with a large number of 
customers and often a significant number of suppliers. If it is a commercial or industrial market
with just a few customers, we can still use the same method, but we may have the luxury of 
evaluating each customer and considering their possible future changes in purchase patterns. Of 
course, if the number of customers is low, then the estimates will inherently suffer from statistical 
uncertainty.
Constratint-scapes
Customers do not buy if there is no product affordable to them through the distribution channel(s) 
they shop (Figure 12).46
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Figure 12. Constraint diagram showing the customers willingness to pay and which 
channels they shop. Some customers shop both channels and are shown both places.
Figure 12 is almost like an utilityscape, but for constraints. The difference is that in the 
utilityscape each customer will select one favorite spot, here is shown what percentage of all 
customers can accept being at a certain location. In other words, in a constraint diagram a 
customer draws a line how far they are willing to go, and anything on their side of the line is 
acceptable to them. Therefore a customer can be found in more than location of a constraint 
diagram.47
Figure 13
It is here assumed that there is no correlation between what people want and how 
much they can afford or which channel they shop. However, a four dimensional diagram 
combining the constraint diagram and a utilityscape can be constructed to take such a correlation 
into account. Graphically a four dimensional diagram can be challenging to represent on a flat 
piece of paper. When it comes to problems with many dimensions the type of diagram shown in 
can be helpful.
Figure 13. Key variable diagram
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Dynamic Utilityscapes
The adoption rate of a new product relates in part to the customer profit, which in turn depends 
on value to the customer, risk, market power and, the pricing decision factor. The adoption rate 
can be positive or negative; negative if the item is going out of use. We can use the utilityscape as 
a tool for analyzing such changes in the market. The first customers who adopt a new technology 
will gravitate in specific areas of the utilityscape, depending on which dimension of the 
utilityscape the product improves upon. As the product and the market evolves this will, however, 
change. Depending on the type impact the new product has on the utilityscape we see different 
changes as discussed in the following. 
No Change in the Axis of the Utilityscape
Most new products neither alter the utilityscape they are in nor change the total market size; all 
they do is capture market share at the expense of existing products. We often see customers 
willing to travel within the utilityscape when they discover a new product. Sometimes even a new 
technology replacing an old technology falls in this category, when the “outside box” and the 
functionality remain the same. Likewise, withdrawing a product from the market will often just 
alter the sales volumes of the products left. These kinds of changes can be evaluated by analyzing 
what influenced market shares in the past (an example is provided in the case study at p. 82).
Cost or cost savings to a customer may or may not be a separate dimension in the utilityscape.
At any rate, a utilityscape based on the sales volumes for existing products takes into account the 
current price levels. Often it is found that prices change in a regular manner going across a 
utilityscape, and that price is one of the factors determining the variations in sales volume from 
one part of the utilityscape to another. By inserting a product that is priced either below or above 
what would be expected for the location it occupies in the utilityscape, the sales will be 
influenced positively or negatively. Based on the price variations among existing products, 
relative to what is expected, we can estimate how large these gains or losses will be.
It is evident that most markets evolve over the years. Some of these changes result from a net 
migration of customers from one part of the utilityscape to another. This could for example be a 
result of changing fashion. But most changes relate back to the position of products in the 
utilityscape. A products position in a utilityscapes shows how it compares to the other products, 
and as products and expectations change over time the position of a product in the utilityscape 
will change, even if the product remains the same. If we keep and keep selling exactly the same 
product for 25 years meanwhile all the competition regularly enhance their products, then our 
product will little by little change position in the utilityscape. An example of that is the British 
Morgan Sports car which remained almost unchanged since the mid 1930’s which changed from 
being a modern sports car to being a niche product with a historical appeal. The rapid rise of 
gasoline prices in the US around 2008 pushed the large SUVs down to very low scores on the 
“cost management” dimension making them less attractive to some of the large segments of 
customers. It is worth noting that the distribution of customers in the utilityscape mostly 
remained the same AND the products remained unchanged. However, the price changes in one of 
the complements (gasoline) made some products (SUVs) slide into lower demand regions of the 
utilityscape.
Stretching of the Utilityscape
This type of change may include the stretching of the current utilityscape, so the new product 
falls beyond the current offerings as measured on one or more of the value driver dimensions. For 
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example, an innovation may enhance already existing value drivers or deliver existing value 
drivers at a lower price, thus stretching the utilityscape in the cost savings dimension (or 
corresponding constraint variable), and may enable a supplier to capture customers from the 
competitors, or even increase the overall market size. The customers who are likely to switch to a 
new part of the utilityscape are the ones who already reside along the frontier defined by the 
current products. For most value drivers the bulk of the customer population resides within the 
territory already covered by existing products; however, for a value driver like cost savings the 
majority of customers are always “frontier” customers. New technologies that can deliver the 
same performance at a fraction of the cost are therefore often a relatively safe bet when it comes 
to product innovation.
Even when innovations modify the utilityscape, we often can extract relevant knowledge 
about the new market from existing products. For example, the amount of material that can be 
transported by a truck could in older times been hauled by one or more horse wagons, and the 
cleanliness of nanoparticle based soil-repellant fabric48
The price dimension is often critical in driving utilityscape changes. Take hybrid vehicles as 
an example. To make matters simple, we can focus on two value drivers (
could in older times have been achieved 
by frequent washing. In order to estimate the sales of a new product we must include a 
sufficiently broad spectrum of preexisting markets to learn from. For example, a new type of 
personal transportation can be evaluated if we include demand for alternatives as different as 
walk, bike, car, bus, train, hitchhiking or airplanes.
Figure 14): social 
image of owner and vehicle lifetime savings, calculated as the net present value relative to a 
similar “conventional” vehicle. When hybrid vehicles were first launched the savings were 
negative as the hybrid vehicles were priced above what was justified by the fuel savings. 
However, as fuel prices go up or the cost of a hybrid vehicle goes down savings from driving 
these vehicles increase. The social dimension represents the desires of people who would like to 
portray themselves as environmentally conscious, helping to create change for the better in the 
society and making a statement toward others that they care.
Figure 14. Part of the utilityscape relevant to hybrid vehicles. The arrows indicate possible 
evolution paths over time
All conventional cars fall, by definition, in the fields with zero saving. The first hybrid vehicles 
were introduced in the field with “negative saving” and “high social.” Evidently the most price
sensitive customers will not be early adopters. Even before the first hybrid vehicle was 
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introduced we could have estimated people’s willingness to migrate based on sales volumes and 
surcharges paid in other markets offering a similar tradeoff; for example, ecological food, private 
alternative energy installations, “green energy” offered by public utilities at a surcharge and 
recycling efforts. Another factor: the frequency at which people purchase vehicles, which means 
that if people only consider a hybrid vehicle when they are going to purchase a new vehicle 
anyway, then there will be a time lag before the average consumer even considers the option. As 
the surcharge decreases over time, hybrid vehicles become available as used vehicles and the 
public perception of these vehicles changes, the adoption rates will gradually change accordingly.
Time Changes in Expectations
Conspicuous consumption has long been a way of gaining prestige.49 Around 2007 there was a 
surge in the demand for ultra-expensive food in the New York City – dishes exceeding $1000 per 
serving.50
1. Level of appearance spending, e.g. how many of the car buyers buy cars to make a 
statement about their wealth and status (e.g. Rolls-Royce Maybach, Bentley) versus need 
spending (a utilitarian and logical solution).
Why this surge in demand for something like that. Could we have expected it? Let us 
look at an utilityscape with three dimensions:
2. Expectations to durability and lasting quality / value preservation.
3. Different groups of products, such as cars, clothing, jewelry, food, books, electronics, and 
so on.
Now lets, look at the changes over time. The level of appearance spending has been remaining 
constant or going up.51
Creation of a Utilityscape with a New Dimension
The expectations to durability has been going down – in part because of 
quicker obsolescence and reduced prestige from dated products and in part because of a change 
from repair to replace mentality (driven by lower manufacturing costs and higher service cost). 
Therefore the natural consequence is that appearance spending is likely to spread from durable to 
perishable products over time – and that is exactly what we are seeing with the New York “ultra 
meals”.
A few radical innovations add new dimensions to a utilityscape and result in major value net
changes. This may lead to significant conversion of current non-consumers to consumers. These 
changes often occur when a company focuses on an “insignificant” niche market that over time 
turns mainstream as the majority of customers initially buying the main product switch,52
In the case of a hybrid vehicle we could assume that all the hybrid-car buyers would have been 
buying regular cars if they had not been able to get a hybrid.. But what if non-consumers became 
consumers? What if it had been a personal plane costing less than a car—then many non-
aviation-oriented people would adopt the technology. The plane would deliver value drivers
found in existing products: transportation as offered by cars and scheduled commercial air traffic 
and leisure as offered by yachts and ATVs. And we can learn from all of those markets. 
However, a plane lacks the convenience of a car, in part due to the absence of a nation-wide 
network of small landing strips coupled with a car rental or loner car system that offers travelers a 
convenient way to complete their journeys. 
resulting in a restructuring of the entire market and the value net.
Radical innovations usually create new value nets different from existing ones. That can be 
difficult because value nets normally originate through gradual evolution directed by the 
decisions by millions of individuals, rather than based on a masterminded blueprint. Companies 
may influence this process by taking the roles of several nodes and by getting into the business of 
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supplying complementary products or services. To illustrate how to deal with this problem, we 
can consider a simple product with only one value driver and a simple value net with only two 
groups of nodes: “us” and “everybody else.” We can now plot this as shown in Figure 15.
It is normally a chicken-and-egg situation: the external contribution does not evolve unless 
there are enough customers to justify doing so, but customers will not buy in until the external 
support exists. If a gradual increase in customers occurs as you move in the x or y direction, then 
the market can be expected to evolve naturally because each of the two groups (core product and 
complements) will at any given point in time see enough of the other to have an incentive to 
continue investing in growth. However, if there is no change until a large critical mass has been 
achieved, it may take huge investments, and be risky. Sometimes the external contribution is the 
consumption by other users, such as a telephone that only becomes valuable if there is somebody 
else to call. In that case, gaining critical mass becomes even more challenging because it depends 
on so many decision makers.
Figure 15. Value driver contributions in a new market
41
Question asked by Richard Shandross (personal communication March 2005).
42
Some jackets provide “rare” value variables as offered by waterproof jackets and reflective safety jackets, however, these are
also disregarded in this discussion.
43
This is like a fuzzy membership function.
44
This is parallel to the balanced scorecards (see Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, 1996, The Balanced Scorecard, 
Translating Strategy into Action, Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA, 323 p.)
45
This figure is not based on factual data; it is only intended to illustrate the principles of a utilityscape.
46
The figure shows the percentage of the total potential customers (at a given price level which they can afford) who will 
purchase depending on which channels the products are available through.  The reason that sum of Ch 1 and Ch 2 is more than 
100% is that some customers will buy if available in either channel, but they will not purchase additional units if sold though 
both channels (i.e. Ch 1 and Ch.2 is 100%).
47
Some utilityscape dimensions behave like constraint diagrams
48 Alan Zeichick, 2003, The Fabric of Consumer Reality, Red Herring, no. 123, p. 54, March 2003.
49 Thorstein Veblen, 1970 (first published 1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class, An Economic Study of Institutions, Unwin 
Books, London, 261 p.
50
Rachel Jones, 2006 02 28, A Thousand-dollar ice cream sundae? Why not? Columbia News Service, 
http://jscms.jrm.columbia.edu/cns/2006-02-28/jones-thousanddollaricecream.
51
At least for product groups like cars.
52
Ed M. Yoklay (of Think Craft Inc.), 2002, Strategies for Speed Dependent Disruptive Business Environments, presentation at 
the American Chemical Society National Meeting, Boston, MA, 20 Aug. 2002.
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Chapter 6
Prices
We need both estimates of price and quantity to evaluate the revenue potential for a new product. 
The previous chapter discussed sales volume. But how much will the customer be willing to pay?
To answer this question we will look further into the following topics:
A. The value to the customer.
B. The risk to the customer.
C. The market power between buyer and seller.
D. The price ceiling.
A. Value to the Customer
A product and service usually provides solutions to a few basic needs, and the value drivers
discussed above is a way of expressing those solutions. The value drivers experienced by a 
customer will limit how much he or she may be willing to pay, and quantifying the value drivers
is therefore a good starting point for estimating the market price. Often we can estimate the 
monetary value of a value driver to a given customer; it could be based on what the customer 
currently is paying for getting those needs satisfied or how much a solution will save the 
customer. Companies using value based pricing use these kinds of estimates as the foundation for 
their prices.
Usually a customer decides to buy a product some time prior to harvesting the benefits it 
provides, thereby introducing some risk as to how much value the customer will actually receive.
If I find a tool useful today there is the risk that I will no longer need it in the future; or that it 
may break in a way so I cannot use it. When we try something we are not familiar with, the risk
increases, so an unknown brand or a new supply channel increases the risk. A “low introductory 
price” offered by some companies is, in part, in response to this increased risk faced by new 
customers.
B. Risk to the Customer
Depending on the risk, the customers consciously or unconsciously discount the value, just 
like we in finance discount the value of stocks, which by nature are risky, based on their beta. We 
don’t have a beta for a lawnmower but we can look at the probability that it will become useless 
(for whatever reason) during the next one-year period. Every value driver, positive and negative, 
is associated with various risks, so we can start by looking at the risks associated with each value 
driver and then combine them to find the overall risk. Once it’s determined we can discount the 
value accordingly to achieve a risk discounted value.
What really matters is how the customer perceives risk, because that perception will influence 
his or hers purchase decisions. When a customer assigns a risk level to a product, he or she often 
compares it to other products and services. The risk premium is therefore a market-driven 
phenomenon. For example, the market line and beta in finance reflect the risk level; however, the 
specific conversion of risk to an actual percentage premium will depend on market forces, so if 
the entire market becomes more or less risky the majority of investors will follow and accept that 
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change, while the actual premium is based on how risky the company is relative to other 
companies. There are two different types of risks: risks associated with the value drivers and risk
associated with the value net.
Value Driver Risk
Value drivers reflect the combination of customer’s need with a solution to that need. Both need 
and solution are associated with risks:
1. Product risk. The product may fail or the availability of supplies or services may be 
discontinued.
2. Customer risk. The customer may no longer need the item, may find a better solution, may 
no longer be able to afford using the product or may find the side effects incompatible with 
his or her value net.
In each category there exist foreseeable value drivers and risks, and surprises that may emerge 
over time. Part of the risk hinges on our inability to predict what the future brings. Even if we 
cannot pinpoint specific risks, people often have an overall feeling for the level of additional risk
and, based on that, they discount the value accordingly. And that holds not only for products, but 
for any value net exchange; for example, there was an engineer who rated his business contacts 
on a “flake factor” scale from 1 to 10, reflecting his impression of their integrity, or lack thereof.
Companies have been adding complements specifically designed to manage or reduce risk,
although rarely do they quantify the impact these measures have in terms of how much more the 
customers will be willing to pay. Some examples of complements are:
 Warranties to reduce the risk associated with product failures or poor quality in general.
 Money-back guarantees and free trial samples to reduce the risk of the product not 
matching the customer’s need.
 Customer-help hotlines to reduce the risk of the customer not figuring out how to use the 
product.
 Free product upgrades to reduce the risk of obsolescence.
 Educational advertisements to help customers identify if a given product suits their needs
and wants, and if so, how to buy and use it.
 Industry standards used to ensure compatibility. The risk of buying a generic computer 
mouse is lower than having a pointing device that only works with one type of computer. 
Even if the mouse fails, and the original supplier goes out of business, there will be another 
supplier who can help. This ties into the idea of safety value nets (p. 60).
While these are risk-mitigating tactics, they carry risks of their own. For example, a company 
may default on the money-back promise or it may take the company a year to fulfill its warranty
obligation, leaving the user without the product during that period.
A brand name and a large ad campaign can signal a lower risk to the consumer: a strong 
company with a good brand name reputation at stake and a budget for a large ad campaign is less 
likely to default on its promises. In fact, there may be comparable benefits of an ad campaign as a 
warranty program in terms of ensuring product quality.53 The boom of franchises is in part based 
on the risk factor: at a restaurant that belongs to a fast food chain we know what we can and will 
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get. A similar restaurant that is independently owned and operated could bring us something 
unexpected. Some customers use the popularity of different stores as a risk gauge, with a popular 
store perceived as less risky.
Some risks remain outside the control of the seller. That does not mean that the seller should 
not worry about them. When the customer failed to follow the instructions, burned the product, 
and does not want to buy another one, it is the customer’s fault, but the company has lost a 
potential repeat customer and must deal with the negative impact that the customer’s negative 
publicity may cause. Therefore, even if it is not our fault, it is still our problem.
We can view the reduced risk as the “core value” of an insurance, and consequently enter the 
risk (or lack thereof) as a value driver. On the other hand, an insurance policy is only a 
complementary product to something else; if it is house insurance the value to us is the house, not 
the insurance. If the insurance costs so much that the homeowner is indifferent to having any, we 
have: The risk-reduced value of the home with insurance is the same as the risk-reduced value of 
the home without insurance plus the price of the insurance premium.54
61
From this viewpoint it is 
still useful to look at the risk as a separate entity in the equation rather than treating it as a 
conventional key variables. Looking at risk-mitigating measures from this perspective opens the 
possibility of putting a dollar value to investments in real options, safety value nets, a speed 
culture or innovation capabilities (See p. ).
Value Net Risk
There are several risks associated with the value net. The company may not have the financial or 
human resources required to deliver as expected. Also, the company may change the business 
focus in a way so that it loses interest in a customer. In small businesses the company may rely 
on a few key people, and if something happens to one of those individuals it may mean failure for 
the entire business or at least discontinuity in the service to some of the customers. There is also 
risk related to the remainder of the value net: New solutions may come to the market that make 
the product superfluous or providers of complements may discontinue their supply, making the 
core product or service useless. 
Some value net configurations are more risky than others. One-stop shopping reduces the risk
because it is more likely that everything bought will work together. For example, software that 
comes preloaded on the computer usually works, while software bought separately may not. A 
single-source supplier will increase the risk because if it goes out of business it can cause a major 
interruption in supplies. That is the reason why some companies55
In reality the risks may not be as large as they appear to be from looking at risk of the 
individual nodes and value drivers. If the supplier is part of a network of companies it reduces the 
risk to the customer, because if the supplier fails, other companies in that network may be able to 
step in and provide assistance, e.g., a value-added reseller may assist the customer to avoid the 
loss of future sales, or if the product turns out to be useless to the buyer it might be possible to 
sell it used. Or there may be tools to reduce certain risks, for example futures markets and long-
term delivery contracts may reduce the risk of future price fluctuations.
require a minimum of two 
independent sources for each component.
C. Market Power
The market power is a measure of the supplier’s ability to appropriate value. Usually businesses 
cannot charge the full risk adjusted value, because they lack the market power to do so. However, 
the customer’s risk adjusted value includes value created not only by the supplier but also by the 
remainder of the value net surrounding that customer. So in theory it is possible for a business to 
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charge for value created by others—if the business has sufficient market power to do so. Often 
we encounter businesses that excel at creating value but are poorly positioned to charge for the 
value they created; some of the failed Internet companies can attest to that. By analyzing the 
market power balances in the value net we can estimate what fraction of the risk-adjusted value 
actually can be charged as a selling price. A transaction always involves multiple value flows, for 
example, a hardware component, a service component and a money component. Each of these 
flows may go in different directions and in varying degrees contribute to the overall aggregate 
market power. For example, in the case of a computer system the customer may posses technical 
resources in house that can provide the service component at a much lower price, therefore 
leaving the supplier with little market power in that area.
Competition depends in part on the proximity to other products in the utilityscape and the 
price differential to those other products. A directly competing product is a product that is “close” 
to another product in terms of value, cost, risk and market power. There are many ways of 
acquiring and managing market power. Uniqueness in any of the value drivers or risk-reducing 
factors can be a basis for a monopoly. A trusted brand name is unique to one supplier and 
therefore a form of monopoly. Exclusive agreements with key suppliers of complements
(complementary products, distributors or service providers) also give market power; however, if 
the market power depends on these organizations, they themselves will be in a good position to 
claim their stake of the value created for the customer.
Table 1. Summary of market power factors
Internal to node External to node
S
u
p
p
ly
 Own supply
 Supplier monopolistic power
 Other barriers to entry
 Knowledge
 Emotions
 Market supply
 Competitors and alternative offerings
 Market structure (company size distribution)
In
te
r-
a
c
ti
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n  Negotiation skills  Legal restrictions favoring either supplier or customer
 Total market size
D
em
a
n
d
 Customer demand
 How badly the customer needs the 
product
 Switching cost
 Knowledge
 Emotions
 Market demand
 Buyer consortia
The more a customer needs a product from a specific supplier, the more market power that 
supplier has. So competition reduces market power, because it creates alternatives for the buyer. 
There are three different types of competition:
 Direct competition from fairly similar products, e.g., one mid-size sedan model versus 
another.
 Indirect competition from products that solve related problems for the customers in other 
ways, e.g., a car versus public transportation. Sectors do compete; for example, if the public 
pension system deteriorates then people will look for alternative sources of retirement 
income, which in turn increases the demand for pension funds, mutual funds and stocks, 
reducing the market power of the buyers of those assets.
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 Competition from unrelated products; e.g., buying a cottage instead of a car. While the car 
and the cottage have little to do with each other, they may both compete for the same 
money. The customer’s budget constraints may significantly reduce the market power of 
the supplier. One “competitor” we always need to keep in mind is the consumer who does 
not want anything at all; after all, we can do entirely without the majority of products and 
services offered today.
There is no clear boundary between one group and the next; however, if I had my eyes set on a 
car, then cottages must be priced low compared to cars, in order for me to consider them, while if 
it is one car versus another then even small price differences may tip my decision one way or 
another. 
A supplier may depend on other companies to deliver complementary offerings, and these 
suppliers claim their own share of the market power. In the case of computers and software 
suppliers, the complement supplier (the software) often exerts more market power than the core 
product (computer) supplier. That has resulted in an average profit margin that is 2.4 times higher 
in the computer software and service industry than in the computer hardware industry.56
In conventional microeconomics the equilibrium price is defined based on supply and demand, 
and in most cases the competition is also the most important factor limiting market power and 
influencing the market price. A large group of customers who desire a product in limited supply 
will give market power to the supplier, thereby allowing a higher price. Competitors to the 
supplier give the customers market power by increasing the overall supply and by offering 
alternatives to the customers.
As the 
customer considers the value of the entire bundle, and that value is limited, it often ends up being 
a market power battle between the various complement suppliers.
Monopolies and cartels can, through the lack of competition, gain significant market power.
Controlling a standard is one way to create a natural monopoly. While a technology-based natural 
monopoly is an excellent source of market power, it can quickly disappear once a new generation 
of technology wins the market. Owning a trade secret, a patent or a trademark is another way to 
gain monopolistic power. Competitors often find ways around these rights, however, allowing 
them to introduce competitive products resulting in a reduced market power. So market power
requires continuous development in order to remain effective.
Many companies and individuals derive income from knowledge associated with market 
power. The knowledge that has lost its market power becomes a common good that it is hard to 
turn into profits (e.g. expired patents). However, most of the standard of living we enjoy today is 
founded on knowledge that was developed in the past, but has lost its market power, and is today 
not even acknowledged for its value.
Interrelationship Between Parameters
Some product characteristics will influence not only the value, but also the risk and the market 
power; for example, the brand equity of a well-known car brand can influence:
Value. It can create direct value for the car’s user by providing the image that the user is seeking; 
maybe the user’s friends will view the driver in a different way when he/she drives a car of this 
brand. The value that counts is the value in the eyes of the customer; therefore intangibles, like 
the way others look at the user, could be important. Of course, not everybody has a positive 
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connotation of a particular brand name; a name cherished by some might be considered as 
snobbish or poor by others.
Risk. While a generic car brand will not suffer much from random quality glitches, a name brand 
could get seriously hurt by that. Therefore, companies cherishing their name brands often monitor 
the quality more closely, and at the same time the supplier of a major name brand is more likely 
to stay in business and deliver on its warranty obligations in case something should go wrong 
than a low-cost supplier that may be fairly ephemeral. Therefore, most customers regard a major 
name brand as less risky than a less known name brand. Again it is the customer’s perception of 
risk that will influence the price he or she will pay, so whatever the customer’s perception is, that 
is the reality we seek.
Market power
In the computer industry we can see a tradeoff between risk and market power. Some large 
computer companies
. For a particular trademarked name brand there is only one brand owner. For 
customers who really want a particular brand, the supplier gains significant market power. Again 
here it is the customer’s perception that defines the market reality.
57
Price
require significant financial transparency from their component suppliers 
to ensure the financial strength required to maintain uninterrupted supply of components. From
the computer company’s’ perspective this reduces the risk because it sees that the component 
suppliers are in a position to deliver. However, at the same time this reduces the component 
suppliers’ market power because their customer knows more about their business. It is an 
interesting balance act for the component supplier, how much financial information it is 
beneficial to reveal.
The price is limited by the value to the customer; the more value the higher the price. However, 
the higher the risk, the more this value is discounted. If we had total market power we could 
charge the customer full risk reduced value (market power = 1), while if we have no market 
power (market power = 0), we can only give the product away. These observations can be 
summarized in the following conceptual price equation:
PowerMarket 
Risk
Value
hPrice 
The factor h is a pricing decision factor discussed below. This equation can be formally derived 
as discussed in Appendix 1 (p. 102). The selling price has nothing to do with the cost; however, 
in a competitive market with competitors with a similar cost structure, new competitors will keep
entering the market and drive the market power down until the price is close to cost, at which 
point no more competitors will want to enter and no further dilution of market power will take 
place. In that case we see how this model is reduced to the conventional micro economic theory 
stating that in a competitive market the market price will equal cost.58
For numerous products and services the market is basically competitive, i.e., cost driven. As 
consumers we tend to refer back to some sort of generic baseline price. Although that price will 
In the case of other factors 
providing market power, such as ownership of a standard or a patent, this dilution of market 
power will not take place and higher prices can be charged.
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change over time, we can at a given moment say we know “what is a reasonable price.” If it was 
regular gasoline we may as a consumer recognize that some gas stations offer more than the basic 
product, e.g., it may be a brand name, full service or it may offer one-stop shopping convenience 
for gas, newspapers and food. Let’s say the market has defined the baseline price and we assume 
we cannot influence it. Then we can look at how we can price our product above or below that 
baseline price based on how we score in terms of relative value, relative risk managing 
capabilities and the relative market power we have compared to the generic product sold in a 
generic store.
The pricing decision factor, h, reflects how we choose to price the product relative to what the 
different customers are willing to pay. If we look at one customer, the theoretical price ceiling, or 
the highest attainable market price, is basically the price that will result in zero customer profit,
i.e., the pricing decision factor equals one. If we have a list price, rather than a different price for 
each customer, then we will have to take a pricing decision that implies that we charge less than 
some customers are willing to pay, and above that for other customers. We may be setting the 
price low if we are aiming at gaining market share, establishing a standard or signaling a potential 
competitor that they should not enter the market space. It is therefore common that the price is set 
at a level less than the market power is permitting us to do, i.e., the factor h is less than one.
Table 2. Examples of proxies used for variables in the price equation
Variable Proxy
Value Scores on different value drivers, savings to the customer, enhanced earning potential to the 
customer.
Risk and 
risk
mitigation
Prices and sales volumes of extended warranty programs. Price volatility during a quarter.59 Type 
of good (fashionable, seasonal, or baseline).60 If the product is a stock then we can use the widely 
adopted beta for stocks.61
Market 
power
Brand recognition, advertisement, market share, government regulations (e.g., government-granted 
monopoly), market size/structure, number of suppliers and number of buyers), firm size 
inequality,62 buying power, profit margins. If we assume that companies tend to optimize profits, 
then we can correlate public available profit data (e.g., from annual reports) with the various 
factors that traditionally tend to increase market power, such as patents, company size versus 
competitors, market share, and benefits from laws and regulations. 
Dynamic Changes in the Price Equation Variables
Value. Radical innovation often involves the extension of existing utilityscapes or the creation of 
entirely new utilityscapes. That leads to a focus on value creation, and many startups are built 
around a strong value proposition. It is not uncommon to see businesses that, at the time of 
funding, aim at offering their customers a value-to-dollar ratio that is one to two orders of 
magnitude better than the incumbent competitors.63 Lead users have the highest need, the most 
involvement and on average the most skills, and are therefore valuating the product the highest. 
As the audience gets broader, customers with less urgent a need may join the market, causing a 
The market price is: PowerMarket 
Risk
Value
hPrice 
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decline in the average value to the customer. However, if the product requires familiarity, 
complementary products, or a large user base in order to become useful, then the value will 
increase over time. Many products are perishable because the needs keep changing; for example, 
old magazines and outdated computers usually fail to meet the value expectations of customers, 
of course, unless you into collecting historical items.
Risk. A new product from a startup is typically associated with significant risk: neither the 
company nor the product has a track record and the customers face uncertainty in terms of how to 
use the product. These risks have been termed liability of newness.64 Venture capitalists often 
seek to reduce this uncertainty by bringing experienced entrepreneurs on board early on. Because 
early adopters often have the highest need, the risk that it will not be useful to them is the lowest. 
However, customers have yet to gain confidence in the product and the supplier, and develop an 
understanding of the usage, so from that perspective the risk is highest in the beginning and then 
ebbs as time passes.
Market power
A sole supplier’s market power will go up over time as the market grows: each customer 
becomes less important, and the supplier becomes a more important player in the value net
relative to its suppliers and companies offering complements; e.g., a publisher of “how-to-use” 
manuals becomes more interested as the sales volume of the product goes up.
. A startup exploring a radical innovation will usually gain a short period of 
market monopoly until competitors decrease the market power by bringing competing offerings 
to the market. Therefore, time to market becomes important. Companies have been exploring 
many different strategies for maintaining market power, from creating a steady stream of new 
products to relocating to a central and unique location in the value net. Even in the beginning it 
may be challenging to claim market power because a new company or a new product may lack 
brand recognition and there will not be widespread market awareness about the product, thereby 
limiting the market power. While a new product may offer unique advantages to the customer, it 
is competing for the same disposable income and the same limited time for consumption as all 
the other offerings in the marketplace. For a product released two days ago, every potential 
customer knows that two days ago they lived without that product, and most likely can continue 
doing so.
Pricing decision factor. Often the pricing decision factor changes over time depending on the 
pricing strategy; however, if the market becomes more competitive, the possible range (i.e., the 
difference between highest price that can be charged and cost) drops, reducing the pricing
strategy options. 
Marketing
 Value. Marketing can be used for customer education; teaching customers the usefulness of 
the product or service. This creates a sense of need among the customers or it creates 
dreams that the customers would like to fulfill. This makes the customer aware of the value 
that they can obtain through a purchase.
. Each of the basic variables in the price equation is addressed by marketing in 
different ways:
 Risk. In particular if the company, the brand and the product are unknown, customers often 
like assurances that this is not just a scam, and marketing can do that. Some customers 
interpret a major marketing campaign as a signal from the seller that “we are in this for the 
long run,” giving the customer confidence.
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 Market power. Awareness among customers, such as improved brand recognition or 
reminders that this product is in the market. Marketing could also support the creation of a 
brand-based culture shared among the users.
So marketing supports the establishment of value, risk and market power perceptions among 
customers. As a product moves through its product life cycle, we can expect the marketing to 
change. For a traditional product the focus may over time be changing from value and risk
reduction to awareness, brand recognition and other market power related efforts.
Pricing Strategy
Some businesses focus on one part or another of the price equation, and they may select a 
different pricing decision factor (h), or gradually change these choices over time leading to 
different pricing strategies. Some extreme pricing strategies include:
Full pricing equation driven strategy: Market Skimming is a strategy that seeks to optimize 
the profit over time by gradually lowering the price and expanding the market to include more of 
the reluctant customers. The largest challenge may be that competitors feel invited to join the 
market during the early phases where prices are high, and subsequently it may be hard to get rid 
of these competitors. If there is no list price, but customers are quoted individually, then this can 
be taken one step further by adjusting the quotes according to the value, risk and market power
specific to each customer—if we can estimate it.
Strategy for companies lacking market power: Cost Plus is a modest margin above cost
typically seen in commodity markets where the market power is weak.
Market power driven strategy: Killer Pricing is explored by companies that want to drive the 
competition out, and then subsequently enjoy higher market power. During the initial killer
phase, market power is taken away from the competition, and during the subsequent harvest 
phase the higher market power in the absence of the competitors is used to claim higher profits. 
Alternatively, the killer pricing for one product can be used to earn more on other products, as 
was the case with the free web-browsers.
Value and pricing decision factor driven strategy: Premium Pricing is used for some high-
end products. A pricing decision factor chosen to limit the market size can signal value and add 
to the customer’s perception of exclusivity.
Risk driven strategy: Penetration Pricing
Much has been written about pricing strategies for new products.
is used to establish market confidence. For a new 
product the customer’s risk is high because the product, the company and/or the usage are not 
well known. Some companies recognize the adverse effect this high risk has, and adjust the price
accordingly. Discounts to new customers are trickier. They may make more people try the 
product, but it sends the message that loyal repeat customers are not appreciated as they have to 
pay more than the first-time buyers.
65 In selecting an optimal 
quantity-price evolution, consider to what extent the product depends on a large user base to 
become a valuable product for the customer. A market skimming pricing strategy with a high 
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initial price that is subsequently gradually lowered may be good for stand-alone products 
delivering a direct value to the user. For products where the value goes up with the number of 
users (telephones, Internet), it may be advantageous to grow the market quickly through an initial 
low price strategy. A low price strategy may also act as a weak barrier, or deterrent, against new 
competitors. However, growing a low price strategy into a high margin profit generating 
enterprise can be a challenge; just look at most Internet companies. Identifying what strategy
makes the most sense is much easier after the full profit evaluation has been completed, as 
described in the following chapters.
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Chapter 7
Cost
Having discussed what drives revenue for a new product, we still need to look at the cost in order 
to evaluate the profit potential. Numerous movements in management focused on the cost side of 
the business, including reengineering, operations research and just-in-time (JIT).66
Just like the buyer, the seller exchanges both positive and negative value drivers. The positive 
ones include typically both money paid by the customer and non-monetary income, such as 
customer information, and feedback about the products that can lead to higher future sales. The 
negative value is mostly “cost” in one form or another.
Without 
attempting to add to this wealth of tools, this chapter focuses on providing some structure that can 
facilitate determining how profits depend on the strategy selected. While written with a 
manufacturer in mind, the concepts apply equally well to any type of business.
Cost Components
We can look at four different types of cost (Table 3). The center column in Table 3 relates to the 
cost associated with developing and manufacturing the products; the right column relates to 
acquiring and supporting customers. If we want to know what products to manufacture, each type 
of product should be accounted for separately, and if we want to know which customers or 
groups of customers we want to serve67
Table 3. Examples of the four components of cost
we need to keep them separate in the accounting as well.
Internal cost Customer related cost
Fixed cost/upfront investment R&D, plant and tooling, marketing Getting a specific customer
Variable cost/volume
dependent
Materials, labor Maintaining and supporting a customer
Figure 16. Pyramid diagram illustrating the relative balance between cost components for 
different types of products
Manually 
made 
products
Internal fixed cost
Direct variable cost, 
scarce resources
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volume 
manufacturing
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products
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Customer 
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Any product or service will contain some fraction of all four cost components; however, the 
relative importance varies widely depending on the type of business (Figure 16). Analyzing the 
impact of different levels of investments in fixed versus variable cost, and product versus 
customer cost, allows us to better understand different strategic options, including the benefits of
higher volume or specific types of target markets.
Customer specific fixed cost is what it costs to acquire the customer in the first place. This 
includes targeted promotions, demos and presentations. It may be necessary to write contracts, set 
up accounts and establish a payment mechanism. Customer specific fixed cost creates network 
competition. When you develop a well functioning network of distributors and customers, the 
marginal cost of adding one more complementary service or product is much smaller than if you 
have to build a new network. Why? Each tie in this kind of human network is costly. When a 
company acquires another company to gain access to their customers we sometimes see a fairly 
large premium paid; this premium reflects, in part, the investments it would otherwise take to 
build this customer network up anew.
Customer specific variable cost is what the company needs to spend to maintain a customer.
Some software companies found this cost component to be significant. And, some customers will 
cost more than what they pay to the company.68 Companies that manufacture small lot sizes, or 
even a lot-size-of-one, may find a fuzzy line between the customer specific variable cost and the 
internal (manufacturing) variable cost; however, for a lot-size-of-one it is essential to know what 
each customer really costs, to avoid losing excessively on “expensive” customers. Some indirect 
customer specific costs can be hard to quantify. For example, a dissatisfied customer may be 
“expensive” because he or she spreads bad news about a product.
Internal variable cost is often related to scarce resources, including raw materials and direct 
labor. The key to this kind of cost is to save. Conventional, or close to perfect, competition as 
described by Adam Smith69 often appears in markets where the scarce resource cost is dominant.
These markets have low barriers to entry, little economy of scale, and were dominant in pre-
industrial times. Over time, value creation evolved from relying on scarce resources such as raw 
materials and labor to an ever-increasing exploration of knowledge and leverage.
Internal fixed cost includes the costs required for planning the business, gathering market 
intelligence, developing new company core competencies, developing the products and services,
developing the manufacturing processes, acquiring the manufacturing equipment and the 
facilities, creating a brand image and general marketing. In one way or another, this can be 
characterized as knowledge stored in people’s heads, on paper, in computer files or embodied in 
equipment—and later used to create the products. When this component constitutes a significant 
portion of the total cost we may talk about the knowledge economy,70
The cost faced by the customer in many ways resembles the cost faced by a supplier. They 
have both fixed cost (e.g., surveying the market) and variable cost (e.g., purchasing the item). 
And they benefit from leverage, e.g., by purchasing products that can be utilized in many 
different value nets: the same car can be used to transport people, transport goods, plow snow and 
deliver power for a variety of hydraulic tools.
but in reality it exists in all 
industrial economies. Typically, higher knowledge content reduces the need for labor and raw 
materials, enhances productivity, and reduces the marginal cost. Examples of products dominated 
by this internal fixed cost include automated manufacturing systems, software and movies.
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Leverage
Initial fixed cost investments can lead to high knowledge content and subsequent production 
characterized by a low marginal cost through leverage of this knowledge. In this book the word 
leverage is not used, as it traditionally is in finance, for the fraction of long-term debt to total 
capital; rather, it expresses the ability to create more value with less scarce resources as a result 
of prior investments in knowledge and tooling embodying such knowledge. There are three 
different ways of acquiring leverage:
1. Create internally controlled resources, such as conventional IP.
2. Collaborate with external entities. Some companies excel at leveraging on assets (including 
know-how) that belong to other organizations. Dell Computers is a classical example where 
its suppliers take over portions of the production and provide extensive leverage based on 
the high volumes, not only from Dell, but also from the other computer companies supplied 
by these companies.71
3. Benefit from general trends or waves in society such as fashion. Starting a wave does not 
mean benefiting from riding it, but riding against the wave can be difficult.
Another example is StandardMEMS, which when in business, 
employed a strategy of leverage on the R&D abilities present at a number of external 
research organizations.
During the agricultural revolution in the Middle Ages and during the industrial revolution,
processes were developed. Once a process was developed it was applied over and over again to 
create more value with a minimum of direct labor input. The leverage of knowledge embedded in 
manufacturing tools makes it possible to benefit from economy of scale in manufacturing, 
promoting fewer and larger businesses. Leverage is easier to achieve for certain types of products 
than for others, and it may require significant upfront investments.
Industrial- and other knowledge-based products are only manufactured when the volume is 
sufficiently large to justify the initial investments in knowledge, processes and equipment 
required. Leverage becomes more important as the market increases in terms of number of 
customers and their ability to purchase. At the onset of the industrial revolution the first target 
areas were high-volume products such as textiles, food and bricks for limited geographic regions 
with a large population count. As the economy grew, more products became industrially 
manufactured, with poor regions staying longer with the pre-industrial production processes. The 
larger the market the more people will benefit from the intellectual part of a product such as a 
design, a patent, the content on a CD or the literary content of a book. In recent times new areas 
have become subject to leverage, such as electronic trade which achieves greater leverage than 
conventional store-retail trade as fewer employees can serve larger groups of customers. As the 
world population increases, and in particular as their purchasing power increases, more products 
and services can economically benefit from high fixed-cost investments. Over time we can expect 
a product to go through an S-learning curve72
The importance of leverage and intellectual content for a few different product groups is 
illustrated in
which basically reflects how the leverage normally 
increases over time and eventually flattens out.
Figure 17. In this figure asset groups are plotted in two dimensions with the 
intellectual part of the value as a percentage of total value on one axis and leverage on the other 
axis.
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Cost 47
Figure 17. Intellectual content and leverage for different product groups
In the information revolution, products and services with almost no raw material content were 
created. Economy of scale became now even more important than before, as the incremental cost
of additional production approached zero. Increasing returns73 and hyper competition74
When the same information and pictures are presented to readers of many different 
newspapers all subscribing to the same news service, the publishers benefit from leverage created 
by syndication.
are often 
seen in markets where knowledge related cost dominates. Here success depends on extensive 
economy of scale, and the natural equilibrium state is often a monopoly.
75 Syndication is traditionally associated with information intensive products;
however, know-how embedded in manufacturing tools or products manufactured for many 
companies could just as well be the basis. The increase in virtual companies and strategic 
alliances76
The shortening of product life cycles and customization of products both reduce the leverage,
i.e., less products shipped for a given initial investment in R&D and tooling. On the other hand 
this is counteracted by modularity, flexible automation and products that can be used in more 
than one value net. Modularity consists of basic building blocks that can be used in numerous 
products, like the CD read head of a CD player that can go into any type CD drive, CD player or, 
in a slightly modified form, DVD player. Flexible automation aims at reducing the needs for 
product specific investments in tooling, so the assembly line can be rearranged and reconfigured 
to produce a different product in a short period of time while maintaining the leverage of a fully 
automated production line.
has opened new possibilities for syndication in manufacturing. Likewise,
manufacturing process license agreements and franchises offer opportunities in this area.
A good organization is the human counterpart of a good manufacturing process: the 
organization induces knowledge and structure that enhance the combined value output from each 
of the individuals in the organization. Organizations are designed to create efficiency in the 
delivery of value to the customers—or at least they should be designed in that manner. Inefficient 
bureaucracies survive too often due to benefits from the other areas such as economy of scale in 
manufacturing.
77
K
n
o
w
-h
o
w
 i
n
 v
a
lu
e-
a
d
d
ed
 p
ro
ce
ss
Processed 
goods
Technical 
products
Know-how
Leverage
100%
0%
Raw 
materials
Manual     Tools     Automated    Parallel               
                                           manufacturing
Services
Internet services
Software
Micro electronics
Automobiles
Minerals
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Cost 48
Time Changes in Cost
Most startups and new products are facing a steep learning curve, and it can be difficult for them 
to avoid high costs initially. The cost per unit often decreases as we go down the learning curve;
however, as the market becomes more competitive, keeping the cost low becomes increasingly 
important. Fixed cost is not quite constant, as high volumes will require more expensive 
manufacturing facilities, but within certain bounds it is fixed. The customer specific cost may go 
either way over time. In general, late adopters need more support and more selling efforts; 
however, at that stage the user friendliness of the product has been improved and more 
supporting products are available making it easier for the supplier. In competitive markets the 
cost benefits associated with learning are translated into a reduced market price. For example, for 
solar cells the learning curve is reflected in steadily decreasing market prices (Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Price to the end user ($/W peak power) for solar cells (photovoltaic) as it 
decreases with increasing volume
78
66
William L. Ducan, Luftig & Warren International, 1995, Total Quality, Key Terms and Concepts, American Management 
Association, New York, NY, 187 p.
67
Benson P. Shapiro, V. Kasturi Rangan, Rowland T. Moriarty & Elliot B. Ross, 1987, Managing customers for profits (not just 
sales), Harvard Business Review, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 101-108, September-October 1987.
68
Robert S. Kaplan, 1989, Management Accounting for Advanced Technological Environments, Science, vol. 245, no. 4920, 
pp. 819-823, 25 Aug. 1989.
69
Adam Smith, 1776, The Wealth of Nations; edited and annotated by Cannan, Edwin, 1994; introduction by Alan B. Krueger, 
2003, Bantam Dell, Random House, Inc., New York, 1231 p.
70
L. C. Thurow, 1999, Building Wealth, The New Rules for Individuals, Companies, and Nations in a Knowledge-Based 
Economy, Harper Collins, New York, 301 p.
71
D. Kirkpatrick, 1997, Now Everyone in PCs Wants to Be Like Mike, Fortune, vol. 136, Issue 5, pp. 91-92, 8 Sept. 1997 and 
G. McWilliams, 1997, Whirlwind on the Web, Business Week, issue 3521, pp. 132-136, 7 April 1997.
72
P. Conley, 1970, Experience curves as a planning tool, IEEE Spectrum, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 63-68, June 1970; R. N. Foster, 
1986, Innovation. The Attacker's Advantage, Summit Books, New York, 316 p. and B. C. Twiss, 1980, Managing 
technological innovation, Longman, New York, 239 p.
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Cost 49
73
W. Brian Arthur, 1996, Increasing Returns and the New World of Business, Harvard Business Review, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 100-
109, July- Aug. 1996.
74
Richard A. D’Aveni, with Robert Gunther, 1994, Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Maneuvering, The 
Free Press, New York, 421 p.
75
K. Werbach, 2000, Syndication. The Emerging Model for Business in the Internet Era, Harvard Business Review, vol. 78, no. 
3, pp. 84-93, May-June 2000.
76
J. A. Byrne, R. Brandt & O. Port, 1993, The Virtual Corporation, Business Week, Issue 3304, pp. 98-102, 8 Feb. 1993.
77
An example of such as system is the AssemblyFlex system from DT Industries.
78
The graph is based on data from A. Shah, P. Torres, R. Tscharner, N. Wyrsch & H. Keppner, 1999, Photovoltaic Technology: 
The Case for Thin-film Solar Cells, Science, 30 July 1999, vol. 285, pp. 692-698. The line drawn represents the relationship 
Price = 16.31-4.19*log(quantity sold). This data does not include the later price increases due to raw material shortages.
50
Chapter 8
Profit-Loss Estimate
Looking at one customer, Figure 19 illustrates how value, risk, market power and cost fit together 
conceptually. The size of the outer circle represents the total value to the user. By subtracting the 
risk, we obtain a smaller circle that represents the risk-discounted value. By identifying the 
market power we can further scale this circle down to a smaller circle that represents the 
maximum price we can charge the customer. Starting at the other end we can estimate cost. The 
difference between the total cost circle and the maximum price circle leaves us with a ring, the 
thickness of which represents the range of feasible profits. Depending on the pricing decision we 
will capture more or less of that profit. The profit that is not captured by the seller could be 
considered the profit for the customer. That is the difference between what the customer would 
have been willing to pay and what was actually paid, shown as money left on the table (mlt) in 
the figure. There is a loss, if the cost ring is larger than price ring.
In going from one customer to an entire market we have the overall profit given by:
Profit = Price * Volume – Cost
The price was discussed in Chapter 6, the volume in Chapter 5 and the cost in Chapter 7. In 
business-to-business sales, we may know enough about the individual customers to be able to 
understand the entire value equation and we may be giving individual quotes, thereby allowing 
for customized pricing decisions. In the consumer markets the number of customers is much 
higher, our knowledge about the individual customers will be less and other measures are needed 
to evaluate how price influences volume.
If the utilityscape has one axis describing cost-efficiency to the end user, then any change in 
price will directly influence the product’s position in the utilityscape. As the utilityscape is a map 
of product popularity, a new position gives us an estimate of how that will influence sales up or 
down (Figure 20). One of the case studies (Chapters 12-13) later in the book goes a step further in 
looking at the market share among products all occupying a certain region of the utilityscape and 
showing how price and other factors influence that market share, total volume and how they can 
be used to estimate elasticity of demand. In that case study the estimates are based on historical 
data, but could alternatively be based on surveys of different customer segments.
An alternative approach takes its starting point in the demand curve in conventional 
microeconomics. It shows how different customers will value a given offering and we can adapt 
that to the present situation. As the price goes down we should expect more customers to make 
purchases and/or each of them to make more purchases. However, the marginal value of each 
additional purchase (by the same or another customer) will likely diminish (Figure 21).
Likewise the discounted value (per unit) will be diminishing, and it will likely diminish faster 
than the value because the risk for the most hesitant customers will be higher—they may, for 
example, not be sure that this product will meet their needs at all. Again, when we take market 
power into account we can expect an even steeper line, because the most hesitant customers will 
be considering the widest range of alternative product/services. These are the ones who most 
likely will be able to do without this product at all. The cost curve in Figure 21 is drawn so it 
approaches the fixed cost at low volumes and asymptotically approaches the variable cost at high 
volumes. The hatched area is the region that can yield a profit, and the vertical distance between 
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the total cost curve and the maximum price, taking market power into account, shows the 
maximum potential profit per unit. The maximum total profit is given by multiplying this by the 
volume.
Figure 19. Profit or loss to seller. The area of the cross-hatched ring represents profit. “mlt”
is money left on the table. The outermost two rings are determined by the buyer, the 
innermost two rings are determined by the seller and the center ring is determined by the 
market interactions. The triangle in the background illustrates these three main forces: 
buyer, seller and market.
Figure 20. Simplified utilityscape, with areas of higher demand in darker colors; the arrow 
shows the effect of lowering the price
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Figure 21. Aggregate value diagram
In practice, drawing these lines (which most likely are non-linear curves) can be done by 
surveying representative customers from the different customers segments, starting with the 
pioneers and early adopters and finishing with the late majority.79
Figure 22
The quantity on the x-axis is 
the actual volume that can be expected to be sold, taking into account the likely purchase 
decisions (or probability of a purchase) by different groups of customers and the number of 
customers in each group. 
summarizes the combined effect of the typical changes discussed here for the 
different phases of the life cycle. The graph does not represent a sufficiently long time span to 
reach an ideal competitive situation where marginal cost is approximately equal to the selling 
price—most markets never reach that stage.
Figure 22. Typical value, price, cost and profit evolution. The abrupt vertical offsets along 
the profit zone reflect introduction of competitive products
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Chapter 9
Innovation
Innovation by the human community has been shaping history ever science the Stone Age. It has 
been pointed out as a lasting competitive advantage80
Figure 23
and it is clearly a way to create value. If
innovation can take place fast enough it can be used to overcome unforeseen changes in the 
market. Innovation is not only focused on product development, but just as much on creating new 
business strategies and new value nets ( ).
Figure 23. Bringing a new product to the market. Innovation takes place at the business, 
product and market side. This chapter focuses on steps 2 and 3 (idea creation and initial 
evaluation) in each of those three areas.
Innovation has become one of the big buzz words in twenty-first century business and there are 
today many methods that aim at turning innovation and new product development into a 
predictable science. Creating ideas at random and hope that the customers will be excited about 
them is risky and often costly business. Having an innovation factory where only one of every 
million projects fail to become a huge market success is utopia. We are all somewhere between 
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these two extremes - but where? And how much better could we do? The three basic steps of (1) 
defining the problem, (2) create ideas, and (3) go through the initial screening of the ideas, are 
discussed in this chapter. A business success requires the combination of:
1. Directing the innovation process in a way so that the ideas as much as possible offers 
feasible solutions to the customers needs and
2. Evaluating the ideas repeated times, with a willingness to discard suboptimal ideas.
Defining the Problem
“Go and create something great” is often too vague to get the thoughts going in a fruitful 
direction – so bringing a market oriented starting point on the table may help. Here is a list of 
questions taking that approach:
 Some companies find that being at the customer’s command is not enough, because 
most clients lack the knowledge and imagination to go far beyond the current 
generation of technology. Better results can be obtained by first observing the client’s 
behavior and really comprehending the client’s needs and then proceeding to be 
creative in developing a new product.81
 Look at gaps in the utilityscapes. Where are the underserved market opportunities? 
Including cost to solve problems.
Which jobs need to be accomplished (the 
value drivers)? Which areas do we need to improve upon?
 What are the customers asking for?
 Look at trends – what can you expect next? where should we be in 5 years? how can 
we achieve that?
 Imagine that you could do magic – what would you do? In other words, forget all the 
limitations imposed by what is possible today, what would you really like to do?
 Imagine that our product was free – how would you use it?
82
 Imagine that we had unlimited resources – what would you like to do?
 Imagine that you were the competition – how would you beat us?
 Imagine that the competition did what you are planning on doing – what would you do 
to counteract it?
 Imagine that the project had already failed – why do you think it did?83
 Imagine that you only had half the resources – what would you do (i.e. what is the 
most important?)
And how 
could we have avoided that?
Innovation implies a change over time (i.e. a time derivative). Most of us tend to think of (1) 
what we have now and (2) what we will have when we are done – as two discrete stages of 
existence. An alternative would be to think in terms of processes – how can we create processes 
that keeps moving us in the desired direction. In that way there will never be a finite end state,
rather an ever changing situation. Inventing an “end stage” or a “process” is often very different, 
but what will serve the business best?
Realizing and verbalizing the problem is half of what it takes to find a 
solution
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The Innovators
Here is an incomplete list of sources of innovations:
Employees. Foster an internal innovation culture, make sure that people with different 
backgrounds connect. Hire people with ideas and solutions.
Customers. Some great products grew out of customer-generated ideas, customer complaints, 
surveys mapping the customer’s needs or looking at competitors who are not living up to the 
customer’s expectations.84
Technologies / research. Another common starting point is for companies to look for suitable
usages for a technology they already have or are developing. By finding applications in many 
different fields it may be possible to achieve high volumes and good leverage in a relatively short 
period of time.
Innovation harvesting. People proudly put lots of great ideas out in the public domain, and 
maybe some of them can contribute to the solution we are looking for. Alternatively, networks of 
external domain experts may have answers and awareness of what will be coming. By knowing 
what we need and where to look, we may be able to get a head start and a faster development 
cycle subsequently.85
Innovation outsourcing. Have outside contractors sell you ideas, which they either develop or 
have previously developed elsewhere.86
Idea sharing. Looking toward other areas for solutions often proves fruitful. For example, 
methods developed in medicinal research may be applied to research into superconductors; 
however, almost any learning process could initiate innovation.87 What one person says is not 
exactly what another person hears: when a piece of information is transmitted it moves from one 
context to another, in which it may take on a new meaning and spur new ideas. 
Customer do-it-yourself innovation. The food flavor manufacturer, Bush Boake Allen
pioneered in giving the customers tools that allow them to design their own products.88
Manufacturing continues at large plants serving many clients, to allow for economy of scale and 
leverage of resources.
Manufacturing by the customer. There is nothing like giving customers the tools they need to 
create value for themselves. The extreme in customer-driven innovation is to give customers both 
the tools and the manufacturing capabilities to create their own products. Computer controlled 
desktop manufacturing is an example of this.89
Given the opportunity anybody can innovate
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Creating Ideas for Solutions
The more fundamental or disruptive change is sought the harder it is to come up with an idea for 
a solution. We can here look at three different levels of innovation, with level one being the 
hardest. Typically an innovation will have to go through the high levels below it before it 
becomes practical and ready to move on, so a level two innovation will need to go through level 
three before moving on.
Level 3: Applications of existing methods
Example: An engineer calculating the dimensions of a beam in a house or a farmer feeding the 
animals using prior experience to provide the right feed stuff in the right quantity. Some of the 
level 3 tools are:
 Knowledge Management – making existing solutions available in an efficient manner
 Best practice
 Recipes
 Equations and software
 Mechanical and manufacturing tools and know how
Level 2: Recombining existing ideas or applying existing solutions to new problems
Example: When we combine ideas from micrographs of bird bones with knowledge of metallurgy
to create high strength – low weight structural members, we are combining existing knowledge to 
solve a problem. Some techniques to foster level 2 innovation are:
 Find people who has worked in multiple fields, or bringing people together from multiple 
fields to solve the problem.
 Identify emerging technologies or new enabling technologies, look for existing 
applications where they can outperform the incumbent technology
 Look for new applications – that have so far not been feasible
 Apply existing technologies to areas they are currently not serving
 At a conceptual level, which other fields have had to solve a similar problem, and how did 
they do it?
Technically you should not be able to get a patent for a level 2 innovation, however, almost every 
patent issued falls in this category, when you look at it conceptually.
Enabling technologies can often open for the possibility of leapfrogging in terms of 
performance, capabilities and/or cost. From an innovation perspective it is often easier said than 
done because, it takes a lot of insights to fully appreciate the possibilities and limitations of a new 
enabling technology. This appreciation is here called an enabling mindset. Acquiring that mindset 
early on in the process is often critical to success. In other words you need that understanding 
when you conceptually design the product or process, not when the equipment arrives.
Level 1: Conceptually New
Example: Viewing light as a particle rather than as a wave, as previously done, opened the mind 
to a number of solutions in photonics. However, very few ideas are conceptually new. They will 
typically extend the utilityscape in one or more dimensions, or even add an entirely new 
dimension. Some of the level 1 innovation issues are:
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 Overcoming the mental limitations imposed by the languages used in external 
communications, as it tend to influence our perception and description of the world 
around us and thus the framework in which ideas are formed. People with a visual mind 
can to some degree overcome the language limitations.
 Shared values and ideas, from fashion to language and religion. By accepting these ideas 
we gain membership in communities providing various benefits. However, by getting 
used to accepting ideas we train ourselves in reducing the questioning and alternative 
seeking process. Loners or small isolated communities may be in a better position to 
innovate, e.g. a skunk work team working independent of a large corporation. Just like it
has been proposed that small isolated clusters of animals living in marginal areas, are the 
ones most likely to undergo speciation.90
 Experience making our mind force fit problems into solutions, or accept current 
perceptions of where the boundaries to the impossible is. Newcomers to the field are often 
better at innovation.
Evaluating / Screening Ideas
The following rhetorical questions will make it clear that looking at the product or project out of 
its context in terms of internal and external value nets may not be very helpful:
 Some ideas stick.91
 Some ideas catch on in the market? But how do we know how well they will do and 
spread by word of mouth? Marketing will contribute to the creation of messages that 
customers spread, but were the future marketing campaigns included in the research that 
was used to decide the chances of success?
Are those the ones you should move forward with? What if they stick 
among management but not among the customers? Is the project likely to move forward if 
the idea does not catch on with management?
 Is a historical success a guarantee for a future success? If steam engines used to dominate 
the railroads, should that be the next investment?
 If market research shows what the customer really wants, does it matter who delivers it?
Does a locomotive company have the same possibilities marketing the next “hit” soft 
drink as The Coca-Cola Company does?
A commercial project will fail if any one of the following fails:
 Success meeting customer need at the right price
 Success at ensuring that the customer has everything else he/she needs in order to utilize 
the product, including availability of complementary products
 Success in getting the message out and having access to the customer
 Success in cost management
 Success in making the employees / managers buy-in. A failure could be driven by fear of 
loosing the job if the project succeeds
 Success in execution, in a timely manner
Most of this book is dedicated to the first of these three items. In general successful innovation is 
characterized by:
Good ideas are self evident - but only after they have been discovered
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 Changing the whole system
Table 4
for the better. Innovation is only successful if the whole 
system works. A full system evaluation (the 3C s in ) is needed
 Follows a path that goes through a series of achievable stages: Each stage addresses the 
resistance to change and investments needed
 The Company is only one out to the 3-Cs (see Table 4), so success is subject to a path that 
the two other Cs will or have to accept
 Willingness to cut losses, abandon ideas, reduce scope and cost, save time and change
established culture
Table 4. The Three Cs.
Customer Company Competition / external orgs
Value (does it do the job?) Value proposition Alternatives solutions, commoditization of 
product, competition for attention
Liking it / feeling in tune with it Brand, positioning Social context / values plus fashion
Accessible to customer Distribution channels Competition for “space” in front of the 
customer
Affordable, cost management Pricing Setting the perception of what is a fair price
Abilities Customer support General resources
Bandwidth / interest in 
“listening”
Marketing Competing marketing and other information
Perception of the company Company culture and mission Norms and expectations
System Dynamics
When we introduce an innovation the conventional thinking is that it spreads from the early 
adapters to the late majority,92 which from a marketing perspective is very useful. What the more 
significant innovations also do is alter the system which consists of the consumers, competitors, 
suppliers, lawmakers, and so on, and that takes much longer. So the introduction of a mobile 
phone, first spread and then changed the way we view, use and expect mobile communication 
(oral, visual, text, etc.) to work and it changed the way we live, work and interact with each other.
In that way the mobile phone changed the system and these changes affected the customer wishes
and expectations. Some of these changes do not show up until long after near-complete adoption 
of the innovation. In part because they are limited by culture, and do not occur until new 
generations, who have grown up with the technology, replace the generations of people to whom 
the technology was introduced as something foreign. Some of the inventions introduced 50 – 150
years ago (from snack food to personalized transportation solutions) are still causing changes in 
the way people are and live today compared to last year, e.g. percentage of obese people and 
demand for exercise equipment and gym facilities.
Analytics can reduce the risk at a low cost.  
Implementation can positively prove the concept at a high cost.  
For larger projects we need both.
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We can look at the market as a network of interconnected entities. If the knowledge of a new 
product spreads like a virus, then who-know-who and who is exposed to which marketing venues 
determines the sequence of adaptation among the population. However, the long term market 
response to the innovation is more similar to the development of immune responses to the virus.
It can take a lot longer than contracting the illness to get well again, and it will have a lasting 
effect on the population (e.g. immune to future attacks of the same virus).
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Chapter 10
Unpredictable Changes
Business is usually about change. Because of never-ending changes in the value nets and the 
utilityscapes any product will see changes in the way customers perceive value, risk and market 
power. At the same time, businesses initiate changes by applying new technologies, or by finding 
new ways of commercially exploring existing technologies. Whether it is a new business, a new 
product or a new market, its evolution is often driven by predictable changes in price,
utilityscape, volume and cost. Understanding the dynamics can help us plan a successful product 
life or company growth. We may, for example, aim at moving a product gradually from a 
specialty niche position to being a mass market product as the technology matures and more 
people adopt it, i.e., going from “early markets” (innovators, early adopters) to “mainstream 
markets” (early majority, late majority).93
Some changes, however, defy prediction—causing a lot of harm and grief—and certainly 
deserving a chapter of their own. Such changes often originate outside of the organization and 
could be viewed as market turbulence with an extreme magnitude. Turbulence becomes a source 
of opportunity if we prepare for it, but failure if we are unprepared. So what does it take to be 
prepared? No human will ever be able to preview everything: how can we predict the nature of an 
ingenious invention or a totally new business strategy? While there may not exist any miracle 
medicine for a company hit by surprise, there certainly are prescriptions to make the company 
less vulnerable. A few approaches are discussed here.
Some people have smoke detectors and fire extinguishers in their homes, in case of a small 
mishap in the kitchen or elsewhere. Those are planned responses to minor local surprises and we 
use our own tools for them. Big problems, like a major fire, are dealt with by the fire department 
and the fire insurance. For those circumstances we rely on other entities in the value net outside 
of our direct control, but entities that we, before the incident, formed ties with, such as signing up 
for a fire insurance or supporting the formation of a fire department in our community.
External Safety Value Nets
What businesses are traditionally poorly equipped to deal with are the unpredictable changes, 
such as a competitor introducing a “market killer” product that “steels” the entire customer base.
The answer may not be a huge R&D department that invents everything before the competition
does, just like every household should not invest in their own fire engines. It is more a matter of 
creating value net links as a safety net that we can rely on to help us quickly, professionally and 
economically respond to the surprise. Intel took this approach and invested in many 
microphotonics companies, presumably in the hope that increased bandwidth will increase the 
demand for high performance microprocessors that can handle the large amounts of information 
and images transmitted. However, at the same time, if a competitor to Intel should introduce a 
photonics-based processor, or even an optical computer bus, then Intel’s value net partners 
already own many of the core competencies required to quickly develop a competing product. In
that way the value net partners become technology gate keepers serving as the “fire department” 
of Intel’s value net community.
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Companies often incorporate a mixture of different organizational structures, but for the sake of 
argument let’s focus on a purely hierarchical structure and a network structure. In the hierarchy,
information needed for decision making moves from the bottom up. The top creates goals and 
then the orders go from the top down. The network, on the other hand, is like a community of 
collaborating teams or individuals with a shared interest of success and a shared global strategy,
but with many different approaches to its tactical implementation. Information and requests for 
work mostly move laterally among teams. The latter resemble a market economy, and it can be a 
good way of motivating employees.
Internal Value Nets
While the latter example remains rare in the corporate world, some organizations successfully 
incorporate aspects of such networks into their organizations. Meyer and Davis94 show how
companies can utilize effective self-organization through first influencing the rules people use in 
their decision making, and then giving them the freedom to take their own decisions. As an 
example, they quote how GM allocates paint jobs at one of its plants by having the different paint 
booths bid on the jobs, bidding low if it appears easy for them to take on the job and high if it 
requires more costly changeovers. A conventional “single-brain” approach could use an 
optimization algorithm to allocate the work tasks among the booths, but would most likely fail to 
account for special situations such as technical issues or employees present but not feeling well,
thus being unproductive that day.
Another example is 3M, which allows its engineers to spend 15 percent of their time on any 
project that interests them, creating a wealth of innovation, and because the business managers 
must obtain 30 percent of sales from products less than five years old, incentives abound to turn 
the innovations into sales.
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More local autonomy makes it necessary that employees master a little broader range of skills 
than in a conventional hierarchical organization. Specialization offers simultaneous advantages in 
terms of cost and market power. By being specialized we can become efficient at our 
specialization, a cornerstone embodied in the idea about labor division in the industrial
revolution. While highly specialized companies efficiently explore business opportunities in a 
stable business and economic environment, a more general skill set allows the group or company 
to apply the skills in different ways, giving some ability to survive independent of how the 
environment changes. At the same time diverging opinions, among employees frequently leads to 
better strategic decisions, as long as the pace can be maintained and the conflicts do not lead into 
office politics.
These types of networks with decentralized decision making, and 
decision making at many levels, possess a number of important traits:
Local decision making is one of the facets of a so-called speed culture
97
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Development work may be performed in parallel rather than sequentially and in duplicate by 
independent teams, almost like several startups all working to bring a new technology to the 
market. If one team fails or falls behind schedule, the other teams may be able to deliver.
Modular designs can be used to allow for independent development, testing and manufacturing, 
and to allow for easier and faster redesign, if need be. Some companies choose to pursue several 
different likely strategies in parallel;
as execution of plans 
need not await traditional approvals. A speed culture company will not necessarily be as cost
effective as a process driven company; however, it offers quicker response to customer needs and 
it prepares the organization to react better to sudden changes in the market.
99 for example, Microsoft was at a certain moment 
developing Windows, DOS, OS/2 and a UNIX-based operating system in parallel.100 It arguably 
reduces the tactic focus, but in a highly unpredictable market it may be the only way of 
maintaining a high chance of success.
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Investing in a speed culture, multiple parallel strategies and redundancy in the work may 
sound like a waste of resources. However, it carries the same value as an insurance policy, or 
buying financial options as a way of managing uncertainty.101
Each value net structure exhibits a different robustness to change. The hierarchy fails if the top 
fails; the sequential system fails if any one node fails. The parallel systems can continue working 
if one node fails, but still the failure of one node will slow down a whole line. The network is the 
most robust because flow can be redirected around failed nodes with minimum disruption. The 
hierarchical framework depends on some form of power by the uppermost node(s) to maintain 
the structure. The collaborative network will only work well if everyone gets enough profit to 
make it worthwhile to be part of the network.
Based on the current increase in 
companies interested in real options, this idea seems to be moving toward mainstream. While 
each individual strategy in the family can be analyzed by using the methods in this book, they 
often are interrelated; for example, the success of one strategy precludes the success of the other, 
or part of the cost associated with the knowledge required for one can be shared by another, so 
only looking at the whole portfolio at once makes sense.
More on Internal Value Nets
It is claimed that you as a human node in the social network are on average only six nodes away 
from any other node in the world.102
The market is simulated by a random number generator: in X percent of the time intervals it is 
a totally random number in the interval 0 to 1 reflecting a disruptive change in the market. In the 
remaining time steps the market is based on the market in the previous period, plus or minus a 
random change of less than 0.005, reflecting a small evolutionary change in the market. Each 
employee in each organization presents a number to the market: The closer the number is to the 
number demanded by the market, the larger the profit: perfect match gives a profit of 1.
Both organizations learn: In the hierarchical organization each employee selects the number 
his or her boss had in the previous period, and the CEO in the top selects the number that was 
optimal in the previous period. In this example it is assumed that no one in the network 
organization ever has the privilege of knowing what the current market is (as the CEO did); 
however, a certain percentage (Y) of the workers are innovators, who select random numbers 
between 0 and 1. All the rest of the workers know how much profit 10 of their coworkers made 
during the previous period and they select the same number as that one of the 10 coworkers who 
had the most profit. In that way good ideas from the innovators spread throughout the 
organization and not-so-good ideas immediately die out.
If you work in a mid-size company with a stiff hierarchical 
organization where employees are only allowed to speak to their immediate bosses or their 
immediate subordinates, then it could easily take six or more contacts to go from the lowest level 
employee to the CEO or president. This model will explore what the effect of that is.
The model compares two organizations. Each employs 1,111 people. One is hierarchical with 
four layers where each person is the boss of 10 people in the layer below them, with the 
exception of the lowest layer, which has no subordinates. All decisions are made in the top and 
migrate downwards, one layer each time-step. The other organization is a network, where each 
person interacts with 10 other people at random, and in each time period the interactions are 
randomly reshuffled.
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Figure 24. Simulated profits earned by two different types of organizations as a function of 
the frequency of market disruptions
Figure 24 shows the results from simulations of the profits earned under different market 
conditions. Not unexpectedly, the hierarchical organization does best under stable conditions, in 
part because it does not have the overhead of innovators and in this example it benefits from the 
CEO’s perfect knowledge of the current market. However, as the market disruptions become 
more frequent, the network organization takes the lead, until the market is totally unpredictable 
(X=1).103 Figure 24 shows a network organization with 25% innovators, however, the optimal 
percentage of nodes that need to take an innovator role depends on how turbulent the market is. 
Risk
Most people prefer stable to turbulent environments because that facilitates planning and a more 
optimal utilization of the opportunities at hand. Even a relatively simple thing like a product 
failure can cause major interruption in our everyday life. Depending on the nature of the risk, we, 
and our customers, may elect different strategies. One extreme: taking a short-term approach and 
buying just what we need for now at the lowest possible cost. The other extreme is to take a long-
term approach and buy a quality solution that at the same time is sure to meet our changing 
needs. When customers spend money on an extended warranty instead of on additional features, 
people are reducing risk at the expense of value. When a two-person household with 
“conventional” transportation requirements spends the extra money buying and operating a car 
that seats seven, they reduce the risk of not meeting their transportation needs in some extreme 
situations.
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In making this selection the conventional approach is to look at the return on investment or net 
present value: what would it be with a higher risk, shorter service life and lower initial cost
versus a lower risk, longer service and a higher upfront investment? The cost of capital often 
leads us to select the investment option with the shorter payback time. The higher the risk, the 
shorter term is optimal. For example, buying inexpensive cars that depreciate quickly frees up 
capital and gives us the option to re-evaluate our transportation needs more frequently.
An alternative approach, more in line with the value net and value driver concepts used here, 
is to look at an investment in conjunction with the value net it is part of. For example, instead of 
looking at the return on investment (ROI) of a renewable energy system, we can look at the 
system as an integral part of the house it goes into and the needs of the house’s occupants. Today 
most houses are only considered livable if energy is available. Extended blackouts or a major 
energy crisis could make the house much less usable and, in particular for large energy 
consuming homes, it could make the property value plummet. Therefore, an alternative energy 
system reduces the risk of the house becoming less usable and less valuable in case of a lasting
energy crisis. So part of what the system does is create a “value insurance policy” for the house 
itself.
To evaluate an alternative energy investment we need to take the value of the house and the 
value of that insurance policy into account in addition to the market value of the energy 
produced. Sometimes a poor system level ROI may turn out to be a great investment, taking the 
whole value net into account. The preservation of resources, such as ores, fossil fuels and even 
knowledge, follows much the same logic: should we optimize the net present value of the 
resource itself or should a broader value net perspective be taken? The latter would normally lead 
to a more conservational strategy. Some commercial insurance companies go proactively into 
helping their clients identify facility upgrade investment opportunities that can reduce future 
risks. While their motive is to keep insurance premiums low, the end result is similar to what is 
described here.
If asked, most businesses would rather do without competition—internal or external—and from a 
market power perspective that is the optimal situation. However, from a long-term survival 
perspective it may not be so. The U.S. machine tool industry experienced in the 1980s a major 
decline. The industry consisted predominantly of smaller companies focusing on the local U.S. 
market which, with the exception of tools for the defense industry, was not very demanding.
Market Power and Competition
104 At 
the same time many foreign companies faced global competition, and demanding customers,
forced them to develop cost effective high-performance tools. When the U.S. market was opened 
up to foreign competition these companies gained significant market share at the expense of the 
local companies that previously felt less competitive pressure. The opposite can be said about the 
Swedish truck makers (Volvo and Saab Scandia) that developed under the influence of 
demanding domestic customers and fierce global competition leading to two successful 
companies. These examples might suggest that healthy competition may in the long run be better 
for a company.
A company focusing on surviving rapid changes may have to accept somewhat higher cost, such 
as: investment in modular and reconfigurable manufacturing systems, acceptance of less 
Cost
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leverage, tying the incentive and bonus systems to speed and creativity, and budgets that allow 
for mistakes and unforeseen cost overruns, to a larger extent than conventionally done. In a
company focused on quick responses to market changes, project delays can cause much more 
harm than a cost overrun.
A few other general areas can be helpful for survival under extreme business conditions. We can
adjust the tactics continuously; perform small-scale strategy changes regularly and large-scale 
strategy adjustments occasionally:
Strategy
 Keep the long-term direction and limitations in mind. It helps that the organization is 
“hungry” enough to have a reason for surviving. While the CEO may feel the pressure to 
make the company survive, many compliant employees often do not feel the pressure and 
resist the necessary changes. The software company Attivio had a set of clearly defined 
long term goals, and then every four weeks they would revise their short term tactic plans 
making it easier to accommodate changing customer needs, changing market conditions 
and technical developments / challenges.
 Watch for red flags and adjust the scenario models on a regular basis (weekly, monthly or 
quarterly). No matter how comprehensive a strategic analysis we perform, it will rest on 
certain assumptions, and when these assumptions change we may need to revise the 
strategy. It is good to maintain a list of which events should trigger a red flag to go up.
105
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 Regularly do a clean sheet of paper strategy. That is probably what a competitor new to the 
market will be doing, so can we compete against that competitor?
It 
could, for example, be that the cost of capital goes up by 5 percent or that the competitor 
announces a new product.
 Regularly redefine the strategy, and what strategic options should be kept open. The main 
strategy itself is likely to contain a family of related alternatives that can support each other 
and act as strategic diversification, even though they all point in the same overall direction.
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past market, which means that they get confused by market values going up and down at random. At total or near total 
randomness both organizations could have done better if they had realized this state and consistently selected the average 
market (0.5). In that case half of the time periods would have a value that in average would be 0.25 above the selected value,
and in the other half of the time periods would be 0.25 below. That strategy was not incorporated into the model. 
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David Finegold, Keith W. Brendley, Robert Lempert, Donnald Henry, Peter Cannon, Brent Boultinghouse & Max Nelson,
1994, MR-479/1-OSTP, The Decline of the US. Machine-Tool Industry and Prospects for Its Sustainable Recovery, vol. 1, 
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Chapter 11
A New Product in a Simplified World
So how do all the ideas, discussed so far, come together and help us select which product to 
develop next? Before stepping into the complexity of the real world, it will help going through a 
simplified text book example. This example is entirely based on made up data, which was then 
analyzed in a way similar to what would be done with real data.107
Figure 25
Imagine that we were to 
launch one or two new products targeting a specific market, and we would like to estimate the 
potential sales volume and profit. To begin with we have a value net ( ), which here has 
been simplified to a point that it is no more than a short conventional value chain.
Figure 25. The value net
The products in this market help the customers solve two fundamental different problems, and 
have therefore two value drivers: performance (P, measured on a scale 1 to 5) and aesthetics / 
design (D, also measured on a scale 1 to 5). Performance is calculated as an aggregate score 
combining all the performance related features of the product (speed, power, precision of 
controls, etc.). The design score reflects relative ratings by customers in areas such as how 
modern / fashionable the casing is and how appealing the color options are. There is also one 
constraint variable: cost of purchasing and ownership (C).
Price
The market price will depend on customer value, risk and market power.
Customer Value
The price a customer at most is willing to pay for a product depends on the value the customer 
expects to receive from it. Value drivers can help us estimate the monetary base-value assigned to 
the product by a given customer. We can base the estimates on what the customer is already 
paying to obtain a similar utility or from the size of the savings that the product brings. If it is a 
new product where there is no directly relevant historical data, we can learn from other markets. 
For example, we can learn about the value of user-friendly software from the computer industry 
and the value of an appealing design from other product categories.
Value Adjusted for Risk
With a new product, most customers will wonder about how much value they ever will be able to
harvest, and naturally will discount the product accordingly. Many looming threats include: 
product failure, poor levels of service and support, risk of not having the expected needs, risk of 
Suppliers 
(define 
cost)
Customers (see 
utilityscape for 
segmentation)
Company 
(point of 
view)
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obsolescence, and risk of not becoming a proficient user. If we, through marketing, can educate 
the potential users and convince them about the benefits, then the discount will be less. A 
warranty or a money-back guarantee can also help reduce the risk and thereby increase the risk
discounted value. For financial products it is customary to discount their value according to how 
risky they are. We lack a similar well established method for discounting the value of consumer 
products, but here again historical data from other products can help us. For example, many 
electronics retailers sell extended warranties, and from that we can estimate the discount
associated with the risk of a product failure. 
Market Power
If value is depicted by the size of a cake, then market power describes how large a slice of that 
cake we possibly can get. The user will look at the entire value they can derive from the product.
It is possible to charge for value that others create, including value created by the customer,
however, in order to do so we must possess adequate market power. It is easier to create value 
than to charge for it. There are two aspects of market power. The market power relative to the 
customer determines how much of the value to the consumer actually can be charged as a selling 
price – and the more competitors are offering the customer alternatives the more power the 
customer has. The market power, among the suppliers of complementary products, determines 
how much each of them can get. Even for a new product with no direct competition, there will be 
indirect competition from all the other potential ways customers can solve the basic problems 
addressed by the value drivers.
The relative profitability of various existing industries provides a clue to how a new product 
will fare in the battle for market power. Many “conventional” businesses are used to thinking of 
the market price as “cost plus”; however, that assumes there is strong competition and that the 
suppliers are willing to quit doing business if they cannot get their “plus” above cost. That type of 
market weakness may not apply to a new product. The market power to the supplier tends to go 
up as the market grows. Any single customer becomes less important and the suppliers will 
become more dependent on the product. However, once a competitor enters, the market the 
market power will go down.
Price Ceiling
We are now ready to look at the price we can charge. Each customer has a different perception of 
value, risk and market power, and for some products each customer acts as a market in itself, 
with its own price setting (e.g. through negotiation). However, for a consumer product in a 
certain geographic / customer region there is often only one market with fairly well defined prices 
relating back to the variables discussed. In this example it is assumed that there is a base price 
which is set as follow:
Value, V = 0.3*(1 + D + P + D*P)
Risk discount, R = 1.20
Market Power (MP) and pricing decision factor (h), MP*h = 0.8
Price, P is then:
P)*DPD(1
1.2
P)*DPD(1*0.3
0.8
R
V
MPhP 

 *.20
where D and P are the value driver scores. This estimates the base price: the fraction of the risk
adjusted value we can capture, thanks to our market power position. Prices are in $100s.
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As the market matures we typically see a decline in the prices. In this example the base price will 
be higher or lower by the following factor (f), relating the total amount of products (cum. vol.,
measured in 1000 units) sold in this market since the initial product launch:
 vol.))log(cum.-(0.9*ln(10)ln(f) 
In this way more and more customers will be able to afford making a purchase as the market 
matures. The initial market size is 1500 units. This product is “perishable”, so customers will 
keep purchasing the product as repeat customers. When prices drop to one, they are maintained at 
that price level.108
Sales Volume
If there had been an infinite amount of different product offerings available, the customers would 
have distributed themselves in the utilityscape as shown in Table 5 and illustrated in Figure 26.
The utilityscape is like a demographics map showing where the customers ideally would like to 
“live” in terms of value driver combinations. In this example most customers prefer a 
combination of medium performance with medium good design characteristics – or a little above 
that. In a real world case this could be mapped by surveying customer preferences for different 
product features, and then aggregating this to form value driver scores.
Table 5. Native demand for different value driver combinations in this example
D = 1 D = 2 d = 3 D = 4 D=5
P = 1 2.5% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 3.5%
P = 2 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.0%
P = 3 3.5% 4.5% 5.0% 5.0% 4.0%
P = 4 3.5% 4.5% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0%
P = 5 3.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.5%
1
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Figure 26.
Utilityscape showing 
which percentage of 
all customers select 
different value driver 
score combinations. 
The axes are relative 
going from low (1) to 
high (5).
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Regarding the one constraint variable: Product base prices and the customers’ purchase abilities
at those prices are shown in Table 6. This example is constructed such that sales would total 
100% (i.e. affordable by everyone) if prices dropped to 1. This figure illustrates how the market 
expands as the price drops – as expected. As the cumulative volume increase the prices will drop 
and the market grow. In a real world case this would have been based on how much money the 
customers today are spending in similar areas.
Table 6. Base prices (in $100) and percent of customers who is willing to purchase at that 
price
D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4 D=5
P = 1 $1.00* $1.20       83%100% $1.60       63% $2.00       50% $2.40       42%
P = 2 $1.20       83% $1.80       56% $2.40       42% $3.00       33% $3.60       28%
P = 3 $1.60       63% $2.40       42% $3.20       31% $4.00       25% $4.80       21%
P = 4 $2.00       50% $3.00       33% $4.00       25% $5.00       20% $6.00       17%
P = 5 $2.40       42% $3.60       28% $4.80       21% $6.00       17% $7.20       14%
*
Elasticity of Demand
Adjusted as explained in the text.
The problem is that there is not going to be a product that matches every customers taste and 
budget. So what do customers do when they cannot find their first choice? Some customers are 
going to settle for a second best option, while others may not purchase anything at all. Price 
elasticity of demand (or other constraint variable related elasticity of demand) tells us how much 
a change in price will affect demand. Figure 27 shows this graphically. 
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Figure 27. Customers willingness to pay
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In a similar manner, value driver elasticity of demand tells us how big an impact a compromise in 
a value driver will have on sales. Evidently the impact will not be the same for every value 
driver, or if the deviation from the ideal is for the better or for the worse. Figure 28 illustrates the 
relationship as used in this example.
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Figure 28. Value driver elasticity of demand
Normally customers accept tradeoffs between all the key variables, value drivers and constraint 
variables, so if the customers feel that they get a lot more in terms of value they will be willing to 
pay a little more in terms of money. In this simplified example the following simplifications are
assumed: 
 There is no relationship between product preferences (ideal value driver score 
combination) and financial abilities (budget constraint). In other words, having an 
expensive taste is totally independent of being able to spend a lot of money or not.
 If two products occupy the same field in the utilityscape they share the sales evenly, but 
the total volume remains the same.
 Customers, who cannot find their ideal product, calculate a “penalty score” (PS) for each 
available option. The product with the lowest penalty score becomes the product of choice 
for that customer.110
 The probability of a sale (Xsale
Figure 28
) will decrease as the penalty score increases. In this 
example it is assumed that the relationship is as follows (see ):
2sale
100
PS
1
1
X

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Cost
The cost to the company, associated with a product, is assumed to be:
Total cost = Sales * (0.1 + 0.45* P) + 0.1
where the P is the market price. In this way the cost decreases over time reflecting that the 
company becomes more efficient and obtain better deals from the suppliers as the volume 
increases. Sales of any given product in any given month cannot exceed 10% of the total 
historical market sales. This limitation is imposed because in real markets there will always be a 
limit to how fast a new company can ramp up production.
Profit Opportunities
If we were to introduce, one or two products, which ones should that be? Based on the 
assumptions listed above we can calculate sales volumes, prices, costs and profits. By iterating 
the net present value has been calculated for each product option, or combination of products.
The calculations were done assuming a 10 year life (120 monthly calculations) and no 
competitors entering the market space during that period. Table 7 and 
Table 8 show the estimated net present values for each product or product combination.
For the higher end products the volume will go down a little as fewer customers can afford 
them; however, that is made up by higher price per unit sold. An expensive product, sold in small 
quantities, will not bring the price down as quickly either, preserving the “exclusivity” of this 
market for longer. However, choosing this strategy will be an invitation to the competition to 
capture the business from all the customers left out.
The larger the penalty score is for being one value driver unit off, the more important it is that 
there are products in the vicinity of the customers’ wishes. So for large penalties that would mean 
that there need to be products near the center of the diagram in Figure 26. On the other hand, if 
the customers really “need” a solution and therefore think “any product is better than no 
product”, then the supplier can benefit from forcing the customers to upgrade to more expensive 
solutions, as long as the competition does not step in and offer a more cost effective alternative.
Both aspects are important here.
If we were only going to launch one product it could be D=4, P=4, which provides the highest 
net present value (Table 7). It is not the product in highest demand, enough customers are willing 
to “upgrade” and accept a higher price – leading to higher profits.
Table 7. Estimated net present values for different products, if only one product is sold
D = 1 D = 2 D = 3 D = 4 D=5
P = 1 6.9 9.3 10.6 10.7 9.4
P = 2 11.1 14.4 16.4 16.5 14.8
P = 3 14.4 18.6 21.0 21.3 19.1
P = 4 16.2 21.0 23.8 24.0 21.4
P = 5 16.1 21.2 23.9 23.9 21.1
If we were to introduce two products, the calculations suggest D=2, P=4 and D=5, P=5. That is 
one on each side of the peak demand area in the utilityscape, and pushed towards the higher price 
end. Interestingly enough, having two products only increase the net present value by 2.5%. If 
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sales would have dropped more steeply in response to a poor match with the original customer 
wishes, then there would have been a much stronger argument for having two products in the 
market. However, it is not clear that the two product alternative is the way to go when the 
assumptions about the market are as outlined above. 
Table 8. Estimated net present values if two products are sold (the table is symmetrical so 
only one half is shown). First products listed horizontally, second products listed vertically.
D 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
P 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 6.9
1 2 5.2 11.1
1 3 9.1 8.9 14.4
1 4 11.4 11.9 11.0 16.2
1 5 10.8 12.8 12.4 11.0 16.1
2 1 3.7 5.0 9.1 11.9 12.7 9.3
2 2 9.2 9.6 10.0 12.3 13.7 9.2 14.4
2 3 12.5 14.6 14.4 13.9 14.0 14.1 13.5 18.6
2 4 15.2 15.2 18.0 17.4 16.2 17.2 17.1 16.1 21.0
2 5 15.8 16.3 14.8 19.0 18.0 16.3 18.5 17.8 16.3 21.2
3 1 5.2 7.4 9.6 12.7 12.9 5.6 8.8 13.4 16.7 17.8 10.6
3 2 10.8 11.6 13.7 14.7 14.7 12.3 12.0 13.2 16.7 18.4 11.6 16.4
3 3 15.9 16.8 16.8 18.8 18.4 16.0 18.2 17.4 17.4 18.2 17.3 16.4 21.0
3 4 18.8 20.5 20.4 20.0 21.6 19.4 19.0 22.1 20.7 19.5 20.9 20.6 19.2 23.8
3 5 17.5 21.3 21.9 21.4 20.6 20.3 20.5 19.2 23.3 21.4 19.7 22.4 21.2 19.5 23.9
4 1 6.3 8.3 10.4 12.4 13.6 6.3 9.3 13.8 17.5 17.3 6.0 11.1 16.0 19.8 21.1 10.7
4 2 11.8 13.4 14.4 15.9 16.6 11.6 12.9 15.7 17.1 19.3 13.4 12.5 15.8 19.2 21.2 12.3 16.5
4 3 16.0 18.3 18.9 19.2 20.2 17.9 17.7 18.3 20.7 20.3 17.0 19.5 18.0 18.7 20.2 18.4 17.1 21.3
4 4 18.6 20.3 22.3 22.4 21.8 21.4 22.5 22.0 21.8 23.4 20.8 20.3 23.4 21.4 20.2 22.3 21.6 19.9 24.0
4 5 19.4 20.9 21.2 23.7 23.3 19.8 23.9 24.3 23.6 22.5 21.9 22.2 20.9 24.4 21.6 20.7 23.7 22.0 19.6 23.9
5 1 5.0 8.5 10.8 12.4 12.5 6.6 9.6 12.8 16.6 18.0 5.6 9.9 16.4 20.5 20.1 4.8 11.6 16.6 20.6 22.1 9.4
5 2 9.8 11.3 14.6 15.8 15.8 11.5 13.4 15.5 17.7 17.8 9.9 12.0 15.9 19.4 21.8 12.4 11.0 16.1 19.3 21.3 11.1 14.8
5 3 14.4 15.7 16.2 19.3 19.3 16.1 17.9 19.1 20.0 21.2 17.0 15.9 17.3 20.3 19.9 15.7 18.0 16.1 18.5 19.1 17.1 15.2 19.1
5 4 17.6 19.1 19.4 19.2 22.0 18.5 20.2 22.5 22.7 22.2 20.5 21.5 20.3 20.6 21.8 19.5 19.0 21.3 18.9 18.2 20.9 19.6 17.2 21.4
5 5 16.9 20.5 21.0 20.7 19.9 19.7 20.9 21.8 24.6 23.6 18.7 23.3 23.3 22.2 20.8 20.8 21.0 19.8 21.8 19.0 19.0 21.5 19.5 17.0 21.1
Technology Adoption
We can look at the sales volume of two products (D=2, P=4 and D=5, P=5) in each of the 120 
month (Figure 29). Not surprisingly the shape resembles a traditional S-Curve seen for the 
adaptation of new products.111
Figure 29
Early growth is limited by the constraint variables such as price, 
supply (limits to how fast production can ramp up) and distribution / availability. Later on growth 
is limited by the value variables: As the market matures the prices come down and if they come 
far enough down anyone interested in the product is getting it. The last part of the curve is 
exclusively driven by general price changes. The point on the curve in where there is 
abrupt change in the slope reflects the transition from supply- to demand-imposed limits to the 
market size. For some of the other product options adoption goes faster, and the cumulative 
volumes may be higher, however, the profits are lower. 
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Figure 29. Sales per time period based on the example discussed in the text
Figure 30. Diagram of the process used to calculate the results in this example
Discussion
The evaluation in this example was performed in the way outlined in Figure 30. First, the ideal 
market was established to describe what the customers are wishing for in terms of key variables. 
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Second, the actual market, was established by taking into account the trade-offs the customers 
will have to do in a market with a limited number of products. Third the limitations imposed by 
the company, such as their cost structure is introduced. And finally the results are calculated 
giving the net present value and market development. The calculations were repeated in order to 
evaluate all product options, and the results can be used to support the development of a good 
product strategy. 
Numbers help us support business decisions, not dictate them, so these results need to be 
combined with other considerations. If a competitor threatens to enter the market, we might, for 
example, consider a different pricing strategy. What if we were off in our initial estimates of the 
relative importance of the different value drivers? One approach is to utilize a modular product 
design, where the modules can be reshuffled as needed, and if we erred initially, only some of the 
modules need redesigning, rather than having to rebuild the entire system. Having multiple 
product configuration choices in the market at any given time allows the customers to select what 
gives them the most value. And we can learn from the customer choices.
107
The data processing was done using a custom built C++ program (by the author), which systematically evaluates every 
possible set of products over a specified period of time by combining the demand from every possible customer segment. The 
methods and assumptions used are discussed in this chapter. It is easy to modify these assumptions, and the ones used were 
just selected in order to have something (simple) to work with.
108
The reason for maintaining the prices at one (1) is that it is assumed that 100% of the customers can afford this price, so the 
company does not gain anything from dropping the prices further.
109
An example from the real world:
Cumulative graph showing the actual spending on new cars with the x-axis being the fraction of the market and the y-axis 
being the purchase price in $-thousands. Data for this figure comes from the sources used in chapter 11 and 12 (see first 
edition of the book). 
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The penalty scores are calculated as follows:
Value driver Each step down Each step up
P 40 15
D 25 25
These scores reflect that there is a large penalty for not meeting performance expectations, a small penalty for having too 
much performance and an even penalty for changing the design in either direction away from the ideal.
111
E.g., Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller & Frank Bass, 1990, New Product Diffusion Models in Marketing: A Review and 
Directions for Research, Journal of Marketing, vol. 54, pp. 1-26 and Johan Norton & Frank Bass, 1992, Evolution of 
Technological Generations: The Law of Capture, Sloan Management Review, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 66-77, Winter 1992.
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Note:
The case study presented in Chapters 12 and 13 is based on 2003 data and reflects the market 
realities at that time. At that time cost management had a high correlation with the other 
variables, and for the sake of simplicity it was omitted. In order for this case study to apply to the 
present day situation the following would need to be done: (1) newer data used; (2) adding a cost 
management value driver, so the effects of changing fuel prices and different economic climates 
can be evaluated.
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Chapter 12
The U.S. Car Market
This chapter combines the theory developed in the previous chapters with data to develop an 
understanding of the market for cars in the U.S. In the following chapter the results will be used 
to analyze the opportunities for a vehicle new to this market.
This case study (Chapters 12 and 13) has been based on historical data for 267 models of light 
vehicles sold in the U.S.
Car Data
112
While these variables are relevant, a more meaningful classification is required to better 
understand the market. To this end, we can consider the following: Any car can be considered to 
fulfill five basic needs: (1) provide transportation, (2) deliver comfort and pleasure, (3) offer fun 
during the ride, (4) enhance the owner’s social standing and (5) manage cost constraints (
These models account for more than 99 percent of the country’s 2003 
volume. Only very low volume specialty brands were left out. Each model is described by 64 
variables. These variables encompass vehicle characteristics/specs, the price range, sales volume,
buyer’s age profile as well as sales and marketing related data. For most of these variables both a 
low and a high value were included reflecting the range of the various trim levels that a model 
covers. The data was normalized to facilitate comparison.
Table 
9). These needs become the five basic value drivers of a vehicle, and of course they differ in 
importance with every customer. Each characteristic of a car impacts one or more of these 
dimensions (Table 10). While the satisfaction of a need adds value to the customer, this value is 
reduced by various risks. In response to these risks the carmakers offer risk-mitigating measures 
which also have been included in these tables.
Pleasure, driving fun and cost savings are relatively straight-forward dimensions from the 
perspective of “more is better” as perceived by the majority of customers. For example, if a 
vehicle is offered with more horsepower at no additional cost and without affecting the fuel 
economy, then most people would prefer the extra power.
When considering the transportation and social dimensions, more is not necessarily better; 
rather, people have an ideal somewhere on the scale. Furthermore, these dimensions are each 
multidimensional. Transportation could be considered two-dimensional: ability to transport (1) 
people and (2) cargo. The social-standing dimension is complex: for example, some customers 
seek an “optimal” environmental image, some focus on prestige, and others focus on a power 
appearance. The optimum represents an optimal fit within the framework of the driver’s social 
network. Often people desire to be in the upper end of their social group, but not way outside it. 
For instance, does a Rolls-Royce help a construction worker fit in, when parking among the full-
size pickup trucks on a construction site? Not necessarily.
Table 9. Vehicle value drivers
Dimension Need satisfied Risk mitigation
Transportation Land transport Reliability, occupant safety
Pleasure and aesthetics Comfort and styling Pre-purchase evaluation
Fun Driving enjoyment Test drives, magazine evaluations
Social standing Others’ opinion Advertisement 
Cost savings Limit resources spent on vehicle Warranties, maintenance
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Table 10. Selected variables classified according to the value drivers they impact
Variables and risk reduction
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 Vehicle size (length, height, width, wheelbase)
 Vehicle shape (“ability to transport”) from two-seat roadster to full-size van
 Seating capacity
 Number of doors
 Cargo volume or cargo payload, towing capacity
 Empty weight
 Bumper-to-bumper and power-train warranties
 Occupant safety and vehicle reliability ratings belong here but have not been included due to 
incomplete data
 Engine size and horsepower
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 Luxury level
 Ride quality
 Interior styling and ease of use
 Interior space, comfort and noise level
 Doors per seat (for ease of entry)
 Type of transmission
 Convertible or not
 Design. Higher scores if design stood out as true three-dimensional sculpture with attention to detail
 Retro/futuristic design or not
 Body corrosion warranty—reduces risk of a shabby-looking car
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 Acceleration (inverse of time to reach 60 mph)
 Power-to-weight ratio
 Torque-to-weight ratio
 Handling/steering
 Driving wheels (which wheels pull)
 Sportiness and size (smaller is better)
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 Brand image
 Price (more expensive is more prestigious)
 Luxury level
 Environmental image: hybrid or not
 Ratio of horsepower to engine volume. It was found that upscale cars tend to have more advanced 
engines with higher ratios
 Engine (cylinders, liters, horsepower, torque) – numbers to impress others with
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 Price
 Fuel economy (for urban and highway driving)
 Expected maintenance: cost and time spent on car repair should be here, but have not been included 
due to incomplete data
 Various types of warranties and free scheduled maintenance
Note: Subjective variables were rated on a scale 0 through 10. Units are not shown as all variables are normalized. 
Some variables were considered more important than others in defining the dimensions.
To keep this case study simple, only the first four dimensions (transport, pleasure, fun and social) 
are used in the following discussion; the cost savings, being somewhat collinear with the other 
dimensions, was left out. A weighted average score was calculated for each of the four 
dimensions for each of the 267 models. Because most variables have a high and a low value, 
every car model displays a range in each dimension.
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According to Chapter 6 we can expect a pricing model to include the value drivers, risk and 
market power. However, in this case study it turned out that the market power factor was 
secondary to the other factors. Exotic car brands were left out, so it is not surprising that all the 
cars in the study were competitively priced or at least that market power correlated with some of 
the value parameters. So as a first approximation we can thus assume that the price relates to the 
risk discounted value to the customer (V/R). That means that the five value drivers (transport, 
pleasure, fun, social standing, and cost of ownership—including their risk-mitigating measures) 
should be determining for the price. The following equation for competitive market prices was 
developed:
Car Pricing
where T stands for transportation, P for pleasure, F for fun, S for social standing and C for cost to 
the owner, all measured in terms of standard deviations above or below the average vehicle.
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Price($) = exp(10.42 + 0.28T + 0.075P + 0.25F + 0.28S – 0.044C) – 7,000 (12-1)
Figure 31 compares observed and estimated prices.
Figure 31. Comparison of pricing estimates to the actual prices. The diagonal line is the 
ideal 1:1 relationship between observed and predicted prices.
In the low price range the estimates are on average slightly above what is expected. This 
presumably reflects a more intense price competition in the low price range, depressing the actual 
market prices. If market power had been taken into account, this could have been accounted for.
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We can use the utilityscape introduced in Chapter 5 to analyze the car market. The simplified 
utilityscape (disregarding cost of ownership) includes four dimensions: transportation, driving 
fun, pleasure and social standing. Any car model will plot somewhere within this four-
dimensional utilityscape, and different trim levels serve to spread a model over a larger volume.
The Utilityscape for Cars
Customers settle at the location in the utilityscape they like the best among those of the 
available choices they can afford. If they, due to budget constraints or lack of vehicles offered, 
cannot buy what they really would like they will feel “pain,” and in general customers will 
attempt to minimize this by seeking an alternative as close to their ideal car as possible. The sales 
volume thus depends on how the customers distribute themselves after they have made any 
tradeoffs. This description is superior to a market-segmentation where the boundaries are defined 
based on one-dimensional characteristics such as body style (subcompact, full-size sedan, SUV) 
which may not reflect customer desires. For example, a performance-seeking customer may 
consider a BMW X5 and an Audi A6 Quattro despite the first being an SUV and the other a 
sedan, while a customer may not consider a Ford Mustang and a Porsche 911 as substitutes 
despite both these vehicles being traditionally classified as sports cars.
A utilityscape is a continuous shape without sharp boundaries, and it should ideally be treated 
as such. However, for this case study the utilityscape is divided into subgroups, each of which 
covers a limited range in each of the four basic value drivers. Each dimension is divided in a way
so that one-third of the vehicles sold fall in each of three segments. That resulted in the cutoff 
limits in terms of standard deviations above or below average shown in Table 11. The exact 
location of these cutoff limits in the utilityscape proved unimportant for the final results. Later on 
in the case there is another example using five, instead of three, divisions. With three segments in 
each of the four dimensions, the utilityscape is divided into 81 subgroups (34
Table 
12
= 81). Each vehicle 
was then classified according to which subgroup or subgroups it fell into. If a vehicle spanned 
three subgroups the sales would be divided among those according to how much overlap the 
vehicle’s range of characteristics has with each of them. So a subgroup will include vehicles of 
several brands and models, but not all of a given model will fall in a particular subgroup.
shows examples of two of the subgroups. By adding up the sales of the vehicles in each 
subgroup we can see how the customers distributed themselves across the utilityscape (Figure 
32). An explanation of how to read this and subsequent multi-dimensional utilityscape figures is 
given in the notes.
Customers of the 36-55 age group buy 49.2 percent of all the vehicles, while the younger ones 
buy 25.3 percent and the older ones buy 25.5 percent. But the distribution of sales among age 
groups varies across the utilityscape.
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Figure 33 shows which age group buys the most vehicles 
above the average for their group. It reveals that the middle age group dominates sales in the high 
transportation region, reflecting that people in this age group often have families with children 
and need the most transportation capability, and/or work at a job that requires a truck. The 
younger age group has only half the sales of the middle age group, although the number of people 
is about the same, and the desire for individual transportation is at least as high. This reflects the 
lower buying power of the younger customers, forcing them to consider used cars and other 
means of transportation. Furthermore, the 16-35 age group dominates the lower end of all 
dimensions, again reflecting their limited buying power. The oldest of the three age groups (56+) 
gravitate toward the end of the utilityscape representing the lowest need for transportation; 
however, contrary to the younger age group, a larger fraction of customers in this age group can 
afford more expensive vehicles as reflected in their liking for the more expensive subgroups with 
higher P, F and S scores.
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Table 11. Cutoff limits for the classification of vehicles into 81 subgroups, shown as 
standard deviations above or below average
Dimension Transportation (T) Pleasure (P) Fun (F) Social (S)
Segment 1 (33.3%) Up to -0.306 Up to -0.113 Up to -0.237 Up to -0.242
Segment 2 (33.3%) -0.306 to 0.391 -0.113 to 0.128 -0.237 to 0.116 -0.242 to 0.009
Segment 3 (33.3%) Above 0.391 Above 0.128 Above 0.116 Above 0.009
Table 12. Examples of vehicles in different subgroups
T F P S Vehicles
1 1 1 1 Chevrolet Aveo 1.00, Hyundai Accent 1.00, KIA Spectra 1.00, Suzuki Forenza 1.00, KIA Rio 
0.98, Suzuki Esteem 0.87, Jeep Wrangler 0.43, Ford Focus 0.29, Hyundai Elantra 0.21, KIA 
Sportage 0.08, Pontiac Grand Am 0.05
3 2 3 2 Isuzu Ascender, 0.70, Chevrolet Avalanche 0.56, Chevrolet Suburban 0.47, GMC Envoy 0.42, 
Chevrolet Tahoe 0.40, Oldsmobile Bravada 0.39, Chrysler Town & Country 0.31, Chevrolet 
Trailblazer 0.27, Chrysler Pacifica 0.25, GMC Yukon XL 0.21, GMC Yukon 0.20, Mercury 
Mountaineer 0.19, Buick Rainier 0.11, Ford Explorer 0.03, Dodge Caravan 0.03
Note: The numbers following each car indicate what fraction of the sales of a particular model falls within the
subgroup—the higher the number the more the vehicle is targeted toward that particular subgroup.
T1 T2 T3
P
1
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
F1 298 87 235 F1 685 196 202 F1 443 466 97
F2 753 195 41 F2 110 31 13 F2 147 184 46
F3 324 232 147 F3 19 26 8 F3 207 291 31
P
2
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
F1 18 55 111 F1 230 327 56 F1 487 519 130
F2 154 243 166 F2 415 263 107 F2 181 255 142
F3 68 190 337 F3 354 377 163 F3 74 113 19
P
3
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
F1 10 28 94 F1 23 114 89 F1 149 338 67
F2 115 100 294 F2 77 177 422 F2 73 445 402
F3 116 184 958 F3 14 36 1018 F3 10 79 156
Figure 32. Sales (in thousands) in the various subgroups, as defined by the value drivers
transport (T), pleasure (P), fun (F) and social (S) - each of which has been divided into three 
segments (1, 2, 3), e.g., the sales for T1, P2, F3, S1 were 68,000 units.
For a market of 16.6 million cars per year, a utilityscape with 81 subgroups is not a whole lot, 
and some of the fields end up grouping cars that really cannot be described as close substitutes. 
We can therefore use a finer subdivision of the value driver axis, e.g., with five intervals on each
of the four axis. That gives a total of 625 subgroups (54 Table 13= 625), ( , Table 14 and Figure 
34). The division of each axis was done in the following manner: 10 percent of sales fall in 
groups 1 and 5, 20 percent in groups 2 and 4, and the remaining 40 percent in group 3. Having 
smaller percentages in the high and low ends allow us to separate out the “extreme” cars that 
typically sell in lower volumes. Table 14 gives examples of cars in subgroups defined in this 
way.
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Figure 33. Utilityscape with age preferences plotted. The figure is similar in construction to 
Figure 32. Legend: white is ages 16-35, grey is ages 36-55 and black is ages 56+.
Table 13. Cutoff limits (standard deviations above or below average) for the classification 
with 625 subgroups
Dimension Transpor-
tation (T)
Pleasure 
(P)
Fun (F) Social (S)
Segment 1 
(10%)
Up to 
-0.685
Up to
-0.450
Up to 
-0.558
Up to 
-0.390
Segment 2 
(20%)
-0.685 to 
-0.351
-0.450 to 
-0.141
-0.558 to 
-0.255
-0.390 to
-0.264
Segment 3 
(40%)
-0.351 to 
0.475
-0.141 to 
0.158
-0.255 to 
0.157
-0.264 to 
0.046
Segment 4 
(20%)
0.475 to 
0.997
0.158 to 
0.419
0.157 to 
0.624
0.046 to 
0.770
Segment 5 
(10%)
Above 
0.997
Above 
0.419
Above 
0.624
Above 
0.770
Table 14. Examples of subgroups from the utilityscape with 625 subgroups
T F P S Vehicles
1 3 1 1 Chevrolet Cavalier 0.76, Suzuki Esteem 0.15, Ford Focus 0.05, Dodge Neon 0.02
2 4 3 5 Jaguar X-type 2.5l, 1.00, Volvo C70 0.92, Acura CL 0.22, Lexus IS 300 0.12, Saab 
93 0.09, Mercedes C-class 0.07, Volvo S60 0.06, Audi TT 0.05, Mercedes CLK 0.02
5 1 3 3 GMC Savanna 0.23, Ford Expedition 0.22, Chevrolet Express 0.19, GMC Sierra 0.02, 
Chevrolet Silverado 0.02, Ford F-series, 0.02, Dodge Ram Pickup 0.01
Note: Only vehicles with more than 1 percent of sales in the subgroup are mentioned.
The utilityscape presented here is relevant to the 2003 U.S. car market. However, it is interesting 
to note that all five value drivers predate the invention of the car, and if we in year 1884 had 
wanted to know something about the market for the first cars we could have turned to horse 
wagons, trains, horses and bicycles as a basis for establishing a relevant utilityscape.
It can be a useful first step to look at the individual subgroups as isolated markets assuming that 
all vehicles within a given subgroup directly compete with each other but they do not compete
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Table 15. Coefficients and r
2
for the market share model
Coefficients
115
All age groups 16-35 36-55 56+
Price: a -0.94 ± 0.11
PR
-0.91 ± 0.11 -0.75 ± 0.11 -1.18 ± 0.13
Overlap: a 0.036 ± 0.02
ov
0.045 ± 0.015 0.038 ± 0.014 0.040 ± 0.016
In group: a 0.38 ± 0.014
XM
0.25 ± 0.03 0.34 ± 0.02 0.46 ± 0.03
Varieties: a 0.36 ± 0.03
VA
0.46 ± 0.03 0.40 ± 0.03 0.26 ± 0.03
Years model has been in 
market: a
0.081 ± 0.020
YM
0.068 ± 0.022 0.052 ± 0.020 0.11± 0.02
Years brand has been in 
market: a
-0.22 ± 0.08
YB
-0.20 ± 0.09 -0.24 ± 0.09 -0.23 ± 0.09
Brand ad spending: a 0.22 ± 0.05
AD
0.36 ± 0.06 0.26 ± 0.05 0.085 ± 0.059
Internet popularity: a 0.29 ±0.05
IT
0.27 ± 0.05 0.33 ± 0.05 0.29 ± 0.05
Dealer incentives: a 0.074 ± 0.037
IN
0.050± 0.041 0.055± 0.037 0.14± 0.04
Number of dealers: a 0.41 ± 0.07
DE
0.16 ± 0.08 0.35 ± 0.07 0.62 ± 0.08
r 0.552 0.49 0.55 0.48
Figure 35. Comparison of actual and estimated market shares within subgroups for all age 
groups
N is the number of competing models within a subgroup; if a model has been introduced or 
discontinued during the year it counts only as half. The a’s are coefficients. PR is the minimum 
price for the part of the vehicles that falls within the subgroup, OV is the overlap with the 
subgroup quantifying if the vehicle span the whole subgroup or it only occupies a small fraction 
thereof, XM is the fraction of vehicles, of a model, sold within the subgroup—the higher XM is 
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the more the model targets specifically that subgroup, VA is the number of varieties or trim levels 
of a model offered within the subgroup—the more varieties the better are the possibilities for 
exactly matching the customer’s desires, YM and YB are the number of years in the market for a 
given model, and a given brand, respectively, IT is the Internet popularity, AD is the ad spending 
on that brand (not vehicle), IN is the incentive spending and DE is the number of dealerships in 
the U.S. If a car model spans several subgroups, only vehicles corresponding to that particular 
subgroup are considered (not total model sales). The incomplete data resulted in a somewhat 
inaccurate model (cf. the low r2
It is seen that if there is only one competitor the market share will be one (each of the 
normalized variables will be zero), and if there are N competitors with identical products, 
identical pricing and identical marketing efforts (no differentiation) each one claims an equal 
share of the market. The negative coefficient for price (a
). All of these variables (PR, OV, XM, etc.), x, are relative, which 
means that they are normalized relative to the average, avg, for all cars in the particular subgroup 
in question, i.e. x/avg -1.
PR
) indicates that cheaper cars, 
everything else being equal, will gain more market share. As a first approximation this coefficient 
becomes the elasticity of demand within the subgroup in the utilityscape. Based on the 
coefficients the middle age group is the least price sensitive—in agreement with the observation 
that they also dominate some of the subgroups with the highest average car prices. The number of 
dealerships is important, in particular for the older buyers, while the younger buyers may be more 
willing to travel longer distances to purchase a new vehicle. Older buyers are also more likely 
than younger or middle aged buyers to buy models that have been in the market for some time. 
The data also show that ads are most important in attracting the younger buyers. The next chapter 
illustrates how these results can be used to estimate the sales of a car model new to the market.
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The data was compiled from vehicle sales literature/vehicle specs as published/publicized by manufacturers and/or dealers as 
well as data obtained from the following sources: Power Information Network/J. D. Power and Associates; the Standard 
Catalog publications by Krause Publications and Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures by Ward’s Auto/Prism Business 
Media. The dataset also includes data reprinted with permission from Advertising Age, Copyright, Crain Communications Inc. 
2006. On p. iv these organizations are acknowledged for their permission to use their data for this case study.
113
One sigma uncertainties are: constant 0.01, T 0.01, P 0.023, F 0.01, S 0.01 and C 0.025, r2 = 0.87.
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Effectively Figure 32 to Figure 34 are five dimensional: transport (T), pleasure (P), fun (F), social (S) and sales volume. It is a 
challenge to visualize that many dimensions on a two-dimensional piece of paper, and it may take a little effort getting 
familiar with the presentation. The figures consist of a T-P matrix, where each cell in the matrix is an S-F matrix, and the 
numbers inside that matrix reflect the sales. So increasing the S-value by one is the next cell to the right in one of the small 
(inner) matrices, but increasing the T-value by one means jumping from one cell in one of the small matrices to the same cell 
position in the next small matrix to the right. The figure could just as well have had F and S defining the outer matrix and T 
and P define the inner matrices, or some other combination. The representation is equivalent to a decision tree, where T has 
three or five outcomes (depending on whether there are 81 or 625 subgroups), and at the end of each T-outcome there are 
three or five P alternatives, at the end of which are the F alternatives and then the S alternatives, leading to the sales volume of 
each combination. Again here the sequence of T, P, F and S is irrelevant. The problem with the decision tree representation is 
that it takes up much more space and, even when trained, it is almost, impossible to visually jump from, say, one F value to 
the next F without having to search. A third alternative presentation would be a table with all the permutations of T, P, F and 
S values listed along with the corresponding sales. Again this presentation is hard to use effectively and takes up much more
space.
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Uncertainties represent 1. Regression based on the subdivision of the utilityscape into 81 subgroups. The regressions are 
based on 1944 samples. 
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Chapter 13
The smart fortwo
In 1994, Mercedes-Benz and the Swatch Group established a joint venture focused on ultra small 
vehicles: MC Micro Compact Car SA, later smart (short for Swatch-Mercedes-ART),116 and 
today it is a wholly owned subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG. By September 1997 the first smart
car made its debut and in October 1998 it was launched in nine European countries. As of 2004 
smart was sold in 40 countries with sales of approximately 125,000 vehicles per year.
DaimlerChrysler considered introducing the brand in the U.S.; however, decided later to shelve 
those plans.117
The present case study looks at the opportunities for one of the smart models, the smart fortwo
(
The U.S. market has traditionally been dominated by large, and not particularly fuel efficient 
vehicles, so does a micro-car like the smart have any potential at all in the U.S.? In the 1950s and 
1960s several European companies, including BMW Isetta, Bond, Messerschmitt, Reliant and 
Zundapp, sold small three- or four- wheeled vehicles in the U.S., but these cars vanished 
eventually from the market. In Europe the high gasoline prices, taxes, environmental concerns 
and narrow inner-city streets help maintain an interest for small vehicles, and a significant,
growing interest exists in that segment there. So a success in Europe may not be a reliable 
indication of the market potential in the U.S.
Figure 36), a two-seat car with unique styling and a footprint about half that of a regular midsize 
sedan. The case study builds upon the understanding of the car market in the U.S. developed in 
the previous chapter (see Figure 37 for an overview).
In Europe the smart car is bought by customers from a broad range of demographic groups not 
following the conventional automotive segments. With that experience in mind, it is therefore 
best to consider a broad range of possible customers and value net configurations. Part of the 
value net surrounding the smart customer is illustrated in 
The Value Net
Figure 38.
Figure 36. The smart fortwo is so small it can be parked in “half a parking spot”
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Figure 37. Overview of the method used. Some of the steps were discussed in the previous 
chapter.
Figure 38. Part of the value net surrounding a smart fortwo car customer
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The configuration of the value net will depend on who the customer is. Some of the prospective 
target audiences are:
 Young fashion-oriented people. Possibly wealthy high school and college students or recent 
graduates. Design, such as designer body panels, and some performance are important.
These people often cannot afford large-ticket items. The main competition is from used 
vehicles of any kind. The music system is important. Tachometer and sport features are 
appreciated. Parents may worry about car safety. A low cost of ownership and a lower-
than-average insurance premiums are pluses.
 Older people: many senior citizens avoid long trips; some only do a few errands within 
town. Others travel the country in an RV towing a small vehicle behind. Important features 
include: ease of operation (e.g., automatic transmission), comfort (e.g., a/c), 
maneuverability and ease of parking.
 Singles, a large and growing fraction of the U.S. population. While this car is ideally suited 
for their lifestyle, it may portray them as singles, and not all of them want to be portrayed 
that way.
 Environmentally conscious people: save energy, materials, and space on the congested 
roads. These customers may otherwise consider hybrid vehicles.
 Practical people looking for reliable transportation that is easy to operate and park.
Infrequent need for refueling is a plus.
 Second car for commute and within-town errands for a family that already owns a family 
car. Second car for a person whose other car is not for all-occasion usage such as a $250k 
sports car.
 Urban residents who currently rely on public transportation.
 Rental companies. Most renters do not need to transport more than two people and most are 
“local” rentals, i.e., short trips and needs that are known prior to the rental.
We can evaluate the various potential target audiences and the value net configurations they 
require. That would be based on the demographic profile of existing buyers of transportation
solutions such as new cars, used cars, motorbikes, and public transportation. The customers can 
be characterized based on their educational background, urban/rural residency profile, family 
size, age and other demographics. To keep this case study simple, only the age profile will be 
addressed, although the other parameters could be treated in a similar manner.
While some modifications can be made to the car, particularly in terms of options, the basic 
vehicle is already defined. Two related problems remain: (1) who should the target audience 
be/how should it be positioned? and (2) what is the best pricing strategy? There is a broad 
continuum of options; however, for the sake of simplicity only the following two discrete 
strategic options will be evaluated here:
Initial Options
Option 1. Low-volume social or fashion product, possible as a second or third car for urban use 
or for singles living in a city. A limited number (50) of dealers in selected urban areas will help 
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customers acquire cars that match their style. This option assumes a “brand image,” comparable 
to a Toyota, and a price of $13,000.
Option 2. Higher-volume product: that is to position the car as a competitively priced vehicle for 
people with minimal transportation needs and a modest budget. That position will at the same 
time mean that the social score could be reduced somewhat, as “mass market” products have less 
social value than exclusive products. The cars will be sold through existing stores (2,500 in total), 
not dedicated car dealerships, throughout the country. In order to ensure that a broad range of 
customers can easily operate the vehicle let’s assume it is offered with the option of an automatic 
transmission. This alternative assumes a “brand image”, comparable to a Nissan and a price
around $11,000.
When the smart fortwo is rated on the five dimensions the -scores relative to all other vehicles 
in the market are:
Characteristics
1. Transport: -1.67  to -1.59 , which indicates that this car is most appealing to people who 
want a small car.
2. Fun: -0.66  to -0.59 , which indicates that the smart is not intended for races or hard 
driving.
3. Pleasure: -0.07  to 0.51  indicating that the smart offers a fair amount of comfort, 
practicality and esthetics.
4. Social for option 1: 0.16 . The score slightly exceeds the “average car,” it is pushed up by 
the smart’s fashion appeal and that it may be a cultural product, while the price (less then 
$20,000) does not in itself make it “prestigious.” Social for option 2: 0.01 . The more 
mass-market positioning has drawn the social score down a little, compared to option 1.
5. Cost of ownership efficiency: 0.60  to 1.23 . The fuel efficiency and warranties help
bring the car in line with some of the most economic cars in the market today.
By inserting the characteristics for the smart fortwo into the price equation the following 
estimates are obtained for option 1: $11,275 to $12,450 (1 uncertainty: $450). For option 2 the 
price drops to $10,725 to $12,075. The social standing score was based on smart being an import-
brand fairly unknown to the U.S. public, however, if the social score is brought up to the level of
a C-class Mercedes, then the price range increases to $19,725 to $22,650. That assumes that a 
competitive pricing strategy is selected.
Pricing
Independent of the strategic option the smart fortwo falls in the same subgroups of the 
utilityscape with 81 subgroups (
Position in the Utilityscape
Table 16); however, option 2 is getting close to the social 
subgroup 2.
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Table 16. Subgroups that include the smart fortwo in the utilityscape
81 subgroups
(scale 1 to 3)
625 subgroups
(scale 1 to 5)
Transport 1 1
Fun 1 1
Pleasure 2-3 2-5
Social 3 3 or 4*
* Strategic option 1: 4 and option 2: 3.
The lower social range has lower sales, and it may therefore not be desirable to drop too far in the 
social score. Table 17 includes competing car models in the 81-subgroup utilityscape and the 
sales of these cars are shown in Table 18. Considering that only about 25 percent of the new car 
purchases are made by the 16-35-year-old group, these subgroups present a somewhat stronger 
than average appeal to the younger buyers. In the 625-subgroup utilityscape there are no other 
vehicles in the subgroups where the smart fortwo falls (Figure 34).
Table 17. Competing cars in segments that the smart fortwo may enter in the utilityscape
with 81 subgroups
T F P S Competing vehicles
1 1 2 3 Toyota Matrix 0.46, Honda Insight 0.28, Toyota 
Corolla 0.24, Toyota RAV4 0.11, Mazda Protégé 
0.05, Volkswagen Golf 0.03, Honda Civic 0.02, 
Mitsubishi Lancer 0.01
1 1 3 3 Toyota Prius 1.00, Volkswagen Jetta 0.35, 
Volkswagen Beetle II 0.16, Toyota RAV4 0.04, 
Toyota Matrix 0.03, Volkswagen Golf 0.03, 
Toyota Camry 0.01
Notes: Value drivers: T—transport; F—fun; P—pleasure and S—social. Only cars with more than 1 percent of sales 
in the subgroup are shown. Cars like Ford Focus and Toyota Echo rank lower on the social scale than these 
subgroups.
Table 18. 2003 demand for vehicles (in units) in the two subgroups where the smart fortwo
falls in the utilityscape with a total of 81 subgroups
T F P S Total 16-35 36-55 56+
1 1 2 3 110,984 31% 47% 22%
1 1 3 3 93,867 33% 45% 22%
The effect of introducing the smart fortwo can be estimated using the model for market share
(
Sales Estimates
Table 19) and assuming that the market remains the way it was in 2003 for which the 
utilityscape was calibrated, and that customers do not switch between sub-groups when a new
product is introduced. In other words, using this approach assumes that the smart fortwo only 
cannibalizes sales from competitors within the subgroups in which it falls. Not every competing 
brand suffers equally, and by comparing results with and without the smart, it is seen that the cars 
that suffer the most are the Volkswagen models and Toyota Prius.
Sales of about 15,000 and 35,000 units are estimated for option 1 and 2 respectively. For 
comparison, the 2003 U.S. sales of the Ford Thunderbird reached about 18,000 units and Toyota 
Echo about 26,000 units. These are “steady state” sales, which means that they are annual rates 
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“some time” after introduction, not first-year sales. Option 1 will result in a younger age profile 
of the customers than option 2. While this result is expected, based on the different positioning, it 
is good to have it confirmed by the model.
Table 19. Market size estimates for the two strategic options using the 81-subgroup 
utilityscape
Option 1 Option 2
Estimated total sales 15,447 37,375
16-35 years (of total) 30% 23%
36-55 years (of total) 45% 45%
56 years and over (of total) 25% 31%
A higher price influences sales in three ways: it decreases the market power, it decreases the cost
savings and it increases the social score as a higher price will make people in general regard the 
car as “more.” Figure 39 shows the combined effect on the estimated sales volume for an in-
between option (close to but not identical to strategic option 1).
Figure 39. Estimated elasticity of demand for the smart fortwo in the U.S. for sales within 
the subgroups T1, F1, P2-3, S3. Assumptions: 100 dealers, $40 M/year brand ad budget, no 
dealer incentives. Estimates were calculated using the market share model based on the 
utilityscape with 81-subgroups.
Using the market share model on the 81-subgroup utilityscape assumed that the smart fortwo was 
a direct competitor to the cars in the subgroups in which it falls. That can be questioned because 
in terms of transportation it is smaller than any other vehicle in the market, and when it is plotted 
in the utilityscape with 625 subgroups it falls in three empty cells. It is not uncommon for an 
innovative product to extend the current utilityscape, and the question of how many customers 
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are likely to shift into these subgroups is therefore of general importance. We can use a market 
demand model to answer this question.118 Table 20 shows the results of the model for the smart
fortwo. Without a competitor in these subgroups the entire sales volume is assigned to the smart 
fortwo; however, had a competitor moved into the same subgroups, the market share model could 
have been used to estimate which fraction of the calculated sales would go to the smart fortwo.
There is a significant uncertainty associated with these numbers. For option 1 the total varied 
from about 8,000 to about 25,000 depending on how the model is constructed and optimized. 
However, for both options the estimates seem to agree globally with the estimates using the 
market share model on the utilityscape with 81 subgroups (Table 19). While in theory it may not 
matter which of the two methods is employed, the uncertainty on the market share model is in 
general much smaller and therefore preferable.
Table 20. Market size estimates for the two strategic options using the 625-subgroup 
utilityscape
Option 1 Option 2
Estimated total sales 15,094 32,098
The general aspects of the two strategic options are summarized in
Evaluating the Options
Table 21.
Table 21. Summary of the two strategic options discussed
Option 1: 
cultural product
Option 2: 
broader appeal
Assumptions
Price $13,000 $11,000
Retail 50 dealerships 2500 stores
Brand image high medium high
Ad budget $50 million119 $150 million
Incentives $0 per car $500 per car
Market estimates
Sales 15,000 cars/year 35,000 cars/year
Market share 0.09% 0.21%
Target 
audience
Younger buyers, probably >50% females Non-affluent customers of all ages
Strategic 
advantages
There will only be one “real” smart—that 
becomes very hard to copy by competitors
Could in the long-term be developed into 
high volume?
Strategic 
disadvantages
Price sensitive customers. The fashion may 
change faster than the vehicle, leaving it as 
an “outdated” style. May require large ad 
budget
Hard to really achieve the economy of 
scale needed for this model. Hard 
competition. Harder to differentiate than 
option 1
Option 1: Premium Product
This option builds on the smart fortwo’s strength in the pleasure dimension: exciting design, ease 
of operation and comfort. The estimates above indicate that there may be a market of about 
15,000 units per year with the smart positioned this way. It may be possible to create a strong 
brand that talks to the customers emotionally and helps them define themselves in their social 
systems. In that case the smart will gain additional strength relative to the other competing 
vehicles and may be able to achieve even higher sales. The younger buyers are much more price
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sensitive than the middle-age group buyers, so if the target audience is the younger people, then 
the price may have to be kept near the competitive prices calculated. Fortunately, a close 
proximity of a dealer is less critical for the younger group, but ads will be important.
Option 2: Low-Priced Transportation
While the smart fortwo will not be the cheapest vehicle in the market, it may offer a broader 
appeal than allowed for in option 1. One challenge of this option is to keep maintaining the
image, because if the brand image slides, the vehicle moves down into a region of the utilityscape
with lower sales. Brands selling in smaller quantities are often found in dealerships combining 
multiple brands, thereby allowing them to achieve combined sales in the order of 500-2000 
vehicles per year (brand averages). That can be a challenge to achieve if the smart is sold on its 
own, and may require alternative channels of distribution different from the conventional. Such 
channels may include retailers not focused on vehicles.
Without getting into the cost structure and the long-term potential that can be achieved by adding 
other smart models to the portfolio, the promise of the two options cannot be determined.
However, looking at it from a volume and market share perspective, option 1 may be a good 
starting point, and possibly even a first step on the way to option 2. However, due to the potential 
conflict between specialized value-added resellers and mass-market channels, the transition from 
one option to the other may pose challenges unless carefully planned for in advance. The results 
here are for a “mature” situation; however, based on the time it took for brands like Lexus and 
Acura to achieve steady state we can expect this to take two to three years. It is reasonable to 
expect other products being introduced into this market space, either other smart models or 
vehicles made by competing carmakers, and the potential impact such product introductions may 
exert on the smart fortwo can be estimated using the market share model derived above.
Conclusions
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Chapter 14
Discussion
For years the development of most products has benefited from structured knowledge and 
mathematical modeling to reduce the upfront risk during R&D and knowledge embedded in 
manufacturing processes to reduce the subsequent marginal manufacturing cost. Although 
business operations are more complex, we are starting to see a similar trend toward utilizing 
knowledge to manage value, risk, market power and cost. The framework of the present book 
will contribute to that trend.
The profit-loss equation reflects, like the fairytales, a simplistic view of the world where 
anything is either good (value, market power) or bad (Risk and Cost). This view goes back to 
southern Asia 4-5,000 BC, or even further back. Often we need more nuances than binary black 
and white. Imagine an organization where a boss must classify every employee as either good or 
bad. In reality, each employee will do something that may be beneficial for the organization and 
something that may not be so beneficial for the organization—and we often don’t know until 
afterward where on the scale from bad to good a given act falls.
So in a world of grayscales and colors, rather than pure black and white, how can we analyze 
profit opportunities? The concept of key variables achieves that by focusing on the variables 
essential to influencing sales and profits without classifying these variables as either good or bad 
and letting every variable achieve a range of values reflecting how effective the product solution 
is in each key area. One single variable can even achieve values that go from being a liability at 
one end of the scale to being a benefit at the other end of the scale.120
There is an elasticity of demand associated with each key variable and by understanding and 
quantifying those we can come a long way in estimating what will happen, not only to the 
demand for new products but also to the demand for existing products if the system is exposed to 
external changes. Creating value is not the only goal of humans—their goal is to find a balance 
between value, risk and market power according to their personalities and personal desires. 
People tend to experiment throughout their life, changing the balance between the different key 
variables. Society goes in cycles, again providing some sort of collective experimentation.
Or what is seen as a benefit 
to one person may be seen as a handicap by another. Money was invented as a tangible 
embodiment of a pure “good.” But even that does not have the same value to everybody and the 
value will change over time (inflation or deflation). 
All key variables undergo inflation or deflation over time, and the concept of utilityscapes deal 
well with that in that the axis are relative, meaning that they go from “low” to “high”, but the 
definition of what “low” is and what “high” is changes over time. In that way the utilityscape 
tends to remain fairly constant even as the general expectations change over time. It is very 
unusual for a new product to add a new key variable to the utilityscape, most major innovations, 
only achieve going beyond the previous limit to what was achievable in one dimension or 
another. From the perspective of analyzing the business opportunities for new products, it is 
therefore very important to understand the market dynamics. How will customers react to a 
change in one key variable or anther?
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Chapter 15
Summary
This book describes a framework for how to analyze profit opportunities in a systematic manner
(Figure 40). Each of the main steps is described in this summary. Not every author uses all terms 
the same way, and some of the terms listed here deviates from some of the definitions used 
elsewhere. 
Figure 40. Summary of the method used
The Value Net. A value net is a system constituting of multiple nodes that through their 
interactions support, influence or hamper the formation of value.121
5
The interactions can 
either be direct as a supplier or customer or indirect as an opinion maker or supplier of 
complementary products. See p. .
Node. A person or other entity involved in forming ties in the value net.122
5
The nodes in the 
value net are linked through the joint creation of key variables. See p. .
Dynamics. The dynamics of the value net is in particular driven by trade and social 
networks, and changes are in particular caused by the establishment of sites that 
facilitate interactions and/or trade, from shopping malls to social network sites on the 
Internet.
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Key Variables. The key variables describe the factors most important to the customer when they 
take a purchase decision. There are value variables and constraint variables. A value 
variable will typically have an optimal value to any given customer (e.g. desired 
performance characteristics) while a constraint variable typically represents a limit imposed 
by any given customer (e.g. maximum acceptable price reflecting a budget constraint).
Some of the main groups of key variables are:
Value. A value driver is an identifiable key variable that influences the value to the 
customer.123
19
A value driver is created when a customer has a need and a product 
provides a solution to that need. A customer need is a basic objective he or she wants 
accomplished, e.g., a jacket may have value drivers like keeping warm and delivering 
a social fashion statement. Most products have only a few value drivers, one of them 
typically being the customer’s need to reduce the cost. We can often learn how much 
value is worth to customers by looking at savings or what customers today pay to 
have the same basic needs satisfied in other ways. Evidently, the amount of value a 
customer receives from a product or service will limit how much he or she is willing 
to pay. See p. .
Risk. As an investor discounts a risky stock, a customer will discount a risky product—the 
larger the risk, the less the customer will pay. Therefore, a car that breaks down 
frequently will command a lower price in the marketplace than a reliable car. 
Consequently, the value must be discounted with the risk to the customer in 
determining market price. The amount of discount can be estimated based on the 
price premium commanded by similar products that customers consider having more 
quality, higher consumer ratings and better warranties. So if you offer a warranty or a 
money-back guarantee, how much is that worth in terms of a higher selling price?
And does it bring the product within the acceptable limits imposed by the customer? 
See p. 34.
Market Power. Market power is the relative ability of each of two nodes to retain value 
when they engage in a market transaction with each other.124 36See p. . The risk
discounted value may be how much a customer will pay had there been no 
competition; there usually are competing offerings that reduce the market power to
the seller because the buyer has alternatives. Market power reflects your ability to 
appropriate the value created—even value created by customers and suppliers. 
Gaining monopolistic power from dominating the market, owning patent rights or
controlling a standard all give market power. The more competition, the lower the 
market power, and in the extreme case of a commodity market where suppliers enter 
or exit the market until the price is almost equal to cost and profits almost zero, the 
market power is the main factor dictating price. Market power is influenced by 
marketing efforts and channels availability. If the customer cannot find your product, 
then an attractive price will not help. Customers put limits to how extensive a search 
they will perform, so your product needs to be within those limits in order to have a 
chance of being sold.
Cost to the Buyer. We all put limits to how much we are willing to pay, so is the product 
priced with in limits imposed by a given customer? See section on Price below.
Dynamics. If the needs reflected in the key variables do not meet the customers’ 
expectations sales drop. Price elasticity of demand shows the effect of different 
pricing, while value driver elasticity of demand shows the effect of different being off 
from the customers’ expectations in terms of one value driver or another. See p. 69.
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Utilityscapes and Constraint-scapes. A utilityscape is a multi-dimensional space where each 
dimension is defined by a key variable. Products and customers can be plotted in this space 
as a way of characterizing the market. Figure 41. For example, if it is a sports car the 
buyers are likely to occupy the high-fun, low-transportation part of the utilityscape, while 
truck drivers will occupy the opposite corner. Product scores for each value driver define 
where in the utilityscape they plot. Customers select products based on proximity to their 
objectives. Differences in customer objectives create areas of high and areas of low base 
demand. By looking at historical sales we can get an idea of how many customers may 
settle in different parts of the utilityscape. See p. 25.
Figure 41. Utilityscape with contour lines for customer demand and X-marks for 
product locations
Segments. A segment is an area of limited extend within a utilityscape.125
Segment market share.
Segmentation is 
achieved by dividing the utilityscape into territories defined by ranges for each key 
variable. So within a given segment all customers are similar in their ratings of the 
key variables. Looking at the demand for different combinations of key variable 
combinations we can estimate the market size for a products with that combination.
126
N
re DriversMarket Sha
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A segment in the utilityscape may be occupied by more than 
one product. The market share achieved by one of N products within that segment can 
be approximated as:
The See p. 98 and 82. Based on the segment market share we can estimate the sales 
volume for a product in that segment:
Volume = Segment Demand * Segment Market Share
Market Share Drivers include variables such as ad spending, time in market, brand 
recognition, and number of distribution channels—all relative to the other 
products in that segment. The car case study (Chapters 12-13) goes further into 
this.
Dynamics. For a new product the utilityscape will rapidly change as the customer discovers 
this new product space. A first product in a segment may pull customers from near 
the previous frontier or customers previously outside the utilityscape. Not every 
segment in the utilityscape is likely to have customers, and the dynamics of the key 
variables can help us predict which trade-offs the customers likely will accept and 
how much a mismatch will hurt sales.
Price. So by looking at the three basic factors—value to the customer, risk to the customer and 
market power – we can evaluate the price potential for a product. For a variety of reasons, 
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companies may lower the price, and the factor h reflects that pricing decision. The price is 
given by the following conceptual equation: 
herMarket Pow
Risk
Value
Price
See p. 39.
Pricing decision factor (h). The (theoretical) ratio between the price and what could in 
theory have been charged. See p. 39.
priceal theoreticMaximum
pricesellingActual
h 
Cost. In the profit-loss equation the cost is the monetary expenses associated with the delivery of 
a good or service in question. The costs have four components: product-specific fixed and 
variable cost, and customer-specific fixed and variable cost.127 34See p. .
Leverage. The utilization of knowledge to increase value while reducing the consumption 
of scarce resources. This normally is a result of prior investments small compared to 
the outcome.128
Profit-loss. We now have all what is needed to estimate the profit or loss (
See p. 34.
Figure 42).
Profit = Price * Volume – Cost
For multi-period cash flows we can the use corresponding Net Present Value calculations. 
Figure 42. Key variables driving profit or loss. h is the pricing decision factor
Innovation. Creating new solutions to value creation, risk management and market power 
acquisition challenges.129 53See p. 
Enabling mindset. A comprehension of a technology or methodology that makes it 
feasible to use or manage the use of it as a tool for solving problems. This is the
human counterpart to the enabling technology explained next. See p. 56.
Enabling technology. A technology that makes it feasible to manufacture certain 
products.130
Changes. Typically, over time, a product will face certain predictable changes (Table 22).
Staying afloat in terms of profits requires an ongoing adaptation to the changing 
utilityscape by repositioning products, or introducing and withdrawing products. 
Sometimes the changes in the marketplace can, however, be fairly unpredictable, but there 
are a number of ways to address that. and Table 23 and Figure 43 shows how some of these 
Value net
Utilityscape / constraint diagrams
Value drivers
Price
Market powerRisk
Profit or loss
Volume Cost
Market share
h
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tools supplement each other in terms of addressing changes of different magnitudes and 
time-scales.
Table 22. Predictable changes to expect when product ages
Value
net
 Complement suppliers increase in number
 Vertical and/or lateral integration occurs sometimes
Value  More value as customers learn to use product and integrate it into more value nets
 Less value to the most reluctant customers—as customer base increases in size
Risk  Reduction in risk as company and product become established
Market 
power
 Increase in market power if leadership position is secured
 Decrease in market power as competition enters—both direct and indirect 
competition—and customers are being pulled away to new territory in ever-expanding 
utilityscapes
Cost  Decrease in cost as time elapses—cf. learning curves
Figure 43. Summary of selected change survival tools
Table 23. Strategies for dealing with unpredictable changes
Value
net
 Create an external safety value net, establishing links to external partners with 
capabilities that potentially could become useful in quickly creating new capabilities.
See p. 60.
 Use an internal value net (organizational structure) with autonomous teams working 
toward common goals. Distribute observation, thinking and decision making in the 
organization, reducing risk of reacting slowly to threats or opportunities or relying 
entirely on the luck of one team
Value  Be innovative and foster a culture capable of adapting new technologies—quickly
 Modularity allowing the repositioning of the aggregate product in one or more of the 
value driver dimensions without redesigning the entire product and manufacturing 
facility
M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e 
o
f 
ch
a
n
g
e 
Time
Families of 
strategies, 
real options
Safety 
value net
Innovation
Product lifecycle 
modeling
Alert 
systems
Speed 
culture
Static strategy 
works
K. T. Winther: Analyzing New Profit Opportunities Summary 100
Risk  Look at the risk reduction effect of projects/investments considered
Market 
power
 External pressure helps keeping company competitive 
Cost  Accept higher cost in return for a higher chance of long-term survival
Strategy  Strategic focus keeping the value net manageable, but within that pursuing multiple 
parallel efforts reducing the tactical risk
Profit Strategy
Profits require a reasonable balance between each of the four key variables in the profit-loss 
equation (value, risk, market power and cost), for example, we cannot succeed having a strategy
that relies on value, but has no market power, has infinite high risk to the customer and has 
absolutely no cost advantages.
Most businesses tend to start out with a strategy that relies on one or two of the four key 
variables, but as the product or service matures, businesses must gradually include all of these 
variables because key variables not actively managed by us offers the competition an opportunity 
to take over and succeed. The basic profit-loss equation gives us a tool we can use to analyze 
strategies and investment options leading to faster and more successful development of new 
markets based on a good balance between all the dimensions discussed.
Any value net will feel the strain if the differences are too large from one node to the next, or 
if the changes over time occur too rapidly. That effectively determines how fast a company can 
grow and develop new solutions, and for the society at large it limits the evolution of history. For 
many products the development of an enabling mindset among the potential users takes more 
time than the development of the enabling technology, and growth is therefore not limited by the 
technology per se.131
When a company redefines a market and leaves the competitors far behind, what did they 
change? It could be basically anything: the value net configuration, a new product or technology 
providing new value drivers or at least occupying new areas of an existing utilityscape, risk,
market power and/or cost structure. The corollary is that when you look for competitive 
opportunities you can explore any of the factors in the profit-loss equation. However, most 
traditional businesses rely extensively on only one or two of the variables:
Value. Some companies specialize in creating value, e.g., through innovation and new product 
development. Some of these companies unfortunately fail to follow up in these areas:
 Generating incremental product improvements.
132
 Developing the manufacturing processes required to keep the cost down.
 Developing sufficient market power to profit from the value created.
When companies with a fast follower strategy focus in these areas, they many times emerge as 
market leaders.
Risk. Financial Engineering has been used as a tool by several companies to develop a business 
strategy revolving around managing risk in innovative ways.133
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Market power. Pharmaceutical companies target not only value creation but also their ability to 
appropriate value. These companies often explore market power based on patents and 
trademarked brand names.
Cost. Many companies undergo major cost-cutting exercises, making efficiency the pillar in the 
corporate strategy. For example, several trucking companies and railroad companies have 
developed successful business strategies based on operations models while still paying attention 
to what the customers seek. Many of the East Asian manufacturers successfully contain costs 
through efficient manufacturing operations.
Multi-string strategies. When the profit-loss equation indicates that we must pay attention to 
each of these variables in order to succeed, why do so many companies then focus in just one 
area? First, different markets or types of products benefit particularly from the strength in one 
area or another, so in an emerging high-tech market, for example, value creation dominates to a 
point that inefficiencies in manufacturing do not threaten the business. Second, there are cultural 
challenges. Each variable requires a given enabling mindset to be successful, so if a company 
employs the ideal people for succeeding in one area, it may take a good deal of training to 
achieve optimal performance in other areas. But then what is optimal? That all depends on how 
dynamic the market is.
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Appendix 1
The Profit-Loss Equation
The profit-loss equation can be derived in a variety of ways from existing theory. Below follows 
one such deviation. In a market with perfect competition, the price approaches cost. The price
tends to be lower when there are more companies in the industry and when the elasticity of 
demand is higher.134 In general, the elasticity of demand is less for products with a high level of 
necessity and for products without any close substitutes, giving companies a higher level of 
monopolistic power. Numerous authors have studied either monopolistic power or market power
in relationship to prices, markup or profit in various markets.135 Marchetti found a negative 
correlation between markups and competition.136 While many authors have been working in this 
area, the findings by Waterson137 and Barla138 are used here to describe the aggregate industry 
profit, industry

, assuming a Cournot oligopoly:
industry + IC f
where IC
H    (A-1)_________
   =
_____
IR    
f is the fixed cost for the industry, IR is the aggregate industry revenue,  is the 
elasticity of demand and H (short for Herfindahl)139

i
2
iMSH
is a measure for the firm size inequality 
among companies in the industry:
(A-2)
where MSi is each of the i firm’s market share, or share of capacity, so a competitive market has a 
low H.140 Rather than examining the entire market, we can use the approach to investigate an
average company. If the total quantity sold in the market is Q, the average price is P = IR/Q, the 
average profit for one unit is  = industry/Q and the average fixed cost to price ratio is Cf / P = ICf
/ IR. We now have:
         C f           H (A-3)___
+
___
=
___
P          P 
or
 = P * (H/) – C f
This indicates that the profit margin (/P) is proportional to H/ at a given cost.
(A-4)
Many authors have suggested a relationship between perceived customer value and price,141
and it is, for example, often considered the case in financial markets where the stock price can be 
viewed as the present value of the future profits generated by the company. For most goods, 
value is something we receive over a period of time, subsequent to the moment the purchase 
decision is taken. In finance we discount value received in the future to the present value, by 
taking the risk into account. If it had been a financial product delivering a certain fixed income at 
regular intervals, then the quantification of this value would be simple because it is defined in a 
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unit of currency. The present value, PV, of a sequence of future value deliveries, Vt, can be 
expressed as:
  t tt
t
)r(1
V
PV
142
(A-5)
where rt is a discount factor. In models like the Capital Asset Pricing Model, we relate this 
discount factor to the risk associated with future cash flows:143
r = r f +  (rm – r f
where the discount factor, r, is expressed as a function of the expected return on a risk free asset, 
r
) (A-6)
f, the expected rate of return on the market portfolio, rm, and the slope in a regression of the 
return on the stock relative to the return on the market portfolio, . The difference (rm-rf) is the 
risk premium for the stock. The following discussion will focus on the risk part of r; the risk-free 
interest is a topic of its own that will not be covered here. Dhar and Glazer extended the risk
concept of investment to estimating value of customers by treating the customers as an 
investment portfolio.144 While we lack a similar simple expression for a product, all products are 
associated with a certain risk level, and it is reasonable to assume that the market price is 
influenced by risk in a similar fashion. Therefore, if r is a discount factor reflecting the general 
risk of an asset, we can express a risk-adjusted value to the consumer, Vr
  t tt
t
r
)r(1
V
V
, in the following 
manner:
(A-7)
or for a single period:
Vr 


	



 r1
V
= (A-8)
While conventional net present value calculations will not discount values realized at time = 0, 
we can expect any customer purchase to be discounted because even if the product is purchased
and instantaneously consumed there will be some uncertainty. Under market conditions favorable 
to the seller, Vr will represent the upper limit to the price that the customer may be willing to pay, 
i.e.,
Pmax = Vr (A-9)
By combining (4), (8) and (9) we have:
max 


	



 r1
V
=   (H / ) – C f
The previous equations emphasize several aspects of creating profits, namely create value to the 
customer (V), reduce the risk (1+r or R), gain market power (H /  or MP) and keep cost (C)
down. By using the alternate symbols we have for a single period the following conceptual 
equation:
(A-10)
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max C
R
V
MP 


	



= (A-11)
This equation assumes that the seller is charging a price that is as high as the buyer is willing to 
pay. That is not necessarily the case; in fact, a company may set the price purposely low to gain 
market share, so we may define a ratio between the actual price and the maximum price that 
could be charged:
PriceMaximum
PriceActual
h  (A-12)
The ratio, h, is here called the pricing decision factor.
Parolini suggests a similar division of the value into two parts:145
C
R
V
MPh 
(1) the net value to the 
customer is described as the difference between the gross value to the customer and the purchase 
price and (2) the net value to the supplier(s) is described as the difference between the price and 
the cost. The latter corresponds to the profit discussed here after taking the h factor into account.
By combining equations A-11 and A-12 we have a simplified profit-loss equation for the sale of 
one unit, with all transactions within one time period:
 = (A-13)
The first term of this equation is the market price, P, so the corresponding simplified price
equation is:
P =
R
V
MPh  (A-14)
The second term is the cost. The cost can be viewed in two ways:
1. It can be expressed as the purchase price of each component going into what is being sold.
In that way it will be related back to another set of market power, pricing decision factor,
value and risk factor equations—now describing the seller and the seller’s suppliers, 
including employees and tax authorities.
2. It can be broken down the way accountants do it, e.g., separating fixed and variable cost.
As this equation concerns the transaction of a single item, the fixed cost is the total fixed 
cost divided by the total number of units sold.
The profit-loss equation contains three types of variables: 
1. Variables associated with the market such as power of the buyers and suppliers (MP). This 
is traditionally a zero-sum game: there is only a finite purchase power in the market at a 
given moment, and the balance of market power determines how much each party receives 
from a deal.
2. Variables associated with what the customer receives (V and R). This is an open-ended 
game where there are no theoretical limitations to what can be created.
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3. Variables associated with the resources required (C). Cost is limited by the availability of 
scarce resources (material, labor, investment in R&D, investment in manufacturing 
facilities, etc.)
The above is what could be considered a conventional deduction of the profit-loss equation.
Besides that the validity is supported by successful applications in many other fields.146 As a side 
note at the end of this chapter a parallel to a very different area is drawn. Folklore fairytales from 
a variety of cultures and continents display some commonalities in their structure. According to 
Greimas/Tatar, a traditional folklore fairytale contains the following basic characters:
Figure 44. Traditional role pattern in fairytales (modified after Greimas/Tatar)
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An example of a fairytale could be: a horrible dragon (Adversary) captures the king’s (Sender) 
daughter (the princess, Object). By the help of a fairy (Helper) a foreign prince (Subject) frees the 
princess, he (Receiver) marries her and they live happily ever after. Although the language of the 
fairytale is far from modern finance and economy, we can make some reasonable analogies as 
follows (Table 24):
Table 24. Comparison of fairytale and profit-loss equation variables
Fairytale Equation Explanations
Subject/hero Value The core of the story or market transaction
Adversary Risk What is threatening
Helper Market power External forces that can help you achieve your goals
Object Market price What is “changing hands” in the story
Sender Cost The sender (like the king) often sets the terms of the transactions, thereby 
dictating the cost
Receiver Profit What made the entire endeavor worth while for the recipient (often the person 
who is the hero)
Like the fairytales, which normally have multiple characters filling a single role, such as a group 
of helpers, most business operations woo a number of customers that form one group in the value 
net. So using the fairytale pattern with business terminology we get (Figure 45):
Figure 45. Business terms applied to the basic role pattern in folklore fairytales
Market power Value Risk
Cost Market price Profit or loss
Helper Subject Adversary
Sender Object Receiver
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The upper part of Figure 45 determines the price while the lower part dictates the profit. This is 
actually a good illustration of the profit-loss equation in its own right.
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